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Ethos and Ethics in Migration Bureaucracies1
1Julia Eckert
What do they think they’re doing?
All the contributions to this book engage with this particular question. Fol-
lowing the intricate analyses of what bureaucrats do,2 we now wish to con-
sider what they think they're doing. While their answers might be inter-
1  The research underlying this article was made possible by a generous fellowship at the Kul-
turwissenschaf tliche Kolleg Konstanz. I would like to thank all those participating in the 
discussions of the bureaucracy group at the KuKo for the insights and inspiration I gained 
from our conversations, namely Arthur Benz, Pascale Cancik, Mirko Göpfert, Thomas 
Groß, Hans Christian Röhl, Christian Rosser and Marcus Twellmann. I would also like to 
thank Werner Schif fauer for many inspiring discussions about states and their knowledge 
practices. I am grateful to Olaf Zenker, David Loher, Simon Af folter, Simone Marti, Laura 
Af folter and Raphael Rey for our productive discussions on bureaucratic practice. Last but 
not least, I would like to express my gratitude to the participants in the workshop “Ethos 
and Ethics in Migration Bureaucracies” that took place in September 2015 (just as Angela 
Merkel opened Germany's borders to refugees) for inspiring our conversation on that oc-
casion, particularly those whose insightful contributions are not part of this publication, 
namely Heath Cabot, Fiorenza Picozza and Anna Tuckett.
2  Rather than “bureaucracy”, it might be better to speak of “administration”, as the term 
bureaucracy is of ten used in the context of criticism. (I am grateful to Pascale Cancik for 
alerting me to this with her wonderful historical research on the subject. See Cancik 2004.) 
As we noted, people never call themselves bureaucrats. Instead, they employ terms such 
as civil servant, state servant, state of ficial and social worker. The use of bureaucracy as 
a term of criticism alerts us to deliberations of the value of dif ferent types of skills and 
knowledge, the aloofness attributed to law and knowledge of procedures, contrasted with 
“knowledge of reality”. At the same time, the reliance on references to “legality” or proce-
dural correctness and consistency provide an insight into competing scales of value. This 
question of terminology is not merely a matter of the self-denomination of of ficials, but 
also the search for an appropriate analytical term that might encompass the open bound-
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preted as neutralisation strategies – ex post justifications for actions that 
are shaped by a myriad of concerns – we hold that tracing what bureaucrats 
think they are doing is worthwhile for two reasons. First, we believe that 
what they think they should do shapes what they actually do as much as other 
constraints, whether this concerns their efforts (successful or unsuccessful) 
to act in what they consider an ideal manner or the formation of rationales 
for diverging from ideal behaviour. Second, we claim that their thinking is 
shaped by notions of the “office”, i.e., the duties and obligations of an admin-
istration related to specific political projects. Exploring what bureaucrats 
think they do tells us about the delineation and definition of the moral com-
munity that a bureaucratic apparatus is concerned with. 
To explore what they think they do, we employ the concept of ethics as 
the basis for investigating the value rationality of bureaucratic practice and 
its normative orientations. We see a lacuna of research on ethics in bureau-
cracy. Recent critiques of bureaucracy have focussed on the instrumental 
rationalities of bureaucratic practice, considered its orientation towards 
extra-bureaucratic normative demands, or posited that bureaucracies are 
fundamentally amoral in character (Bauman 1989; Graeber 2015; Herzfeld 
1992). While some critics have attended to the wider ideological frames 
within which “anethical” bureaucracies are embedded, and, as in the case 
of Michael Herzfeld, explored the effects of an anethical role on affects 
(indifference or aversion), most have not examined the ways in which an 
ideological frame is (re-)produced in the specific narratives, categorisations 
and normative orientations that shape bureaucratic practice. One could say 
that they have fallen victim to an inf lated Weberian image of rational legal 
rule that considers ethics and bureaucracy to be antithetical, and restricted 
their critical impetus to this horizon. These critiques echo early criticisms of 
bureaucracy, which actually coined the term (Cancik 2004), by caricaturing 
bureaucrats as “automatons” that stick to the rules, the letter of the law, and 
are indifferent towards and ignorant of the world's true problems.
Other studies of civil servants have examined the various concerns and 
normative orientations that shape bureaucratic practice, be it career orien-
aries of state administrative services. Such services of ten include organisations paid for by 
the state, but not staf fed by civil servants employed by the state, to perform tasks that are 
interrelated with state administrative services. This also includes “civil society” organisa-
tions that are funded independently, but form part of the institutional assemblage around 
issues defined by state administrative concerns, such as “refugees”.
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tation; intra-administrative competition; extra-administrative obligations 
towards kin, neighbours or dependants; or simple economic interests. This 
laudable attention to the multiplicity of concerns that shape the practice of 
civil servants has introduced diversity to the image of the bureaucrat as a 
rule-following automaton and brought to the fore the multifarious norma-
tive orders that civil servants often operate within. What has disappeared 
from view, however, is how the practice of civil servants might be shaped 
by ideas of their “office”, their “volitional allegiance” (Gill 2009: 215) to their 
entrusted tasks (see also Bierschenk 2014: 237-238). The ethics of office gen-
erates a specific notion of the commonweal, which structures the proper 
application of rules in bureaucratic practice. I use the term “commonweal” 
to signal a conf luence between a vision of community and the goods that 
a community shares in. It encompasses both “commonwealth” and “com-
mon good”. Neglect of this dimension of normative bureaucratic orientation 
has been detrimental to our understanding of how particular ideological 
projects, inherent in specific delineations of the commonweal, are actually 
translated and produced in administrative practice. 
Here, we propose that ethics are intrinsic to bureaucracy. This does not 
make bureaucracy “good”, “benevolent” or “democratic”, as Du Gay (2000) 
suggests. Our notion of ethics is empirical (see also Fassin 2012: 4), not nor-
mative. To understand how “rule following” works, we need to attend to the 
ethics of office, because bureaucratic ethics defines how a specific idea of 
the commonweal is served. It delineates moral communities composed of 
those abiding in the common good from others who are excluded. In order to 
understand how certain political projects of specific governmentalities are 
put in place, we must heed the ethos and ethics at play at specific historical 
points in the administrative apparatus. 
Contributions to this volume follow what Wedel et al. (2005: 34) sug-
gested were a necessary focus of anthropological research on policies, 
namely “understanding the cultures and worldviews of those policy profes-
sionals and decision makers who seek to implement and maintain their par-
ticular vision of the world through their policies and decisions”. To overcome 
the individualist bent often implicit in analyses of bureaucratic discretion, 
which might be entailed in the examination of personal worldviews, we go 
further by linking such worldviews to notions of “the office”, and focusing on 
relations among political projects entailed in specific notions of the common-
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weal, understandings of professional roles and bureaucratic practice.3 Such 
professional worldviews are shaped by the structural position of particular 
offices at specific moments, and their designated roles within a hierarchy 
of offices are geared towards maintaining the good of the commonwealth. 
Our aim is thus twofold. First, we introduce the notion of ethics in order 
to argue against the stereotype of the bureaucratic automaton, which does 
not account for the way normative frameworks impact on administrative 
conduct. Second, we address bureaucratic ethics as a means of overcom-
ing the individualistic bent in examinations of bureaucratic discretion, and 
relocating the duty or obligation of the “officium” in particular relations of 
domination in particular historical situations.
Our analyses centre on migration bureaucracies. Here, the production 
and management of categories of difference, which delineate the right 
to partake in the commonweal, are particularly visible. All bureaucratic 
agencies engage in differentiating and delineating the eligibility of access 
to goods and services and participation in decision-making. Migration 
bureaucracies are not specific in this regard, but in the contemporary world 
of nation states where the “right to have rights” (Arendt 1968: 177) is depen-
dent on citizenship status, they distinguish most clearly between who can 
partake in the commonweal and who cannot. “In contrast to other bureau-
cracies, (return) migration bureaucracies govern utopian social orders not 
through the governance of a common good, but through the shaping of the 
community itself,” as David Loher writes in this volume. More than a terri-
torial line separating two polities, borders differentiate access to the rights 
and goods within a polity. They define the moral community with which a 
bureaucratic ethic is concerned. Inasmuch as borders differentiate access, 
migration bureaucracies comprise all state agencies involved in such an 
endeavour. We hold that, through their work, migration bureaucracies actu-
ally produce these borders (see also De Genova 2016). A vast array of differ-
ent agencies engage in delineating differential access to the specific services 
they administer among citizens, various categories of legal migrants and the 
equally numerous categories of illegalised migrants. It is not as though the 
assemblage of administrative actors managing differential access to rights 
3  Heyman has earlier engaged with what he calls the “thought-work” of bureaucrats and 
held that “observations on thought […] can be used to characterize the society, polity, and 
economy that have produced specific ‘thinking situations’” (1995: 264).
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and resources is a coherent and coordinated apparatus; instead, practices in 
these diverse “bureaus” are shaped by the diverse bio-political or disciplinary 
efforts they are tasked with. As they follow specific goals and logics, they are 
shaped by their specific role in serving the commonweal as it is defined at a 
particular place and time. 
Such matters of definition and interpretation are intrinsic to bureau-
cratic work, as they establish how a specific bureaucratic agency can best 
serve the commonweal. We are concerned here with more than merely an 
extra-bureaucratic, ethical definition of the commonweal, as has often been 
proposed. Rather, narration, interpretation, contestation and affirmation 
define and interpret the commonweal in relation to the specific tasks an 
agency performs, and also determine who legitimately shares in the com-
mon good. Thus, close attention to ethos and ethics in the orientation of 
civil servants can elucidate changing understandings of the commonweal, 
and articulate shifting delineations between legitimate members and those 
defined as illegitimate. 
Bringing ethics back in (to the study of the state)
Ethos and ethics: Both terms go back to Weber. For bureaucracy, only the 
bureaucratic ethos seems to have survived in our academic memory. But 
Weber distinguished between the two terms. Ethos denotes the assemblage 
of values that underpin procedures, such as, for example, rule orientation, 
consistency, efficiency, efficacy, equality before the law and depersonali-
sation. Today we often include transparency, and participation. Weber had 
a particular assemblage in mind when delineating his ideal type of ratio-
nal-legal rule. We might consider this a historically specific snapshot of the 
values supposedly underpinning bureaucratic procedures that shaped his 
ideal type, albeit one that corresponds surprisingly often with bureaucrats' 
descriptions of what and how they want to be (Affolter 2016; Eckert 2005; 
Lentz 2014), and what so often they know they are not. Whatever its heuristic 
worth, the ideal type is frequently a standard against which civil servants 
measure their duties, goals and failures: it shapes expectations, claims and 
demands, evaluations, disappointments and resistances.
Such assemblages are specific to a time and place. The relevance of trans-
parency today makes this clear. Entering bureaucratic ethos only in the late 
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20th century, transparency is not relevant everywhere to the same degree, 
not in each bureaucratic sector (where, e.g. street-level bureaucracies vs. 
pure desk jobs, or output-oriented bureaucracies vs. accounting, etc. might 
differ), nor in each institutional system. At least formally at specific times 
and places, different agencies probably share some of the values of their pro-
cedures, i.e. elements of their ethos (but see Olivier de Sardan (2009) on the 
role of practical norms). 
Ethics, on the other hand, concerns orientation towards “the good”. In 
the case of bureaucratic ethics, values and norms associated with the sub-
stantive goals of a bureaucratic apparatus are geared towards ideas of a good 
society, a good life, welfare or justice.4 State bureaucracies, as one specific 
type of bureaucratic assemblage, do not merely execute bureaucratic proce-
dures. Rather, they embrace a purpose, a raison d'etre, whether we actually 
observe a common conception of this purpose, or see several conf licting ones. 
Such purposes entail an ethical core (Du Gay 2000; Osborne 1994: 302). Goals 
and projects attributed to “the state” at a historical moment by bureaucrats, 
citizens and subjects alike relate to the notion of a public, a commonweal. 
“Their legitimacy rests on claims made manifest in a constitutional agree-
ment and they exist for the public good,” as Laura Bear and Nayanika Mathur 
claim (2015: 18).5 State standards and norms are pragmatic conventions that 
also express notions of justice. They articulate theories of a just social order: 
what categories of people are eligible to benefit from what service, how much 
is allotted to whom, what is subsidised, what is taxed, and what can be 
bequeathed, etc. all relate to specific notions of justice. Bureaucratic ethics 
concerns each and every administrative act that declares a specific vision of 
social order to be “just” or “proper”. In fact, the bureaucratic term for justice 
might be adequacy: proper, justifiable, appropriate. If conditions are appro-
priate to standardised needs, average situations, the proper relations of a 
commonweal are established.
The extent of the commonweal with which a particular bureaucratic 
apparatus is concerned depends on the jurisdiction of the agency in question 
and its degree of integration into the larger bureaucratic structure. Precisely 
4  This distinction between ethos and ethics corresponds to Weber's definition of both; see 
Swedberg 2005.
5  Bear and Mathur use the term the “public good”. I prefer to use the term “commonweal” to 
distinguish it clearly from a much narrower notion of “public goods”,.
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because bureaucracies are bound to their jurisdiction, inclusion and exclu-
sion are intrinsic to any bureaucratic work (see also Handelman 1981). Juris-
diction introduces the “nationalistic logic” that Michael Herzfeld pointed to, 
which serves to “distinguish between those included and excluded from the 
national order and to represent these distinctions as given by nature – rather 
than cultural or historical contingencies” (Herzfeld 1992: 174). The reformula-
tion of jurisdiction as a moral community is what matters here. This reformu-
lation, i.e. the moralization of jurisdiction, is currently prevalent in national 
notions of commonweal and arises from the intrinsically ethical character of 
any conception of a “good order”. Whether someone or something deserves 
moral regard is shaped by norms implicit in the notion of a “good order” that 
a specific vision of commonweal asserts. The substantive content of visions 
of good order, of “the common good”, introduces hierarchisation that differ-
entiates those needing protection and support from those considered detri-
mental or even dangerous to maintaining the commonweal. Common good 
(Gemeinwohl) is not identical to commonwealth (Gemeinwesen). 
How the public good is imagined, how the commonweal is conceptual-
ised, and how those defined as outside the commonweal's moral commu-
nity are treated is a matter for enquiry. The general purpose of serving the 
common good is made manifest in the practices, expectations, claims and 
disappointments related to such service. Bureaucratic ethics – like any other 
ethics – concerns questions of how to act in the service of these values. Thus, 
ethics is intrinsic to bureaucratic institutional assemblages, not merely 
external to them. 
Often, the ethics of bureaucratic practice have been perceived to arise 
from extra-bureaucratic social realms, and conf lict with the bureaucratic 
ethos as caused precisely by an incompatibility between the ethical and 
social realm and the rational and legal realm of bureaucracy. In particular, 
anthropology has long interpreted conf licts between “formal rules” and 
informal practices as arising from the demands of conf licting normative 
orders. Such normative orientations have been considered to arise “out-
side” the office, emanating from social relations in which office holders are 
embedded. Obligations to acknowledge these relations give rise to devia-
tions from official procedure. Inevitably, this leads to analyses that establish 
a dichotomy between society and the state, or between an intra-bureaucratic 
ethos of indifference and an extra-bureaucratic realm of moral normativity. 
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At the same time, much critique of bureaucracy has focused precisely 
on assumptions of its anethical nature. Many analyses encounter “Franken-
steins: the rules guiding them can overwhelm the goals they are supposed 
to serve and the missions ‘creep’ continually outward. Bureaucrats […] are 
at once inanimate – lazy automatons, blindly serving larger powers – and 
animate – nefarious, self-interested obstructionists” (Hoag 2011: 82). In his 
book on the Indian welfare bureaucracy (2012), Akhil Gupta, while acknowl-
edging the ethical orientation of governmental programmes and individual 
civil servants, has advanced the thesis that the failures of the Indian state are 
found not in the divergence of state bureaucratic practices from proposed 
formal procedures, but within formal procedures that engender indiffer-
ence towards the arbitrary outcomes they produce.6 This echoes other cri-
tiques that consider bureaucratic practice to produce indifference (Herzfeld 
1992), or point to the violence inherent in bureaucratic classification (Grae-
ber 2015) or to the loss of moral responsibility (Bauman 1989). These analyses 
locate bureaucratic violence in excessive orientation towards bureaucratic 
procedures (rather than in the corruption of those procedures) and consider 
bureaucratic state apparatus a form of domination that rules according 
to instrumental-rational criteria dissociated from moral evaluation. For 
Bauman, the absence of moral evaluation in bureaucracies results from 
functional divisions of labour and the substitution of technical for moral 
responsibility. Functional division of tasks within and between bureau-
cratic authorities undermines the assumption of moral responsibility for the 
outcome of a collective activity, a phenomenon that Matthew Hull superbly 
demonstrated by tracing the erasure of individual authorship on adminis-
trative decisions (Hull 2003).7 A system of fragmented responsibility allows 
the construction of holocaustic apparatus (Bauman 1989: 98), making possi-
ble the banalisation of evil. 
6  Unlike others who point to the anethical nature of the administrative apparatus, Gupta 
claims that indif ference to the arbitrariness of outcomes prevails despite the existence of 
ethical concerns on the part of individual civil servants and the overall goals of the admin-
istration.
7  Hull's examination is based on material from Pakistan's civil service. The erasure observed 
here, and the dissolution of attributable responsibility, has particular contextual reasons, 
as erasures of authorship are deeply entangled with civil servants' fear for their profession-
al careers, a fear largely shaped by the politics of transfer in South Asia. This might take 
entirely dif ferent forms in other contexts, or be less pronounced in other administrations.
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Could and should one read Hannah Arendt's thesis of the banality of 
evil as the possibility of a murderous ethic's normalisation and routinisa-
tion, rather than the anethical nature of bureaucracy? This reading might not 
accord with Arendt's notion of morality, since her normative concept of mor-
als stressed the residual freedom of choice against obedience to the law. If, 
however, we ask whether the banality of evil did not necessitate first a banal-
ization of evil,8 we come to an empirical notion of ethics. Using an empiri-
cal notion of ethics enables us to differentiate between various co-existing 
ethics; it does not negate the possibility of moral resistance to public eth-
ics, since public or bureaucratic ethics do not determine value orientations 
by obliterating all other moral or ethical norms. Rather, the ethics inherent 
in the substantive goals and purposes an “office” is tasked with impact the 
practices of office holders by shaping their “ideologically affected desires” 
(Gill 2009: 215). 
Our approach to the ethics of office is akin to that of Didier Fassin in 
his recent discussion of “the heart of the state”. He holds, and we agree, that 
state agents “work in reference to a certain professional ethos, to a training 
they have received, to an idea they have of their actions, and to a routine they 
develop. The principles of justice or of order, the values of the common good 
and public service, the attention to social or psychological realities […] all 
products of their professional habitus, inf luence the way they will respond 
to state injunctions and behave towards their publics,” (Fassin 2015b: 6-7). 
Fassin complicates analyses of the bureaucrat as “automaton” (Herzfeld 1992: 
1) that often prevails in critiques of bureaucracies. Whereas he stresses the 
interrelation of professional ethics and affects (Fassin 2015a; Fassin 2015b: 
10), we concentrate on the interrelation of the ethics of office and bureau-
cratic practice.
Employing this focus on the ethics of office also avoids the individual-
ist bent implicit in many analyses of bureaucratic discretion. Anthropolo-
gies of bureaucrats often produce implicit assumptions about discretionary 
“freedom” simply by not focussing on precisely how discretion is practised, or 
rather, how it is shaped and structured in itself. Thus, ethnographic bot-
tom-up perspectives on administration, policy or the state suffer from a lack 
of attention to the impact of formal rules and public ideologies – often due to 
the attempt to overcome reductionist top-down analyses that do not attend 
8  Roland Eckert in a conversation in October 2018.
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to variation in bureaucratic practice (see also Fassin 2015b: 5). In order to 
understand the particular sociality of bureaucratic discretion, and to under-
stand “interpretation”, “subsumation” and “application”, I suggest that dis-
cretionary practices are informed by the ethos and the ethics that pertain 
to a specific bureaucracy at a given time and place, and that are trained and 
cultivated formally and informally in bureaucratic sociabilities, as Laura 
Affolter shows in her contribution to this volume (also see Affolter (2016) 
where she develops the term “institutional habitus” for this phenomenon). 
The “bureaucratic ethic” guides the application and interpretation of rules. 
Only with such an ethical basis, as Thomas Bierschenk and Jean Pierre Olivier 
de Sardan have also stressed (2014: 13), can discretion be exercised. “World-
view directs thought-work such as case interpretations. Therefore, organiza-
tional worldview fosters the subtle coherence of decisions over a wide vari-
ety of cases,” Heyman says (1995: 265). Individual segments of bureaucracies 
relate interpreting their tasks to their specific role in achieving overall goals. 
Tasks precisely shape how rules are interpreted and implemented to serve 
these ends. They suggest which division of labour best aligns with an overall 
goal. They outline what responsibilities follow from ascribed competences, 
and which attribution of responsibility is “rational”, questions that arise in 
relation to such quotidian matters as budget allocation, agency competition 
or assigning “cases” to specific bureaucratic agencies or “desks”. What it is to 
do a job well, to be rule oriented (i.e. to interpret the rule), to be consistent, 
effective or efficient, these ambitions can only be achieved in the light of 
the broader ethical goals. Such matters of definition and interpretation are 
intrinsic to bureaucratic work; they establish how the commonweal is best 
served by a specific bureaucratic agency.
I want to hold on to the distinction described above that Weber made 
between ethos and ethics rather than merging the two terms, as might be 
possible through the notion of moral economy as used by Didier Fassin 
(2009). I find it useful to retain distinct notions of ethos and ethics as pos-
sible aspects of a moral economy of state bureaucracies at a specific time in 
a specific place, because they are not the same and they can be in tension 
with each other. Images of the state, as Klaus Schlichte and Joel Migdal noted 
(2005: 14), encompass both the substantive promise inherent in the purpose 
attributed to that state, which I call “bureaucratic ethics”, and the proce-
dures deemed “state-like” and proper that the state bureaucracy can use to 
fulfil that promise, which I call “bureaucratic ethos”. Both are situated in the 
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same historical moment and hold for the same social realm. They are inextri-
cably linked, but can conf lict, as I will explain below. 
The moral community
Visions of what public goods the state is responsible for, and what procedures 
are appropriate for it to use to accomplish them, are subject to change. A state 
may be defined by goals of autonomy, modernization, equality or equity, 
competitive military or economic power or welfare; and its bureaucratic pro-
cedures judged by their efficacy, transparency, participatory nature or cost 
efficiency. Fundamentally, changes in ethos and ethics are expressed in how 
the moral community a bureaucracy is concerned with is differentiated and 
delineated, and how its relations to, and differential obligations towards its 
members and non-members are defined.
Contemporary visions of the commonweal of European nation states are 
entangled in contradictory imperatives. Deep tensions exist among the pre-
rogative of the nation state to distinguish between insiders and outsiders, 
humanitarian appeals to broaden definitions of the greater good, and the 
global interdependencies that are a requisite for any common good. These 
simultaneous imperatives produce institutional contradictions, the resolu-
tion of which demands differential prioritisation. 
In his contribution to this volume, David Loher shows how, in Swiss asy-
lum procedures, the notion of voluntariness serves to align the imperative 
of the exclusionary nation state with humanitarian delegitimisation of state 
violence: the best and most ethical (but also the cheapest) way to exclude is 
when the excluded leave voluntarily. This ethical stance impacts the way offi-
cials who organise voluntary return migration understand their task, and 
how they go about achieving it. The notion of “voluntariness” discussed by 
Loher is central to current conceptualisations not only of human agency, but 
also of fairness, efficiency and efficacy. 
Contradictions between imperatives of the nation state, the national 
economy and humanitarian ideals often come to the fore in competitions 
between bureaucratic agencies, particularly between those charged with 
bio-political duties and those with disciplinary and security tasks (see also 
Schiffauer in this volume; Fassin 2015b: 6). 
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Simon Affolter's chapter describes a smooth negotiation between the 
contradictory imperatives of upholding immigration law and labour law 
standards, on the one hand, and ensuring the ongoing provision of cheap 
migrant labour on which the Swiss commonweal depends, on the other. 
Cheaper labour is less regulated labour, particularly in an agricultural sec-
tor that has symbolic significance for Swiss national identity. Institutional 
inconsistencies arising between these principles are functional, Affolter 
shows us, in relation to the prioritisation of efficiency in Swiss agriculture, 
and as a means to preserve a symbol of national autarky. Enforcement of 
both labour law and immigration law is subordinate to the economic via-
bility of Swiss agriculture (see Heyman 1995 for a discussion of the US situ-
ation). Thus, labour law and its enforcement has little relevance for serving 
the national conceptualisation of the commonweal. Individual officials sit-
uationally enact this hierarchisation of laws (and of administrative bureaus) 
by relying on the overall goal of serving a specific delineation of the Swiss 
common good.
Mediations between the diverse priorities of different state agencies 
are contingent upon many factors. The dominance of one discourse or one 
agency, which directs how best to secure the commonweal, might give way 
to other strategies and other agencies once economic or political expedi-
encies change. Yet, prioritisations among contradictory imperatives of the 
commonweal remain embedded in historical legacies and inf luence con-
temporary functions.9 The memory of “Weimar” as a frail state legitimises 
contemporary ethics of defensive democracy (“wehrhaf te Demokratie”); this 
forms the horizon and legitimatory repertoire for many a bureaucratic norm 
in Germany, as Werner Schiffauer shows in his analysis of the symmetri-
9  Ethos and ethics change in shorter intervals in relation to mediatized events – but relations 
between media representations and public ethics appear to be somewhat dialogical, as 
media representations not only respond to but also shape public ethics. In what was called 
the “refugee crisis” we could observe daily shif ts between a humanitarian perspective on 
the refugees from Syria struggling at eastern European borders, and a security perspec-
tive, ever dif ferentiating the criteria for legitimate mobility, targeting both Syrian and less 
of ficially legitimate refugees (see also De Genova 2016). With such short term shif ts, it is 
not always possible to tell whether a shif t is relevant to ethical values, or whether it af fects 
what, or how something can be legitimately addressed, i.e. a shif t in rhetoric. Yet, shif ts in 
rhetoric, taken “at their word”, can trigger shif ts in practice. Rhetoric sets standards and 
defines the norm or the normal, the way to view an issue.
The Office 19
cal construction of different “extremisms” in German security agencies. 
Chowra Makaremi employs the notion of memory to show how political 
considerations connected to both post-colonial memory and contemporary 
power relations shape the French asylum system. She highlights the colo-
nially informed political stakes that underpin the selection of those who pos-
sess rights to national protection and others, as well as the ramifications of 
diplomatic affinities and tensions in the arena of asylum (e.g. France's posi-
tion of withdrawal from regional issues in West Africa). Makaremi shows 
how the national host community is redefined, first literally through a pro-
cess of filtering and excluding those who do not belong to it, and then figura-
tively, through affirmation of common rationalities and moral values, such 
as democratic assistance or protecting the welfare state against abuses and 
false refugees.
Knowing like a state
In many ways, ethos and ethics are intrinsic to administrative categorisation 
procedures. Bureaucracies process cases according to given (legal) catego-
ries of difference, so that differential access to rights defines multifaceted 
cases for singular purposes, and boundaries are set within the gradual, con-
tinuous character of difference (see Handelman 2004: 23). More importantly, 
bureaucracies create categorical differences according to their specific tasks 
and the perceived needs of the commonweal. 
Thus, administrative categories are deeply ingrained in the way the state 
knows. Classificatory practices are based on knowledge, and at the same 
time shape what can be known. Knowledge is purposeful. Its selection is 
shaped by the problems that an agency is supposed to address. In his contri-
bution, Werner Schiffauer examines the creation of task-specific categories 
and the kinds of functional blindness they produce. Schiffauer points out 
how a degree of “decisionism” inheres in the creation of any category.10 At 
10  Decisionism is the term employed by Carl Schmitt, who proposes that norms gain validity 
only through decisions (by the proper authority). These decisions are, at their core, un-
justifiable as they can never be entirely explained by logical or ethical criteria (Schmitt 
1922). For Schmitt, the validity of law was not inherent in its principles but made fact by 
the proper authority. Max Weber used the term slightly dif ferently to seek a solution to 
the problems of rational legal rule. To him, legality alone could not set goals or make value 
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some point on the boundary between one category and the next, the differ-
ences between two cases in the same category might be greater than between 
two cases f lanking both sides of the arbitrary divide. This ultimate arbitrari-
ness defines administrative exercises in classification precisely because 
the boundary of a category cannot be logically or ethically explained in its 
entirety, but arbitrarily delimits gradual difference at a specific point. This 
decisionism is complemented by the “discretion” exercised in the application 
of categories of difference (see, e.g. Lipsky 1983), as to subsume a specific 
“case” under a categorical rubric necessitates interpretation by those who 
perform this application to such situations. 
It might appear contradictory to claim that the categorical differentia-
tions of (migration) bureaucracies are decisionist in nature, and hence not 
justifiable by logical or ethical norms, and yet that this decisionism is shaped 
by a bureaucratic ethic. In fact, this is precisely the point. Bureaucratic eth-
ics “rationalise” the decisionism of bureaucratic categories because arbi-
trariness is anathema to rational legal rule. This is evident in Schiffauer's 
analysis of the categories of danger developed and continually differentiated 
by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution as it struggles to 
keep up with the intellectual dynamics of Islamic communities. What is also 
evident is the futility of these efforts. Bureaucrats are usually aware of the 
poor fit of these categories with actual “cases” they work on. In response to 
tensions between category and case phenomena, new categories are created 
with even finer differentiations. But they remain anachronistic snapshots of 
an intrinsically dynamic field. Nonetheless, even failed categories are often 
highly productive of social order. As Schiffauer shows, they gain a truth-
value beyond their specific purposes.
Everyday states of exception, or: Does it really matter what 
they think they do?
While the norms of ethos and ethics are both intrinsic aspects of bureau-
cratic practice, ethos and ethics are not the same. They can conf lict, espe-
cially when shifts in fashion affect proper procedure (such as the introduc-
decisions; only a leader's decision(-ism) could save modern society from the iron cage of 
rationalisation (Weber 1919).
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tion of public management techniques; see Bear and Mathur 2015) or when 
changes occur in public ethics. 
This tension comes to the fore in the reasoning of the return migration 
bureaucrats to whom David Loher spoke. Their defence of rule-orientation 
rests on the principle of equal treatment, without implying approval of the 
substantive ethics behind the rules they enforce. They prioritise “rule-follow-
ing – and therefore procedural or formal justice – over substantive justice” 
Loher continues: “Identification of the principle of rule-orientation with fair-
ness indicates that there is more at stake than concern about pure procedure” 
(Loher, this volume). He holds that, in this case, ethos is ethics.
However, when the norms of ethos are perceived as hindering service 
to the commonweal, ethics sometimes trumps ethos. Just as substantive 
goals and values can be overridden by procedural concerns – as in “autom-
aton” accounts of bureaucracy – so can procedural ethoses be overridden by 
adherence to substantive ethics. As Fassin also observes: “whether through 
over zealousness or conviction the agents often extend the realm of policies 
well beyond what is requested” (2015b: 5). Bureaucrats might believe in their 
office. They might believe in ethos and ethics alike, or they might prioritise 
ethics, i.e. specific orientations towards the commonweal, over procedural 
concerns. Bureaucratic ethics import the Dirty Harry problem (Klockars 
1980) into governmental apparatus.11 To put it another way, ethics in tension 
with ethos calls forth a myriad of situational states of exception. 
Everyday states of exception, when law is suspended in order to safe-
guard the legal order (Schmitt 1922) are particularly evident in Nicholas De 
11  It is important to point out the possibility of prioritisation to complement the image of 
“the automaton”, and bring to light bureaucrats' commitment to their of fices, the “voli-
tional allegiance” that Gill spoke about (2009: 215). Furthermore, dedication in pursuit of 
the larger goals an of fice is tasked with to the detriment of procedural rules can be no less 
problematic than mere rule orientation. This is why Du Gay (2000) praises the democratic 
potentials of bureaucratic rule orientation. Detecting everyday states of exception in the 
Dirty Harries of bureaucratic practice, tension between ethos and ethics in bureaucracies 
might come down to an image of the heroic civil servant acting solely in an attempt to 
serve the goals he or she is tasked with. This critical point was made by Klaus Schlichte 
in discussion of a draf t version of this article. I consider ethical orientations towards an 
of fice to be far more quotidian than any notion of heroism would imply. Such an ethical 
orientation is not “exceptional”, but rather, a matter of work ethics, and of labour explored 
as practice, which encompasses habits, routines, skills, value orientations, decision mak-
ing, etc.
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Genova's examination of “detainability”. De Genova shows how “the lowest 
level enforcers of the law must constantly exercise their own discretion and 
routinely decide on a case-by-case basis on the ‘state of exception’ between 
the abstraction of the law and the fact of violence that enforces it, in the puta-
tive interest of ‘order’ or ‘security’” (this volume). Everyday states of excep-
tion are equally present in Affolter's Swiss agricultural sector, where labour 
officers establish a situational hierarchy of legal norms (only some of which 
are enforced) related to their orientation towards serving the commonweal 
of Switzerland. The systematic and systemically related violation of labour 
and immigration law is a functional prerequisite of serving the commonweal 
as currently defined.
Evident in both examples is how everyday states of exception are gov-
erned by many rules. This echoes what Nasser Hussain has called “hyper-le-
gality” (2007). Hussain responded to the easy Agambian assumption of 
“law-less” or extra-legal spaces of exception, and showed how the rule of law 
actually made possible and regulated such exceptions. This insight is import-
ant for us insofar as it demands a process-based approach to the explora-
tion of ethos and ethics, one that can bring to light how, in the continuously 
alternating prioritisation of one over the other, institutional change is pro-
duced. In quotidian states of exception, such as the cases discussed above, 
changes in the image of the state, in its ethics and its proper procedures, also 
encompass a complicated relation between legality and legitimacy. Changes 
in legitimacy occur at different rhythms than changes in legality. More 
importantly, legal procedures considered inappropriate for reaching certain 
state goals can lose legitimacy, whereas illegal procedures and practices can 
become legitimate when perceived as effective in fulfilling state promises. 
Small discrepancies might lead to incremental shifts in the interpretation of 
legal rules by state officers; stark discrepancies might lead to an open depar-
ture from legal rule and legitimate practice (as perceived by office holders). 
Prioritisation of substantive goals over procedural norms is often fol-
lowed by procedural adjustments. Legal reform realigns the legality and 
legitimacy of administrative practice. The discretionary margin is widened 
and executive powers are enhanced (see e.g. Eckert 2012). Central to realign-
ments of legitimacy and legality are notions of threat and crisis (see also Fas-
sin 2015b: 2) that justify drawing lines between those considered to belong, 
and enjoy specific protections, and those outside the moral community that 
a bureaucratic ethic is concerned with. This is why paying attention to the 
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dynamic tension between bureaucratic ethos and ethics is important, and 
why acknowledging their distinction has heuristic value.
Conclusion
While acknowledging the myriad constraints, diverse goals and contradic-
tory logics bureaucrats are entangled in, as well as the possible inf luence of 
personal and public morals (Fassin 2015), the point here is to refocus atten-
tion on the ethics of office. Dynamics born of relations between ethos and 
ethics, and their impact on bureaucratic practice, have not been adequately 
addressed in recent literature on the anthropology of bureaucracy or pol-
icy. Too focussed on either rule-orientation or discretionary freedom, many 
approaches have overlooked the way interpretations of the commonweal 
shape bureaucratic practice. We stress that such interpretations cannot be 
considered extra-bureaucratic ethical concerns, but are intrinsic to the pro-
fession (see also Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014: 12-13; Lentz 2014). 
Certainly, situations exist where orientation towards the public good is not 
of great importance in the conduct of public servants; in such situations 
many factors possibly contribute to a minimal identification with the job (see, 
e.g. Bierschenk 2014: 222). In many other situations, however, viewing one-
self as a public servant who serves a public good is fundamental to the way 
people conduct their work. This holds true, I would claim, in such diverse 
situations as in the Indian police service (Eckert 2005), among Ghanaian 
public servants (Lentz 2015) or in the situations explored in the contributions 
to this volume. However, where such orientations hold sway and how they 
develop or diminish is an empirical question. Differences might arise not 
only in accord with the states in question and the historical moments of anal-
ysis, but also in different areas of state administration. Ethos and ethics are 
highly contextual, and so is their relevance for bureaucratic practice.
At the same time, attention to the ethos and ethics of office is as essential 
to understanding bureaucratic practice as attention to extra-bureaucratic 
expediencies. The notion of the office, of professionalism in civil service, 
even of ubiquitous laments about failure, corruption or inadequacy confirm 
the relevance of the ethics of office to understanding the work of bureau-
cracies. They define the ways a commonweal is best served and delineate 
its moral community. Furthermore, differentiating between the ethos and 
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ethics of bureaucracies and investigating the dynamics that arise from their 
relations can provide insights into institutional and legal change. Bureau-
crats' quotidian struggles to align ethos and ethics, or to justify their diver-
gence, bring about incremental changes that sometimes need normative 
acknowledgement to effect legal reform.
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Keeping Numbers Low in the Name of Fairness 
Ethos and Ethics in a Swiss Asylum Administration 
Laura Affolter
Introduction
“I am interested in foreigners, other cultures. The basic idea is to help these 
people, even if we do – of course – reject many of them”, Gabriel, a case-
worker in the Swiss Secretariat for Migration (SEM), once said to me (Gabriel, 
caseworker, interview transcript).1 The SEM is where first-instance asylum 
decisions are made in Switzerland. Officials working there – officials like 
Gabriel – make decisions about whether asylum seekers fulfil the require-
ments for refugee status, and whether they believe the applicants' state-
ments are credible.2 Applicants must fulfil both preconditions before receiv-
ing asylum. Although Gabriel works in the SEM “to help people”, for him it is 
okay that most applicants get rejected. This has to do with his understanding 
of fairness, a core issue in professional decision-making. Thus, later in the 
conversation quoted above, he went on to say that it was the decision-makers' 
duty to meticulously examine the credibility of each case, because otherwise 
“everybody could just receive asylum and that would be unfair to those who 
1  All the names in this chapter are pseudonyms.
2  I use the terms “asylum seekers”, “applicants” and “claimants” because they are the emic 
terms SEM of ficials employ and it is their perspectives that I critically engage with in this 
paper. However, I am aware that labels carry meanings and, by using them, there is the 
danger of reproducing them. Labels do not “exist in a vacuum” but are “the tangible rep-
resentation of policies and programs”, Zetter argues (2007: 180). Hence, only through en-
tering the asylum system do “people on the move” become “asylum seekers” (ibid.: 175). In 
fact, the term “asylum seeker” fits with the shif t that Fassin (2016) describes from asylum 
as a right to asylum as a favour (see also Jubany 2011: 85). 
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really deserve asylum, who really need protection” (ibid.).3 Gabriel's state-
ment exemplifies a common view within the SEM that, in order for deci-
sion-making to be fair, granting asylum and temporary protection must be 
reserved exclusively for those “truly deserving of it”. Fairness is, therefore, 
based on exclusion. 
The exclusionary workings (in particular, the outcomes) of asylum deci-
sion-making have been widely criticised (see, for instance, Harvey 1997; 
Jubany 2017; Marf leet 2006; Scheffer 2001; Souter 2011; Zimmermann 2011). 
By tracing historical changes in asylum and refugee policy, several studies 
have shown how asylum policies and asylum law started to become more 
restrictive in the early 1980s as applicants increasingly fell outside the East/
West, communist/non-communist divide, and after the 1970s recession 
increased unemployment, which led to restrictions on labour immigration 
(see, for instance, Däpp 1984; Fassin 2013: 8ff; Fassin & Kobelinsky 2012: 
448ff; Piguet 2006). Furthermore, they describe how, in the 1980s, a dis-
course about “false” or “bogus” refugees trying to abuse the system emerged 
as the number of asylum applications increased (Däpp 1984: 216ff; see also 
Fassin 2007). In Switzerland, this “fight against abuse” has been the driving 
force behind and the means of legitimating many of the restrictions made in 
Swiss asylum law in the past thirty-seven years (see Miaz 2017: 83ff). How-
ever, these historical accounts do not tell us much about how such policies or 
policy changes are translated into practice and shaped and mediated in this 
process (see, for instance, Lipsky 2010; Shore and Wright 1997, 2011; Wedel 
et al. 2005). Furthermore, while they show how the eligibility criteria for 
refugee status or for receiving temporary protection have gradually become 
more restrictive, they offer little explanation as to why most asylum applica-
tions are rejected on the basis of so-called “non-credibility”.4
3  I use the term “decision-makers” for the SEM of ficials who conduct asylum interviews and 
write decisions. Final decisions bear their signatures and also that of their direct superi-
ors. As I will show in this contribution, decision-makers' decisions can by changed by their 
superiors. Hence, the superiors also become decision-makers in a way. For a critical reflec-
tion on the term “decision-maker”, see Lavanchy and Garros (forthcoming). Here, I use the 
terms “decision-maker”, “caseworker” and “(SEM) of ficial” synonymously, separating them 
from the heads of the asylum units, whom I call “superiors”. 
4  Unfortunately, negative asylum decisions are registered with the same code regardless of 
whether they are made on the basis of “non-credibility” (article 7 of the Swiss Asylum Act, 
AsylA), of non-eligibility for refugee status (article 3 AsylA) or a combination of both. It is 
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Kelly, who in Sympathy and Suspicion: Torture, Asylum, and Humanity 
“explore[s] the epistemological conditions under which it is possible to doubt 
or deny the claim of others” (2012: 755), offers one explanation. He argues 
that “the very process of imagined identification found in compassion can 
lie behind suspicion” (ibid.: 753). Several other authors have argued that ele-
ments of “non-credibility” – and through them “lies” and individuals labelled 
as “liars” – are actively created by means of decision-making processes, par-
ticularly through the questioning techniques used in asylum interviews (see 
Crawley 1999: 52ff; Sbriccoli and Jacoviello 2011: 184ff; Scheffer 2001, 2003; 
Trueman 2009: 296ff). This argument challenges the common explanation 
put forward by asylum administrations, politicians and much of the main-
stream media that the majority of claims are rejected because the majority 
of asylum seekers lie. Building on both these approaches, I examine what 
makes it normal and desirable for “otherwise compassionate and rational peo-
ple” (Kelly 2012: 755) to doubt and deny the claims of others. In other words, 
how does it become routine for decision-makers to adopt questioning strat-
egies that actively generate indicators of “non-credibility”? 
I approach this question by empirically exploring what SEM deci-
sion-makers think they should be doing. Following Eckert's argument in the 
introduction of this volume, I claim that what “bureaucrats” do is shaped by 
what they think they should do.5 What they think they should do, in turn, is 
shaped by both the ethics and ethos of the office. Eckert (this volume) defines 
bureaucratic ethics as the “values and norms associated with the substan-
tive goals of a bureaucratic apparatus geared towards ideas of a good society, 
therefore not possible to quantitatively analyse what reasons were cited for negative de-
cisions. However, the SEM online manual on asylum and return (Asyl und Rückkehr) states 
that the majority of rejections are attributable to the lack of credibility of asylum seek-
ers' claims (https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/asyl/verfahren/hb/c/hb-c5-d.pdf 
[accessed 19 September 2018]. In addition, all of my interaction partners (both SEM deci-
sion-makers and legal advisors) were of the impression that most negative decisions are 
based on non-credibility. In Af folter (2018) I discuss dif ferent reasons why it is an institu-
tional preference to argue negative decisions on the basis of “non-credibility”, rather than 
on “non-eligibility for refugee status”. 
5  The terms “bureaucracy” and “bureaucrats” carry negative connotations. They are of ten 
associated with “red tape” and “of ficialism” and used as criticism (Eckert, this volume; Po-
ertner 2017: 12). Here, I mostly use the terms “administration” and “of fice”. However, when 
referring to literature that uses the terms “bureaucracy” and “bureaucrats”, I employ the 
same terminology.
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good life, welfare, or justice”. Thus, the term “bureaucratic ethics” stands for 
the specific purposes of a bureaucracy; the goals its employees are tasked 
with, both explicitly and implicitly. Bureaucratic ethos, on the other hand, 
describes the assemblage of procedural behaviours deemed proper for ful-
filling these purposes (ibid.). Taking up Eckert's argument that bureaucra-
cies are not anethical, as Bauman (2000), Graeber (2015) and Herzfeld (1992) 
have claimed, but rather that ethics are “intrinsic to bureaucratic work”, I 
show how the ethics of office shape its procedural values: the ethos of the 
office. That is, decision-makers' understanding of what their role is shapes 
their understanding of how to carry it out professionally. Since what “bureau-
crats” think they should do informs their everyday practices, and their every-
day practices shape and mediate the policies and laws they are charged with 
implementing (see, for instance, Silbey 2005: 324; Wedel et al. 2005: 34), we 
need to explore the ethics and ethos of the office in order to understand how 
asylum law and policies work. Furthermore, as Fassin (2015:4) has stated, 
paying attention to state officials – their “actions, routines, values and feel-
ings” – is crucial to understanding how the state works. 
This chapter consists of four main parts. Part one describes a field epi-
sode in which two SEM officials – a superior and his employee – discuss the 
rightfulness of a decision. From that point of departure I extract, in part two, 
what the officials as decision-makers consider their duties to be. Their con-
ceptualisations form the basis for deriving the ethics of the office. In part 
three I discuss a variety of norms associated with the notion of being pro-
fessional in the SEM. Particularly through the norm of fairness, we see how 
procedural ethos is shaped by bureaucratic ethics. Part four shows how the 
ethics and ethos of the office make one particular decision-making practice, 
which I call “digging deep”, the normal and desirable thing for decision-mak-
ers to do. “Digging deep”, in turn, leads to reaffirmation of the office's norms 
and values. 
This paper is based on ethnographic material from fieldwork for my PhD, 
which was conducted in the SEM during various stays between 2014 and 
2015. I shadowed decision-makers from various organisational units in their 
work, observing them as they wrote decisions, prepared and conducted asy-
lum interviews, chatted to colleagues in hallways and during coffee breaks, 
helped each other with difficult “cases”, performed administrative tasks and 
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participated in team meetings.6 Furthermore, I took part in a three-week 
training session for new employees, conducted semi-structured interviews 
with decision-makers and superiors from nine different units in the SEM 
and analysed case files.
Negotiating "the right" decision: a field anecdote
A decision-maker, Rebecca, and her superior, Alfredo, are discussing a deci-
sion she has made. As Rebecca's superior, it is Alfredo's duty to check and 
countersign her decisions before they are sent to the applicants. In this case, 
he does not agree with Rebecca's decision to grant temporary protection to a 
family from Iraq. I quote this excerpt from my field notes in detail because 
it brings to light several aspects of what Alberto and Rebecca believe profes-
sional decision-making involves. 
I am sitting in Alberto's office, watching him go through his employees' 
decisions and case files. The documents he appraises, decisions that need his 
signature before they can go out, were left by his employees on a table outside 
his office. The first decision he picks up is a negative one for a family from 
Iraq. Yet, the decision-maker, Rebecca, has granted the family temporary 
protection. For my benefit, Alberto comments on the decision as he reads 
through it. I learn that the family came to Switzerland a couple of years ago 
because the husband started work with a human rights organisation. When 
the husband's contract ended, the family stayed on and filed for asylum. 
Alberto tells me that he agrees with the negative decision. He says the 
family's problems do not qualify them as refugees. Then, looking at the inter-
nal application for temporary protection Rebecca has submitted, he says: 
“Ok, the kids are still quite young and they've been here for quite a while, so 
they haven't lived in their country of origin for a long time. But someone 
else might still have decided differently”. He feels that it is a very “generous” 
decision. “I mean”, he goes on, “they're an upper-class family. It wouldn't be 
a problem for them to be socially reintegrated. […] They're a family, they're 
together, they can travel. They could go anywhere they want”. Alberto is not 
quite sure what to do about the case, but he feels he cannot just let it pass 
6  “Cases” is an emic term. Of course, what SEM decision-makers really deal with are not cases 
but people whose lives are greatly af fected by their practices and decisions.
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like that. In the end, he decides to put it aside for two hours and then return 
to it. Quickly, he goes through the other decisions from the pile on his desk, 
reading through them, f licking through the case files and then countersign-
ing them. Once he has finished with the other decisions, he turns back to the 
case of the Iraqi family even though the two hours have not yet passed. 
Seemingly out of the blue, and slightly defensively, he says to me: “The 
question of nation states and whether one thinks nation states are good or 
not, has nothing to do with what we do here. It cannot be solved by what 
we do. I'm all for granting protection”, he continues, “but we don't have to 
hand it to them on a plate” (aber man muss es den Leuten nicht nachschiessen). 
He explains to me that seeing so many cases over the past several years has 
made him stricter and less naïve. What is important to him is that whatever 
leaves his desk is fair. This, he explains, also means protecting the asylum 
system from abuse. Saying that, he grabs the Iraqi family's case file and tells 
me he will take the decision back to the caseworker, Rebecca, to discuss it 
with her. He says that she will either have to add more reasons for granting 
the family temporary protection or reconsider her decision. Alberto asks if 
I would like to join him. Slightly hesitant, but also curious, I follow him to 
Rebecca's office. 
Alberto explains to Rebecca that he thinks this is a very opportunistic, 
upper class family that does not need temporary protection. Rebecca says 
that she can see his point, but she worries that because the children are still 
quite young, their decision denying the family temporary protection might 
be quashed if case is taken on appeal to the Federal Administrative Court 
(FAC). “Also”, she argues, “the wife has health problems”. But Alberto does 
not think her problems are severe enough. He also does not think that the 
young children's not having lived in their country of origin would pose a 
problem in the event of an appeal, and he feels that the risk is worth taking. 
Together they discuss other possible “obstacles to removal”, but Rebecca had 
already ruled them all out after consulting the Federführung.7 
7  Federführungen are SEM of ficials who hold lead positions for particular “countr[ies] of 
origin”. They are responsible for (co-)determining and monitoring the institution's deci-
sion-making practices in dealing with cases from these countries. 
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The discussion ends with the following dialogue: 
Alberto: “I think the decision is too generous”. 
Rebecca: “That's my problem. I'm too nice.”
Alberto: “I'm also nice.”
Rebecca: “Yes, of course”. 
Alberto and Rebecca agree that she will work on the case again and rethink 
her original decision. Before leaving to go back to his office Alberto asks 
Rebecca whether she “can live with” this new decision. Rebecca assures 
Alberto that she can, and that she will still be able to sleep at night. She prom-
ises that it will not take her long to change the decision. 
As Alberto and I set off towards his office again, Rebecca holds me back, 
causing Alberto to come back too. She explains to me that this is just a nor-
mal part of the job. Sometimes, though not often, decisions are given back 
and one has to work on them again. She says that in this case she was prob-
ably inf luenced by the fact that she had interviewed the family herself and 
that they had come across as being very pleasant. Alberto says that he finds 
this understandable and that this is something that has really changed for 
him since he was put in charge of the subdivision and stopped doing asylum 
interviews himself. “I have become stricter, because I see so many cases”, he 
explains, “but I can also see things more clearly now, from a certain distance, 
more objectively”. 
This ethnographic vignette could be analytically explored in several dif-
ferent directions. Here, I limit myself to mapping out both Alberto's and 
Rebecca's understandings of professional decision-making. Professional 
norms that directly contribute to the exclusionary understanding of fairness 
posited at the beginning of this paper will be analysed in more detail later. 
Rebecca and Alberto mention several different aspects of what they 
believe professional decision-making involves. From Alberto we learn that 
professional decision-making is fair, objective and apolitical. The latter 
characteristic he expresses by saying that one's personal opinion of nation 
states (and of the restrictions on freedom of movement and residence asso-
ciated with them) has nothing to do with their job. He also has clear ideas 
of what constitutes fair and objective decision-making. For Alberto, fair 
decision-making relates to strictly following the law, and objective deci-
sion-making to making decisions “from a distance” and not becoming too 
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personally involved in the case. From Rebecca, we learn that being a good 
and professional decision-maker means working fast, not becoming too per-
sonally involved in one's cases, and making decisions that one can personally 
endorse. We further infer from this anecdote that being naïve, “too generous” 
and “too nice” are considered to be features of unprofessional decision-mak-
ing. Protection should be granted, but not too easily. In Alberto's words: “It 
shouldn't be handed to asylum seekers on a plate.” 
In order to understand why all of this has come to define professionalism 
for Rebecca and Alberto, I turn to the ethics of the office to demonstrate how 
it can be derived from what caseworkers understand their duties as deci-
sion-makers and state officials to be. 
Ethics of the office: decision-makers as protectors 
of the system
In this field anecdote, Rebecca seems to be primarily occupied with what the 
FAC might think about her decision in case it is appealed. She worries that if 
she does not grant the family temporary protection, her decision might get 
quashed by the court for two reasons: first, because the children have never 
lived in what is referred to as their “country of origin” and it could be seen 
as unreasonable (or illegitimate) to send them “back”, and second, because 
the mother has health problems.8 Hence, Rebecca regards one of her main 
duties to be the making of “correct decisions”, i.e., decisions that will not be 
quashed by the FAC.9 
Generally, this is also considered important by her superiors. However, 
in this particular case, Alberto finds issuing a removal order for the family a 
risk worth taking because he deems two other duties to be of greater impor-
tance than trying to avoid a quashed decision. These duties are, on the one 
hand, to make sure that only those “really deserving of protection” receive 
8  Rebecca fears that by issuing a removal order she might be defying article 3 of the UN Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child. 
9  Not having one's decisions quashed is important for two reasons. First, SEM units “keep 
records of how many of their employees' decisions are quashed” (Af folter et al. 2019: 270). 
Too many quashings is regarded as bad decision-making. Second, quashings stand in the 
way of fast and ef ficient decision-making (another important professional norm), since de-
cision-makers of ten have to work on those cases again. 
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protection and, on the other hand, to protect the system from being abused 
by “undeserving” applicants. For Alberto, the Iraqi family does not deserve 
protection because, as an “upper class family”, they are not sufficiently vul-
nerable. They do not fit the image of victims in need of help.10 “They could go 
anywhere they want”, he claims. This dual duty of protecting people – but 
only deserving people – and filtering out the undeserving in order to protect 
“the system” becomes apparent in the wording the SEM uses to describe the 
“[b]asic principles of asylum legislation” on its website: 
It is the duty of asylum proceedings to identify those asylum seekers among 
the new arrivals who are entitled to protection under the terms [of the 
Geneva Convention]. Many asylum seekers cannot be classified as refugees 
or persons displaced by war. On the basis of their situation, they clearly 
belong to the group of migrants. They are in search of a better place to live 
in Switzerland. Knowing that they would hardly obtain an entry or work per-
mit, they cross the border illegally. Many of them invent a dramatic story of 
persecution for the hearing by the authorities. With such tactics they hope to 
be granted refugee status. From the viewpoint of the person concerned, this 
behaviour is understandable, from the perspective of asylum legislation it 
constitutes abuse of asylum proceedings. The authorities must reject such 
applications without delay and execute removal systematically, making asy-
lum proceedings unattractive for foreigners seeking employment.11 
The quote illustrates a common assumption within the SEM that many (or 
even most) asylum seekers will lie. While deemed understandable (“anyone 
in that situation would do it”, I was often told), it is, nevertheless, the deci-
sion-makers' duty to separate the “real” from the “false” refugees, the ones 
“telling the truth” from the ones “who are lying” (see also Fassin & Kobelin-
sky 2012: 446; Kobelinsky 2015: 67). This is regarded as important because 
the asylum system is only seen to work if those “not deserving of protection” 
10  Several authors have shown that asylum (and immigration) politics, law and deci-
sion-making produce a very particular “‘figure’ (Fassin 2007: 512) of the deserving aid 
recipient, framing him or her as a victim in need of protection” (Cabot 2013: 453; see, for 
instance, Ticktin 2006; Zetter 2007). 
11  https://perma.cc/ZG4B-NN6U [accessed 22 August 2019].
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are denied asylum. This quote from Miaz's fieldwork shows this distinction 
nicely: 
I think that saying “no” to someone who's not a refugee in the sense of the 
UNHCR and of the Refugee Convention contributes to the protection of the 
asylum institution. One has to say “no” to those who are not refugees in order 
to be able to say “yes” to those who are (Af folter et al. 2019: 273). 
Similarly, Fassin and Kobelinsky have argued that “[t]he less frequently 
[asylum] is granted, the more precious refugee status becomes” (2012: 464). 
Thus, in order to maintain the value of asylum, many applications need to be 
rejected (ibid.: 465). Furthermore, the quote from the SEM website states that 
it is decision-makers' duty to make “asylum proceedings unattractive for for-
eigners seeking employment”. I would argue that it is as much about making 
applying for asylum in Switzerland generally unattractive, or, at least not “as 
attractive” in comparison with other European countries. On the first day of 
training, new decision makers are told: “You are going to hear this often from 
now on: We are always afraid of the ‘pull-effect’” (field notes). The assump-
tion is that if Switzerland is “too generous in the granting of asylum (and 
humanitarian protection) compared to other countries”, many more people 
will come (Poertner 2017: 17). Hence, although not officially stated, it follows 
that the office aims to keep both the number of new applications, and the 
number of successful applications low. That keeping numbers low is a deci-
sion-maker's duty was a message repeatedly conveyed in induction training. 
It may not have been explicitly taught, but it was consistently implied, as the 
following examples show.
In one of the training courses I attended, the instructor presented us 
with a graph comparing the number of new asylum applications in Europe 
and in Switzerland between 1998 and 2014. The graph showed that, in 2014, 
the percentage of asylum applicants in Switzerland was at its lowest point 
since 1998, dropping from 8.2% in 2012 to 3.8% in 2014. Drawing attention 
to this, the instructor commented: “Switzerland must have done something 
right, since the percentage of applications has gone down like this” (field 
notes). The message was quite clear. If “Switzerland” – partially through 
its frontline decision-makers – did its job well, this reduced the number of 
applications (especially in comparison with other European countries). 
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The second example comes from a course on how to deal with applica-
tions for family reunification. The instructor told the new decision-makers 
that the institutional practice for dealing with Eritrean applications was to 
request DNA proof that the applicants were indeed related to the people they 
intended to bring to Switzerland. The instructor said: “If they do not hand 
in DNA proof, the case is ready to be decided, namely negatively. I have seen 
that people have still been granted entry in such cases. Please don't do that. 
That's the worst signal we could be sending out” (field notes). With this state-
ment, the instructor urged trainees to make sure their decision-making did 
not send out the wrong message to avoid creating a “pull-effect”. The wrong 
message is that Switzerland is a country where family reunification is as easy 
as circumventing the regulations. 
The two substantial goals the office is geared towards can be deduced 
from the examples above. As a Federal institution, the SEM – and, therefore, 
its staff – are requested to represent “national interests”. On the one hand, 
this means fulfilling Switzerland's duties under international law (partic-
ularly the Geneva Convention and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child) and maintaining its self-ascribed image as a humanitarian country. 
Upholding the noble value of asylum succeeds by excluding those “unde-
serving” of it. The scarcer asylum protection becomes, the more precious 
its value. On the other hand, it also means securing Switzerland's “borders” 
by restricting non-citizens' access to rights and goods, and by making sure 
that there are not too many “foreigners” residing in Switzerland. My analysis 
subsumes both sets of practices within the phrase “protecting the system”, 
which, via two ostensibly opposed logics, comes to mean keeping numbers 
of asylum applicants low. This is at least partly achieved by keeping accep-
tance rates low. Decision-makers become “guardians of a restricted good”: 
the right to reside in Switzerland (Heyman 2009: 381; see also Lipsky 2010: 
4). My point here is not to say that all decision-makers consciously strive 
towards keeping numbers low. Many explicitly do not. However, I argue that 
the ethical goals of the office shape decision-makers' understanding of what 
it means to do their job well. 
This is illustrated by the widespread language usage I encountered 
amongst decision-makers in the SEM. The verb most commonly used in 
granting asylum is “have to”, whereas for rejecting asylum claims it is “can”. 
Decision-makers typically say things like: “In that case I will have to grant 
asylum”. Or: “If I had better arguments, I could reject this claim, but I can't 
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like this”. This language usage is not something decision-makers seem to be 
aware of, but it is also common amongst caseworkers prone to criticising col-
leagues for being “too strict” or “cynics” who want to reject as many asylum 
claims as possible (see Affolter et al. 2019; Miaz 2017: 371ff). This particu-
lar language usage shows how the role of protector of the system is adopted 
and internalised by decision-makers. It becomes part of their institutional 
habitus, which, building on Bourdieu, I define as the schemes of thinking, 
acting, feeling and desiring that arise from an official's position in the SEM 
(Bourdieu 1976; see Terdiman 1987: 811).12 Protecting the system becomes the 
self-evident priority for decision-makers, as can be seen in the following 
example. While discussing a text in which I had written that the (implicit) 
goal of decision-making practices was to protect the system, a caseworker 
said to me: “Ok, yes, you could put it like this, but you could also phrase it as 
loyalty. That would be a bit more positive” (field notes). Although intended 
as critique, this remark actually reinforces my analytical point. For the SEM 
official, loyalty refers to being loyal towards a particular actor: the state. 
Whereas we could picture other loyalties, towards asylum seekers, for exam-
ple, it is self-evident to the official that being loyal means putting what he 
sees as the state's interests first. This understanding of loyalty shapes the 
norms and values that define what it means to be professional in the SEM. 
The good decision-maker: professional ethos
This section explores the professional norms and values that lie at the heart of 
everyday decision-making. In the SEM, the idea of fairness builds on many 
other professional values: apolitical-ness, objectivity, (emotional) detach-
ment, professional suspicion (or non-naïvety) and strict rule-following. Sub-
sequent sections deal with individual norms in more detail, showing how 
they both reinforce and conf lict with each other.
12  I develop the concept of the “institutional habitus” in more detail in my thesis (see Af-
folter 2017a: 10f f). 
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The fair decision-maker
Alberto tells me that for him it is very important that all the asylum decisions 
leaving his section are fair. That is why he does not want the Iraqi family to 
be granted temporary protection. His view fits with that of Gabriel, quoted 
at the beginning of this paper. For both of them, fairness is about reserving 
protection for those “truly deserving” of it. 
Fairness is an important value in the SEM. Hence, a widespread under-
standing amongst caseworkers, which came up a lot in my material, is 
that their decision-making should always be fair. In most cases, fairness is 
equated with legal equality. The principle of legal equality means treating 
equal things equally and unequal things unequally. Therefore, for SEM offi-
cials, making fair decisions means using “the same standards for evaluating 
each claim” (Nora, superior, interview transcript). Ideally, they said, it should 
not matter who decides a particular case, the outcome should always be the 
same. For them, the way to achieve this is by strictly following the rules set 
by institutional practice (see also Lavanchy 2013: 69). Strict rule-following or 
“law application” is understood in this sense: if there are legal arguments for 
rejecting a case, it must be rejected. One should not grant asylum or tem-
porary protection in such cases (“just”) because making a positive decision 
might be quicker than meticulously arguing a negative decision, because one 
has become emotionally attached to the applicant, or because of personal 
political opinions, for example. At the same time, if there are clearly no justi-
fications for rejecting a claim, reasons should not be made up out of thin air. 
That too is considered unfair. Connected to this norm of strict rule following 
is caseworkers' understanding that good decision-makers who properly ful-
fil their duties “dig deep” into every case to make sure that there are “truly no 
reasons” for rejection.
Consequently, decision-makers who take justice into their own hands by 
trying to help someone who is “undeserving” are portrayed as behaving in 
an unfair and unprofessional manner. Often such behaviour is equated with 
being “political”. One caseworker, Lucy, once explained to me that trying to 
help an “undeserving” applicant – even someone who had suffered great 
injustice, for example, by being “so poor he could not feed his five kids”  – 
would be unfair to others because: 
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This can rapidly lead to one marching to a dif ferent drummer. And in my 
opinion, then you are not being fair anymore, even though you want to be. 
Because your decisions don't conform with our asylum practice, you're not 
maintaining a unité de doctrine. […] It is not up to us to decide what is just or 
not. […]. Really, it's the politician who should ask himself that question” (Lucy, 
caseworker, interview transcript). 
As we see, Lucy fears that by “over-generously” helping one person she might 
end up being “unfair” towards other (more “deserving”) asylum seekers. 
While for her (like most of my other interaction partners) good and pro-
fessional decision-making is very much linked with fairness, it has little 
or nothing to do with justice. The world is an unjust place, several of them 
offered in explanation, but it was not up to them to change that. Justice, they 
felt, was the responsibility of politics and politicians.13 
Yet this does not mean that decision-makers never deviate from “strict 
rule-following”. Even where there are reasons for rejection, decisions to 
grant asylum or temporary protection are sometimes still made. In “excep-
tional cases”, I was told by several interaction partners, it was sometimes 
okay to turn a blind eye. The expression “to turn a blind eye”, used in this con-
text, once again highlights that good decision-making filters out the “unde-
serving” by finding legal reasons and arguments to exclude them from pro-
tection. Only in “exceptional cases” are these reasons deliberately overlooked. 
As the following quote shows, whether or not decision-makers turn a blind 
eye and become more lenient may also depend on the ethics of the office: 
You know, if you have a single man without family and you think what he is 
telling you could possibly be predominantly credible, then you can more eas-
ily turn a blind eye. But with someone with a big family back home, you really 
have to see the bigger picture (Julie, caseworker, interview transcript). 
Julie and many of her colleagues may therefore turn a blind eye if doing so 
does not deviate (too much) from their duty to protect the system. She says 
in the quote that, for a single man, she might stop “digging” for reasons to 
13  This fits with what Das argues when she writes that “detachment is done by an explicit 
distancing from the political process, taking it as a given for the particular outcomes to 
be produced” (2015: 104). 
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reject the case sooner than for a big family who would all be allowed to stay. 
That is what she refers to as the “bigger picture”. In the latter case, she has to 
be more careful to reserve the right to stay for those “truly deserving”. 
The objective and (emotionally) detached decision-maker
Since he has seen so many cases as a superior, he is now able to “see things 
more clearly, from a certain distance, more objectively”, Alberto explains to 
Rebecca and me. For him distance and objectivity are what it takes to be pro-
fessional and reach good decisions. He considers Rebecca's decision to be a 
bad one because it is “too generous”. Rebecca thinks that the fact that she 
was “too nice” and made “too generous” a decision might have been inf lu-
enced by the family's pleasant appearance when she interviewed them. In 
other words, she thinks she had liked them too much. In the SEM, emotional 
attachment and personal involvement are seen as the antithesis of objective 
decision-making. For a decision to be objective, it should be based solely on 
the “facts” of the case: on applicants' recorded statements and all the writ-
ten documents applicants have supplied or decision-makers have acquired. 
“Distance” is considered crucial for achieving this. In the following, I exam-
ine what SEM officials understand by distance, and what measures are 
undertaken to create distance in order to enable objective decision-making. 
SEM officials are not allowed to interview asylum seekers they know 
personally. If they are assigned the case of an applicant they know, they are 
obliged to give it back or pass it on to a co-worker. Moreover, in a training 
module dealing with the role of decision-makers in the interviews, trainees 
were told to maintain appropriate distance – not just towards asylum seek-
ers, but also towards other professionals who participate in asylum inter-
views. They were informed that, whereas it was not forbidden to befriend 
these professionals outside work, the interview was not a place for informal 
or personal conversation.14 
14  In practice, this is somewhat dif ferent. Several decision-makers maintain friendly ties 
with minute-takers and interpreters and this was evident during interviews when they 
initiated personal conversations or took breaks together. However, caseworkers are al-
ways careful to maintain a certain distance between themselves and the asylum seekers. 
Thus, conversations between decision-makers and asylum seekers are usually limited to 
the interview itself and, at times, to some formal small talk on the way to and from the 
of fice and the waiting room.
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Separate waiting rooms ref lect the distance created between different 
types of actors. At the headquarters, one waiting room is for asylum seekers, 
and a separate room is shared by interpreters, social aid representatives and 
other visitors such as myself. At the reception and processing centres where 
I conducted my fieldwork, these auxiliary personnel sit in the same common 
room as the decision-makers themselves, while asylum seekers wait else-
where. This separation ensures that all personal encounters and interactions 
between officials and asylum seekers are confined to interviews, where they 
are entirely “professional”. 
Another feature that promotes professional distance is the seating 
arrangement during the interviews, which usually take place in an offi-
cial's personal office. The offices are equipped in a standard manner. The 
stenographer takes minutes at a desk with a computer. Other participants 
are placed around a larger rectangular table. These small rooms become very 
cramped during an interview with five participants (plus me) sitting in them. 
This forces people to sit close together. Although seating arrangements are 
generally not conscious decisions, but merely copied from other officials, 
most decision-makers sit at opposite ends of the table from the asylum seek-
ers, and they therefore sit the farthest apart. When I asked an official why 
they always sat like that he replied: “Well, for me it's important that I can look 
the applicant in the eye, that I can look at him during our conversation, that 
I'm opposite him and sometimes I am also grateful for the distance” (Gabriel, 
caseworker, interview transcript).
Gabriel's quote points not only to the importance of distance, it also illus-
trates the value decision-makers ascribe to the “proximity” of face-to-face 
encounters. Face-to-face encounters are valued for a number of reasons. 
First, they are seen as an important source of professional-practical knowl-
edge, a term, building on Reckwitz (2003: 289ff), that I use for the institu-
tionalised intuitive knowledge or “gut feeling” that plays an important role 
in decision-making (see, for instance, Jubany 2011: 86ff; Lavanchy 2014: 92; 
Macklin 1998).15 Furthermore, decision-makers believe that by seeing the 
applicant they can do better justice to the individual case, because they get 
15  I develop this concept of “professional-practical knowledge” in more detail elsewhere (see 
Af folter 2017a: 67f f, 2017b: 156f f). It describes what has also been called “tacit knowledge” 
or Erfahrungswissen (experience-based knowledge) by other authors that is acquired on 
the job (see Polanyi 1966; Sofsky & Paris 1995: 54). 
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a better feeling of what is really at stake. Moreover, many decision-makers 
told me that it was easier to stand by their decisions if they had person-
ally interviewed the asylum seeker. They usually felt more confident that 
they were making “the right” decision when this was the case. Finally, one 
decision-maker told me that she found doing asylum interviews important, 
because “you sit opposite these people time and again and you realise that it 
is not just a number [you are dealing with], but a human being with all his 
hopes and dreams” (Lucy, caseworker, interview transcript). Yet, while close 
encounters in the interviews are acknowledged as important for the afore-
mentioned reasons, decision-makers also see a danger that, like Rebecca, 
they will become emotionally attached. All my interaction partners told me 
that, for this reason, they usually put the case file aside for a couple of days 
after the interview, to (re-)gain some distance, so that their decision will 
not be inf luenced by sentiments the interview triggered. In this way, they 
become objective again.
As shown above, Lucy felt that it is important not to reduce people to 
numbers. I frequently encountered this norm in the SEM. Reducing peo-
ple to numbers, not recognising them as persons (but instead as “piece[s] of 
paper”) is regarded as doing one's job badly. Thus, a common outside critique 
(of reducing people to numbers, cases or files) is mirrored in this internal 
value (see, for instance, Eule 2014: 109; Fuglerud 2004: 36; Scheffer 2001).16 
Good decision-makers are supposed to care for the people they deal with (see 
also Watkins-Hayes 2009: 70). 
The sufficiently but not overly suspicious decision-maker
Alberto tells me that over the years he has become “stricter” and “less naïve”. 
Both attributes he (implicitly) connects to fair decision-making: They allow 
him to be fair. As shown above, the common assumption in the SEM is that 
most asylum seekers are “bogus”. They belong to the group considered “eco-
nomic migrants” and are trying to manipulate the system in order to stay 
(see also Kelly 2012: 755; Souter 2011: 48). It is therefore the decision-makers' 
duty to combat “fraud”, uncover the “underserving” and reject their claims 
16  However, “distancing”, as Eule (2014: 109) calls it, also occurs in the SEM in ways that are 
not recognised and reflected on by caseworkers, for instance, in terms of language usage. 
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as quickly as possible.17 This understanding of asylum decision-making leads 
to “a shift from trying to find the truth to searching for untruth, from a con-
cern with proof to a concern with lies” (Kelly 2012: 765). 
On the whole, the role decision-makers have in the interview and in deci-
sion-making processes is that of a “sceptic”, as some have called it themselves. 
They see it as their duty to ask as many questions as necessary until they are 
convinced that the asylum seeker's story is true, or to produce sufficient 
arguments for writing a negative decision. Similar to what Alpes and Spire 
(2014: 269) describe for French consulates and Scheffer (2003:456) cites with 
regard to German asylum administrations, in the SEM “to be suspicious is 
a sign of professionalism” (Alpes and Spire 2014: 269). Conversely, to believe 
asylum seekers' statements without testing their credibility is a sign of 
naïvety. Decision-makers often worry when statements “seem credible” that 
the asylum seekers memorised them beforehand, or have knowledge about 
certain things for reasons other than personal persecution. For instance, 
once, after an asylum interview in which the applicant had talked for quite 
a long time about being in prison, the decision-maker said to me: “This is 
maybe a bit ‘obsessive’ (zwanghaf t), but the applicant could also have been 
a prison guard and that's why he's so familiar with the conditions in prison” 
(field notes).
While being sceptical is a sign of professionalism, being overly suspi-
cious is regarded as a vice. As Das argues, (emotional) detachment does not 
equal cold disinterest (2015: 103ff; see also Candea et al. 2015: 24). In the SEM, 
disinterested or indifferent decision-makers are called “cynics”. They are 
criticised – mostly behind their backs, as far as I observed – for doing their 
job badly.18 Cynics are said to enter asylum interviews with closed minds, 
17  The same has been observed in the case of registry of fices in Switzerland and welfare 
of fices in the US (Lavanchy 2014: 99; Watkins-Hayes 2009: 50f). 
18  An observation I made in the SEM is that decision-makers of ten denounce their col-
leagues – particularly those working in other units of the of fice – for bad decision-making 
(see Af folter et al. 2019). The most common emic distinction made is between “hardlin-
ers” and “sof ties” (see Miaz 2017: 372). While the former are criticised for being too rigid in 
their decision-making, the latter are accused of being too lenient. During my fieldwork, 
I only observed such criticism being made behind other people's backs. However, I was 
privy to a rumour which leads me to believe that the dif ferent “attitudes” may actually 
be used in apportioning cases. I was told that superiors tend to direct the applications 
they think will most likely be rejected to those caseworkers who take negative decisions 
more frequently than others whereas the cases more likely to be judged favourably are 
Keeping Numbers Low in the Name of Fairness 45
always already knowing that everything will be a lie. This opposes the norm 
of open-mindedness. During my research, I was frequently told what is also 
taught in the training modules, that decision-makers must be open-minded 
in order to do their job well. They should go into every interview with a tabula 
rasa even if, at the same time, they should already have an idea of what the 
decision might be in order to conduct the interview efficiently. 
While becoming a cynic is perceived as a greater risk for older employees 
who have already “seen too much”, being naïve (and not sceptical enough) 
is regarded as an attribute that new employees have to grow out of. Con-
nected to these perceptions is a crucial difference in critique. Whereas naïve 
decision-making is regularly equated with being unprofessional, I have never 
come across that criticism of cynical decision-making.19 New decision-mak-
ers who “naïvely believe everything the claimants tell them” appear to lack 
sufficient understanding of what it means to properly fulfil their duty, and 
experienced decision-makers who naïvely believe an applicant are often crit-
icised as being lazy – too lazy, one could interpret, to properly fulfil their 
duties. On the other hand, the term often used to describe an overly sus-
picious and cynical attitude is déformation professionelle, or occupational 
hazard. Used by SEM officials to describe how the views of decision-makers 
may become distorted by long service on the job, this term is applied when 
veracity is disparaged too much.20 Thus, critiques of cynical decision-mak-
ing do not criticise officials for being unprofessional or not protecting the 
system, but for taking protection too far, and losing sight of those who are 
“deserving”.
The apolitical decision-maker
When Alberto, slightly defensively, brought up “the question of nation states” 
in a conversation introduced earlier in the chapter, and “whether one thinks 
nation states are good or not,” he was referring to a particular political ide-
given to those decision-makers with a reputation for granting asylum more readily (see 
also Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012: 462).
19  And neither have Jonathan Miaz and Ephraim Poertner who also conducted research in 
the SEM (see Af folter et al. 2019: 281). 
20  In academia, the term déformation professionelle can be traced back to the sociologist Dan-
iel Warnotte, who used it to describe how “bureaucrats” become “intellectually and emo-
tionally damaged by their roles” (Maccoby 2007: 62).
Laura Affolter46
ology that questions the fundamental idea of nation states. Even if he was 
sympathetic towards this idea – Alberto did not really state his opinion and 
left this possibility open – the message he conveyed is clear: On the job, there 
is no place for personal political opinions. But not only that. By saying that 
these problems “cannot be solved by what we do”, he insinuated that deci-
sion-making is also apolitical. Both of these statements ref lect perspectives 
that are common in the SEM. 
The “apolitical” norm fits with the impersonal spirit Weber depicts as an 
important feature of the bureaucratic ethos. He writes: 
“Sine ira et studio,” without hatred or passion, and hence without af fection 
or enthusiasm. The dominant norms are concepts of straightforward duty 
without regard to personal considerations. […] This is the spirit in which the 
ideal of ficial conducts his of fice (2013: 225).
In contrast, the “politician's element” is “ira et studium” (Weber 1991: 95). 
Thus, according to Weber, politicians must have passion and fight, whereas 
bureaucrats should do neither. A similar opinion is widespread in the SEM: 
there “all” an official should do is to follow rules and “neutrally apply the law”. 
This is illustrated in the following quote: 
I have a problem with “missionaries”. And there are some here in the SEM. We 
don't have a mission here. We just have to decide upon cases. We don't have 
to protect Switzerland from foreigners. That is not our role. But some people 
here feel this way. They think that there are too many asylum seekers here. 
But that is not my problem. I am paid to take decisions, so I take decisions. On 
the other hand, there are some who proselytise on behalf of the asylum seek-
ers. They think that everybody should be able to stay here. But that is not the 
case. We have the law. […] And then there are the others who say: “If you give 
a temporary permit to this guy, who is only 20, and then he stays for 30 years, 
that will cost Switzerland 10 million francs.” Again, that is not my problem. 
If he fulfils the eligibility criteria he can stay. If you're not happy with it, you 
have to change the law. But then you have to go into politics, you shouldn't be 
working here. (Barbara, caseworker, interview transcript) 
I find Barbara's quote particularly telling in three regards. First, she depicts 
“doing the job one is paid to do” and “sticking to the rules” as apolitical work. 
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However, from an analytical perspective, I would not claim that SEM deci-
sion-makers are apolitical actors, but rather that they make policies (and 
politics) while “translating and implementing [them] into action” (Wedel et 
al. 2005: 34). Barbara's statement illustrates how “the political” is masked 
“under the cloak of neutrality” (Shore and Wright 1997: 8).
Second, Barbara uses the word “missionaries” to describe a role deci-
sion-makers should not take on. Missionaries pursue clear goals with their 
decision-making: they either want to enable everybody to stay, or to make 
sure that as few people as possible are allowed to remain in Switzerland. 
In contrast, Barbara claims that a professional decision-maker's only aim 
should be to “correctly” and “neutrally” apply the law. For her, professional 
decision-making has no room for ideologies and pursuit of goals other than 
following the law. At first sight this could be perceived to contradict what I 
have described as being the ethics of the office. But I argue that this is not so 
for the following reason. Although my interaction partners rarely presented 
what I have described as the ethics of the office as explicit norms, they are, 
nevertheless, prevalent in my material as ideologies underlying the explic-
itly stated norms and values. Because they lie at the heart of professional-
ism in the SEM, these ideologies (unlike the ones Barbara describes) are not 
perceived by decision-makers as being outside the law, but they implicitly 
inform what “correct” and “neutral” rule-following means.
Third, Barbara's quote tellingly advocates for “political neutrality” – 
which is widely recognised as an important norm within the SEM. However, 
what this means exactly may vary for individual decision-makers. At several 
points during our conversations, Barbara clearly identified herself as “anti-
SVP” (the right-wing Swiss People's Party). Hence, she was most critical of 
what she sometimes called “SVP-decision-making”. On the other hand, sev-
eral other interaction partners criticised “left-wing decision-making”. For 
example, one superior claimed that some of her “left-wing” colleagues, who 
were too lenient in their decision-making because they “want[ed] to save the 
world”, were egoistic. By calling her “left-wing” colleagues' decision-making 
egoistic, she is criticising them for doing what feels good and looking out for 
themselves, instead of strictly following the rules. In her view, they should 
have fulfilled their duties as decision-makers by attending to the broader 
aims of the office: protecting the system and reserving government protec-
tion for the “truly deserving”. 
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The necessity of “digging deep”
This section addresses a widespread decision-making practice regarded as 
a “correct” and “neutral” rule application: “digging deep”. My example shows 
how the ethics of the office shapes decision-makers' discretionary practices, 
making it normal and desirable for them to act in specific ways. I understand 
discretionary practices to be processes of interpreting the law when fitting 
it to specific cases or situations. Therefore, discretion necessarily forms part 
of the law, since (written) law is “by its very nature unspecific” and “always 
needs to be applied to a specific situation, and therefore interpreted” (Eck-
ert 2015: 1). “Digging deep” is a discretionary practice used to “apply” Article 
7 of the Swiss Asylum Act, which regulates “proof of refugee status”.21 The 
example of “digging deep” that follows allows me to show how this everyday 
practice is shaped by the norms discussed above, and also how it reaffirms 
these same norms and values, upon which it is based. 
Fair decision-making requires strict rule-following. As discussed above, 
if legal arguments support rejecting a case, it must be rejected. Many schol-
ars have observed that asylum proceedings function as quests to find rea-
sons to doubt applicants and deny their claims (see, for instance, Scheffer 
2001: 194, 2003: 455). This can be seen in asylum interviews, where question-
ing is oriented towards “discovering” mistakes and “uncovering untruths”. 
While decision-makers simply call this practice “testing credibility”, I call it 
“digging deep”. When “digging deep”, decision-makers ask “tricky” questions 
in asylum interviews and/or undertake extra investigations until they have 
enough arguments to reject a claim, or are convinced that the applicant's 
story is true “after all”.22 
As the above-mentioned norms and values suggest, “digging deep” is the 
epitome of good and professional decision-making in the SEM. The practice 
21  Article 7 AsylA reads as follows: “1Any person who applies for asylum must prove or at 
least credibly demonstrate their refugee status. 2Refugee status is credibly demonstrat-
ed if the authority regards it as proven on the balance of probabilities. 3Cases are not 
credible in particular if they are unfounded in essential points or are inherently contra-
dictory, do not correspond to the facts or are substantially based on forged or falsified 
evidence” (https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995092/index.html 
[accessed 20 September 2018]. 
22  An exception is when decision-makers know “from the beginning” that a story is “simply 
true” due to their professional-practical knowledge (see footnote 15). 
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is framed as “necessary”, allowing decision-makers to make positive asylum 
decisions with a “clear conscience”: 
Sometimes you do an additional interview when technically everything indi-
cates that a story could be true but there are two, three contradictions in it. 
In such cases it just feels strange to grant asylum when there are still some 
uncertainties, some open questions. So, then you do [an additional interview] 
so that if you then get an answer that really satisfies you, you can write a pos-
itive decision with a clear conscience. (Denise, caseworker, interview transcript) 
Here Denise is talking about the need to carry out additional asylum inter-
views if, after the first “in-depth” interview, too many uncertainties remain. 
She refers to cases in which something “feels off”, but there are not enough 
discrepancies to reject the claim. In those cases, Denise declares, she has 
to “dig deep” in order to see whether there are arguments against asylum. If 
arguments exist, the claim “can” be rejected. If not, a positive decision can be 
made with a “clear conscience”. 
In order to “dig deep”, decision-makers use a particular questioning tech-
nique taught to all caseworkers during their initial training.23 It is common 
for decision-makers to begin their questioning by asking about applicants' 
reasons for leaving their country and applying for asylum. Interviews open 
with a question such as: “Why did you leave country and apply for asylum 
in Switzerland?” After that, decision-makers follow-up with specific “wh- 
questions” and some yes or no questions. At the end of the interview, the asy-
lum seekers are usually confronted with contradictions found in their story. 
The open question at the beginning is intended to give asylum seekers 
the opportunity to tell their stories. One purpose of the follow-up questions 
(the wh- questions in particular) then is to enable the decision-makers to col-
lect all the necessary information for taking their decisions (e.g. who exactly 
the persecutors were and what might have been motives for persecution). 
Another purpose of these questions is to see whether asylum seeker can talk 
in detail about certain events they are asked about (e.g. “please tell me in 
detail about the daily routine in prison”) or to generate answers the deci-
sion-makers can then compare with “facts” they can look up (e.g. “what was 
23  For a closer discussion of this technique in reference to a specific empirical example, see 
Af folter (2017a: 71f f). 
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the name of your church that was bombed?”). Both these things – depend-
ing on whether asylum seekers manage to answer them adequately or not – 
serve as indicators of credibility or non-credibility. Finally, these questions 
allow for comparisons. Hence, in order to “be able to” reason non-credibility 
decisions on the basis of contradictions, decision-makers need on-file facts 
that they can compare with each other. 
My interaction partners used two distinct metaphors to describe this 
three-step questioning technique: “It is like a funnel (Trichter)”, one of them 
said. Another one compared it to the “tightening of a noose (Zuziehen einer 
Schlinge)”. The first metaphor seems to indicate that one gets closer and closer 
to the heart of the matter through this kind of questioning, “the truth” (or 
“non-truth”) of what happened. The second metaphor seems to assume that 
asylum seekers often lie, and sees the procedure as a means of exposing the 
liars. Several decision-makers stated that starting with an open question 
was useful because asylum seekers' “free narrative” ( freien Erzählung) tended 
to get tangled up in contradictions “if the story was not true”. 
As Scheffer (2001: 184) and Trueman (2009: 296) have argued, such 
questioning techniques, rather than passively “discovering” mistakes and 
“untruths”, actively generate them. They therefore contribute to creating 
the figure of the “false refugee”. Once asylum seekers have been classi-
fied as “false refugees” and assigned to the legal category of “non-refugee” 
(with or without temporary admission), their very existence reinforces the 
perception that there “are” indeed many false refugees. This perception, in 
turn, strengthens endeavours to identify and deny them asylum (see also 
Zimmermann 2011: 337). Thus, the practice of “digging deep” reaffirms deci-
sion-makers' duty to protect the system, and confirms ideas of how profes-
sionals should act in service of this duty (see Eckert, this volume). 
Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have shown how the ethics of protecting the system make 
“digging deep” the routine thing for decision-makers to do. “Digging deep”, 
in turn, reinforces the professional norms that lie at its heart, and reaf-
firms decision-makers' role as protectors of the system. By exploring the 
professional norm of fairness in detail, I have portrayed how the procedural 
values that make up the bureaucratic ethos are shaped by the ethics of the 
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office. The bureaucratic ethics not only seem to yield professionally neces-
sary behaviours – things decision-makers have to do – certain professional 
behaviours, such as “digging deep”, also become morally right or, we could 
also say, ethical ways for decision-makers to act. 
It has frequently been argued that “bureaucracies” and “bureaucrats” 
are indifferent (see Arendt 2013; Bauman 2000; Gill 2016; Herzfeld 1992). 
Gill thus writes that “bureaucrats” cease to care about the people they deal 
with because their concern and compassion for them is overridden by other 
concerns: most notably instrumental-rational rule-following (2016: 136). 
However, I have shown on the basis of the procedural norm of fairness not 
how concern for people is overridden by other concerns but rather how it is 
brought into accordance with the exclusionary ethics of the office.
For this purpose, many authors have argued that in order to understand 
how bureaucrats bring in line law and policy work, we need to pay attention 
to “bureaucrats'” actions, routines and habits (Fassin 2015: 4; Silbey 2005: 324; 
Wedel et al. 2005: 34).  Here, rather than “simply” looking at what “bureau-
crats” do, I have dealt with one important aspect of what makes them do what 
they do; namely, what they think they should do (see Eckert, this volume). 
Institutional norms shape the “practices of the state” (Migdal and 
Schlichte 2005: 15; see also Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 2014: 5ff; Eck-
ert et al. 2012: 15). Such norms, images of what the public good constitutes 
and the understanding of how the public good might best be served change 
over time (Eckert, this volume). Taking what bureaucrats think they should 
be doing seriously at different times and places,  i.e. within their specific 
historical situations, we are able to show how bureaucratic ethics and ethos 
are transformed. This allows us to better understand “states at work” (Bier-
schenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014) in and across different (historical) set-
tings. My analysis offers an explanation for the exclusionary workings of the 
Swiss state, asylum law and policies. In particular, it contributes to under-
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The Asylum Procedure in Border Detention 




France has established a border control system at airports that organizes 
deportations in real time. These deportation practices are nonetheless 
restricted by international laws concerning asylum, which the French state 
undertook to respect as a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the 
Protection of Refugees. Two principles apply in particular: an asylum seeker 
is exempt from presenting documents to cross the border of a country where 
he or she seeks asylum, and he or she cannot be deported until his or her 
application has been heard and examined.1 At Roissy-CdG Airport in Paris, 
for example, asylum seekers must be detained until their applications can 
be examined and adjudicated before they are allowed to enter France. Thus, 
the legalities of refugee protection necessitate their detention. This places 
asylum administration at the origins of border detention (Crépeau 1995). 
State power holds sway over asylum applicants in an exceptional legal 
and administrative space determined by specific identification and classi-
fication processes. An applicant's personal account, given to a refugee pro-
tection agent at his or her hearing, is the foundation of asylum procedure. 
The conditions of migration are negotiated in a space where the national 
host community is redefined literally by filtering and excluding those who 
do not belong to it, and figuratively by affirming common rationalities and 
1  “Non-refoulement” (defined in article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees) has become a principle of customary international law, as it applies even to states 
that are not parties to this Convention or its 1967 Protocol.
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moral values, such as democratic assistance or protection of the welfare 
state against abuses and false refugees (Noiriel 1992, Crépeau 1995, Lavenex 
1999, Schuster 2005). Several studies have pointed out that asylum manage-
ment in Western countries is based on truth determination practices (Her-
lihy, Gleeson and Turner 2010, Fassin 2013, Kobelinsky 2015, Kynsileto and 
Puumala 2015, Maskens 2015). These practices are articulated from impera-
tives of control that aim to restrict the immigration of asylum seekers from 
unwanted populations (Marrus 1985, Belorgey 2003 and 2007, Rousseau and 
Foxen 2006, Valluy 2009). These studies remind us that rules established (or 
crafted in situ) for truth determination are inseparable from issues of speech, 
power and population management. Starting with my fieldwork narratives, 
this chapter explores how asylum procedures at the border, built on ways of 
determining truth and falsehood, are exercised under the mutual suspicion 
of both the applicants and the administration. 
For someone experiencing detention at the border, control and resistance 
are tied to the process of “narrating oneself” (Butler 2005), of putting mem-
ory into words. But this personal narrative is conditioned by the applicant's 
precarious situation and by administrative scepticism. Narrative structure 
and form are anchored in the narrator's psychic, cultural and social condi-
tion, including his or her experience of border detention. Both sides have a 
stake in how the narrative is articulated. 
For applicants, coherence and veracity determine the likelihood of sin-
cerity and whether their cases fit under an increasingly restrictive reading 
of the Geneva Convention. Narratives must also confront, def lect or decode 
collective representations in the host country that “produce indifference” 
towards asylum seekers (Herzfeld 199) in the administrative world of border 
control. For the administration, standards of judgement perform the dou-
ble work of narrative transcription and evaluation, constructing a “regime 
of verification” (Foucault 2004b) to determine the fate of refuges. This chap-
ter will investigate processes of identification and administrative catego-
rization, the interactions and narratives that together build asylum proce-
dure as a space where “truth” is investigated by asking: What epistemology 
is at work here? What meanings and definitions of “truth” apply? How are 
national rationalities and moral order delineated at the border, where indi-
vidual decisions control who can enter and who cannot?
This chapter explores these questions through an ethnography of bor-
der detention based on my fieldwork at Roissy-CDG Airport in Paris, where 
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I volunteered as a legal assistant with the NGO Anafé (Assistance nationales 
aux frontières pour les étrangers) between 2004 and 2008. I assisted undoc-
umented migrants and asylum seekers with their paperwork and helped 
them navigate their administrative journey through border detention. This 
“observatory participation” (Makaremi 2008) not only gave me access to the 
detention centre, it helped me understand the procedure, its temporality, its 
actors, its spoken and unspoken rules and how it functions in general. This 
kind of engaged ethnography presented specific methodological and ethi-
cal challenges. But it also offered new paths for knowledge production that 
combine the traditional demands of objectivity with an openness to the 
heuristics of emotions, experience and empathy.2 The analysis I offer here 
builds on field notes, observations of individual trajectories, a critical review 
of forty-eight asylum decisions and interviews with both refugee protection 
officers and former detainees who had been admitted to France. Many years 
have passed since I collected this empirical data. Almost a dozen laws and 
regulations have modified border detention and asylum procedure in France. 
However, these legislative changes did not address real needs for procedural 
readjustment but rather directly ref lect the role of immigration in global 
political power struggles. A new modality of ill-treatment and exclusion 
through administrative complexity has instilled institutional violence in the 
rule of law. Nevertheless, here I focus on the underlying logics and admin-
istrative episteme, setting aside recent border detention and asylum con-
troversies, which have rearranged but not substantially affected the form of 
government at play.3 
The bureaucracy of border asylum 
According to figures from the French Ministry of the Interior, 33 percent of 
those kept in airport waiting zones in 2015 were asylum seekers (Anafé 2016). 
The special procedure for examining asylum applications in such areas has 
evolved over the past three decades, but its guiding principle is as follows: 
applications are examined at the border by officials of the Asylum Divi-
sion, who draw up “opinions” for the Ministry of the Interior, which decides 
2  I discuss these issues in Makaremi 2008.
3  For a discussion of recent developments of asylum laws see, for instance, Palluel 2016.
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whether or not to admit the asylum seekers to France. Yet, this decision is 
only a first screening. Although the administrative authority is the same, 
asylum at the border is treated differently from asylum within in country. 
Several procedural differences at the border inf luence the trajectories of 
asylum seekers. 
Firstly, application at the border is not for refugee status, but to gain 
admission to the country as an asylum seeker. Once an asylum seeker's appli-
cation has been accepted, he or she is allowed to leave the waiting area and 
enter France, but must apply for asylum in the prefecture within eight days. 
His or her application, consisting of a written form and an oral interview, is 
reviewed for the purpose of granting refugee status by the French Agency 
for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA).4 It is not rare 
for an asylum seeker admitted to the country to be subsequently rejected by 
OFPRA and then by the National Court of Asylum (CNDA), which examines 
appeals made by rejected applicants (Valluy 2009). Conversely, an asylum 
seeker rejected at the border, but who succeeds in entering France at the end 
of his or her stay in the waiting zone, can still apply for asylum and obtain 
refugee status. 
Secondly, asylum application at the border does not involve the filling out 
of a form or presentation of a written personal narrative. The examination is 
based solely on an oral hearing lasting between ten minutes and three hours; 
the determination is reported within three days of the hearing on average.5 
OFPRA's procedure for granting refugee status allows the asylum seeker 
one month to complete a written file in French, which may be followed by an 
oral interview. According to OFPRA's 2015 annual report, the average time it 
took to process an application was 100 days – reducing processing time has 
been an important political issue in immigration control policy (OFPRA 2015: 
35). Finally, OFPRA agents at the border examine asylum applications under 
Geneva Convention rules only: no subsidiary protection can be granted at 
the border, although this can happen on French territory.6 Although offi-
4  Karen Akoka of fers a sociological history of this institution (Akoka 2019).
5  “In 2015, 72% of OFPRA's decisions were given within 48 hours of placement in the waiting 
zone, and 90% within 96 hours”. (OFPRA 2016)
6  In France, subsidiary protection is the protection granted to claimants who are not grant-
ed of ficial refugee protection (for instance, only subsidiary protection can be granted to 
people coming from countries of ficially recognized as “safe countries” by OFPRA, such as 
Turkey). 
The Asylum Procedure in Border Detention 63
cials assert that examination criteria are the same in the waiting area and on 
French soil,7 the Asylum Division at the border works according to particular 
rules (spoken and unspoken) linked to the specificities and technicalities of 
border detention. At the same time, the issues at stake and the practices of 
asylum treatment in a restricted space and time can be seen as a microcosm 
of asylum as a whole, as this chapter explores.
In 1991, the Marchand Decree established the procedure by which asylum 
seekers in waiting areas at the border are heard. The procedure falls within 
the competence of the Border Asylum Division (DAF), which was originally 
attached to the Foreign Ministry. In 1998, applications increased consider-
ably, coming close to current figures.8 In addition to a permanent staff of 
four OFPRA protection officers, ten to fifteen contractors were recruited and 
trained to handle the increase in applications by the head of the Sub-Direc-
torate of Refugees at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This coincided with the 
introduction of a more restrictive doctrine for granting asylum.9 From 1998 
until 2001, the first team of agents left the DAF to form OFPRA's “Eurafrica 
section” (sections are organized according asylum seekers' region of origin). 
In 2001 and 2002 the establishment of a new management team within the 
DAF signalled the beginning of OFPRA's gradual strengthening of the asy-
lum bureaucracy at the border. OFPRA was within the Interior Ministry, but 
the DAF was attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The DAF now began 
to develop its own approach to asylum based on the context and objectives of 
border control, as well as the personality, management methods and vision 
of its leadership. Restrictive interpretations of asylum led to significant 
pressure to reduce admission. Rates of around 40 percent in 2001 fell to just 
under 20 percent in 2002, and dropped dramatically to 3.8 percent in 2003. 
At that point even OFPRA expressed disapproval of asylum examinations at 
the borders. 
7  Minutes of the meeting between Anafé and OFPRA on the concept of “manifestly unfound-
ed”, 23 May 2007: http://www.anafe.org/download/generalites/CR%20r%E9union%20a 
nnuelle-version-assoc-16-04-07.pdf [accessed on 20 October 2018].
8  In 1991, 500 asylum claims were registered at the border. This figure increased to 4,409 
in 2008, but decreased again to 1,180 in 2017, according to OFPRA annual reports (https://
www.ofpra.gouv.fr/fr/l-ofpra/nos-publications/rapports-d-activite [accessed 20 October 
2018].
9  Interview with M. Souza, a lawyer and member of the Anafé executive board, 18 March 
2005 (all names have been anonymized).
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The DAF hired fifteen new staff members in 2002 to replace the former 
team and respond to increased asylum requests. This new team was com-
posed of young graduates with master's degrees hired on short term con-
tracts. The job profile for protection officers did not call for specific legal 
knowledge: officers learned the ropes by observing their supervisors on the 
job, as one recalls:
My first chief was Mr. L.: he was from the DGSE [Directorate General of For-
eign Security, Foreign Intelligence Services of France] and had been a former 
spy. How should I put it… he was more a man of the action than a man of 
reflection. For him, 98 percent of asylum seekers were liars. My training was 
to watch my chief do the job. The first time I had a conversation with Mr. L., I 
was embarrassed because I felt that the criteria for judgment were absurd.
I recall how, in an interview, he asked an asylum seeker to describe his cell 
and tell him how many square meters it was. The asylum seeker, anxious, 
responded “four square meters”. At the end of the interview, M. L. told me: 
“You see, he‘s telling lies. There are no prison cells of four square meters!” 
(Interview with Élodie Noir, protection of ficer (OP) in the Border Asylum 
Division, 19 May 2005)
The youth and inexperience of this second team of DAF officers, their sta-
tus on short term contracts, the lack of prerequisite skills, and the on-the-
job training methods combined to diminish their autonomy and room for 
manoeuvre in 2002. This trend strengthened the tendency of the DAF to 
operate autonomously of refugee protection procedures as they were applied 
on French territory proper. However, on 21 July 2004, a new decree placed 
the DAF under OFPRA's supervision, where it remains today. In 2004, the 
asylum admission rate was 7.7 percent. Since 2005, the DAF's management 
has changed, but the daily routine of asylum examinations has remained the 
same since airport waiting zones opened in the early 1990s:
In the morning there are envelopes with cases: we divide the interviews. At 
present there are only one or two [cases] per person per day, which is not 
much. The narratives are taken in their entirety and sent with notes to the 
chief, who has already received the report on the individual's situation by fax. 
[…] The chief either accepts our opinion or does not: he intervenes only to turn 
an agreement into a refusal. Then he sends his opinion to the DLPAJ [police] 
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who transfer it to the GASAI [Interior Ministry], which gives the final decision. 
The of ficers who issued opinions on “manifestly unfounded” claims no longer 
have any influence decisions from the moment the case is reviewed by the 
chief. (Interview with Élodie Noir, protection of ficer (OP) in the Border Asy-
lum Division, 19 May 2005)
All asylum applications rejected at the border are called “manifestly 
unfounded”. This is because refusal decisions at first screening rest on a 
country's legal right to reject “manifestly unfounded” applications that are 
false or fall outside the asylum framework. Refusal decisions are issued by 
the Directorate of Civil Liberties and Legal Affairs (DLPAJ) of the Interior 
Ministry, on official forms faxed from its offices in Paris. The notice most 
often comes on two sheets. The first part cites the legal texts governing the 
right to asylum in France, the asylum seeker's identity as officially registered 
(e.g. “Youssef Betrik alias Ali al-Darwi, born on 27/03/1980, declaring himself 
a Palestinian citizen”) and the application date. The second part summarizes 
the asylum seeker's narrative in a few lines before stating, in a second para-
graph, the OFPRA's reasons for refusal. The last part presents the DLPAJ's 
formal decision: the application is rejected, the applicant will be deported, 
the border police are “responsible for the notification and enforcement of 
this decision”.
The asylum framework
On the morning of November 5, 2007, the Roissy police arrest Ahmed Masri 
while checking a f light from Hanoi, Vietnam. Ahmed asks for asylum at the 
police station and is transferred to the detention centre. There an OFPRA 
officer, a man in his thirties wearing a suit and a tie, hears the case in the 
late afternoon. The room, unlike others in the centre, has windows that can 
be opened, which overlook shrubs bordering the entrance way. In Arabic, the 
agent asks Ahmed to sit on the other side of the desk. The agent stands behind 
a computer and says to Ahmed: “I‘m listening.” As Ahmed speaks during the 
20-minute interview, the agent takes notes on his computer. When Ahmed 
finishes speaking, he is asked if he has anything to add. Then he is asked 
to name the Jewish settlements close to his home. Afterwards, the OFPRA 
officer thanks him and takes him to the door. Ahmed takes his police papers 
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and re-enters the hall, accompanied by one of the police officers at the desk. 
When they arrive on the first f loor, the door of the refectory opens. Detainees 
are seated for the evening meal as the policeman brings Ahmed to join them.
At 1:30 am, Ahmed is in bed when a Red Cross employee comes to wake 
him up and asks him to go downstairs with his police papers. Ahmed rings 
the intercom in the hall, the door opens, and a policeman makes him enter 
and sit on one of the chairs along the corridor overlooking the police station. 
Then he comes back with a pile of papers. Ahmed signs two of them. One doc-
ument extends his 48-hour stay in the waiting zone for another 48-hours. The 
other is a “notification of non-admission to asylum”. He receives all the doc-
uments, which will be explained to him by the duty guard in the Red Cross 
office, where, evidently, insomniacs dwell. His rejection decision from the 
Interior Ministry reads:
Considering that X […], going by the name of Ahmed Masri, declares that he 
was born at Toulkarem and resided at Irtah; that he is of Palestinian origin; 
that he has no political activity or commitment; that he has not been threat-
ened; that the land belonging to his family was confiscated by the Israeli 
army; that he had no professional activity; that life in the West Bank was dif-
ficult; that he would like to live in safety, in France, where he could work and 
provide for himself;
Considering, however, that the applicant confines himself to invoking the 
economic situation which he would have experienced in Palestine; that 
there are no serious, direct and personal threats to him of any kind; whereas, 
moreover, he does not provide credible explanations concerning the exact 
conditions of his departure from Palestine; that he is ignorant of the area 
he claims to come from; that all his considerations are of an essentially eco-
nomic nature and are connected with purely personal reasons, namely to 
find a job in France; therefore, his application does not meet the criteria laid 
down by the legislation governing asylum;
Considering that he comes from Vietnam; Article L.213-4 of the Code on Entry 
and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum, prescribes his return to 
the territory of that State or, as the case may be, to any country where he will 
be legally eligible;
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IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT:
Article 1: The application for entry into France in respect of the asylum of X 
alias Mr. MASRI is rejected.
Article 2: X alias Mr. MASRI will be redirected to the territory of Vietnam or, 
where applicable, to any country where he will be legally admissible.
Article 3: The police services at the borders shall be responsible for the noti-
fication and execution of this decision, a duplicate of which shall be given to 
the person concerned.
The next day, November 7, two days after his detainment in Roissy airport, 
Ahmed Masri goes to Anafé, the legal aid NGO working at the centre, to get 
more information. Kadra Benbedrik, a NGO worker, translates the decision 
into Arabic, then asks him to tell his story. Several times she asks if he per-
sonally fears anything in particular if he returns to Palestine. Each time, 
Ahmed answers by describing his living conditions in Irtah. Kadra concludes 
that she cannot make an appeal in favour of Ahmed: “the narrative is weak”, 
“his case does not fit in the asylum framework,” she notes on the day's bal-
ance sheet. However, she takes Ahmed's police papers and writes a letter to 
the Immigration Analysis and Monitoring Group (GASAI), asking if Ahmed 
could be sent to Jordan instead of back to Hanoi, where he spent only a few 
hours. Ahmed explains that he will certainly be detained for some time in 
Aman, which happens to all who try to migrate irregularly, but he prefers 
detention in Aman to returning to Vietnam. Later that evening, Ahmed is 
handcuffed and escorted to the airport for return to Hanoi. He struggles 
hard against being put on the plane. Finally, deportation does not take place, 
Ahmed is beaten by the police and spends another night in detention. In the 
days that follow, he resists four more attempts to return him to Hanoi.10 On 
14 November, he goes back to the Anafé office to speak again with Kadra. She 
accompanies him to the Red Cross office. Perhaps a mediator could speak 
with the police and try to negotiate Ahmed's deportation to Jordan (except 
she knows very well that this never happens). Two days later, Ahmed's name 
10  The various practices associated with forced air deportation are detailed and analysed in 
Makaremi 2009. 
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no longer appears on the detention centre register. The Red Cross agent says 
they don't know what became of him. I also lose track of him.
In the waiting zone, the high stakes of selection, control and administra-
tion in treating asylum seekers are organized around distinctions between 
truth and falsehood. Here, I would like to ref lect on how the practice of deter-
mining truth is constructed. In preparing this material, I do not have access 
to the interviews themselves, but only to re-transcriptions and syntheses by 
agents. Whereas the CNDA (the Appeals Court) is open to the public, and 
minutes of OFPRA agents' interviews on French soil are communicated to 
applicants when their applications are refused, in the waiting zone, the work 
of agents who listen to and transcribe narratives remains a blind spot for 
observers. It would be ideal to analyse the actual exchanges themselves, as 
they more clearly disclose standards of judgment. As an officer admits, these 
interactions insinuate mechanisms for discriminating against and rejecting 
asylum seekers within a procedure guaranteeing respect for asylum.
I am asked to judge according to criteria that are not those of real life: I live 
in a universe with its criteria of judgments, but they no longer apply at all to 
the waiting area. […] For example, at a party recently, I met a friend of a friend 
who was put in prison for two months in Tunisia where he was on vacation 
(he was mistaken for a traf ficker) and he admitted that it was only two years 
later that he could talk about this experience. It is true that it is dif ficult to 
talk about something that has traumatized us.
[…] There is also a dif ference between the objective threat as it is judged, and 
the fear that forces people to leave. […] Yes, there is some schizophrenia and 
hypocrisy. Take the smugglers for instance: it is well known that sometimes 
asylum seekers cannot tell everything and hide with an awkward lie an epi-
sode as a smuggler. This used to be taken into account. But now the instruc-
tion is to use it as a pretext for refusal. (Interview with Elodie Noir, May 19, 
2005)
The first distinction made in examining an asylum claim is between the 
application's form and its substance. In principle, the claimant's narrative 
recounts a situation corresponding to a sequence of events (including a threat 
and an escape), or describes his or her living conditions. The two axes of ver-
ification around which judgment is constructed are: “Is the narration true?” 
And “Does it place the subject in need of protection?” Processing applications 
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shows that these two issues at stake – i.e. veracity and bodily peril – are 
inextricably linked in the framework of adjudication, as Ahmed Masri's case 
illustrates. We can thus identify categories that inform the French definition 
of asylum. Without entering, for the moment, into judgments of narrative 
truth and applicant credibility, we recognize four exclusionary arguments 
that delimit the framework of asylum in France – which will be discussed in 
turn in the subsequent sections. In the administrative jargon of the border 
administration, they make a refugee's claim “manifestly unfounded” as inter-
preted under the Geneva Convention. 
The national definition of asylum is elaborated in decisions by OFPRA 
and the CNDA, but its chief manifestation in terms of jurisprudence comes 
from the French Supreme Court (Conseil d'Etat), the highest national court of 
appeal for refugee determination procedures. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
addresses both the substance of refugees' asylum requests (for instance, the 
decision that the threat of female genital mutilation falls within the scope 
of refugee protection) and the form (for instance, the decision favouring the 
admissibility of a particular document as supporting evidence for asylum 
applications). Jérôme Valluy (2009) has studied the uses and challenges of 
jurisprudential asylum definitions. In my work, some asylum definitions 
drawn by the border administration incorporate elements of jurisprudential 
definitions, but others are more vague or differ from national jurisprudence. 
Rather than comparing categories of definitions over time, my empirical per-
spective evaluates definitions and categorizations observed within a specific 
bureaucracy at a given time and place, and their relation to specific aims of 
the border apparatus. 
"Manifestly unfounded" 
The first criterion, the state criterion, recalls how the treatment of refugees is 
linked to a temporary suspension of state protection (Arendt 2002 [1951]). At 
first, the border administration conceived of protection only against threats 
emanating from state authorities. Since the 1990s, however, the definition of 
asylum has adapted to the changing reality of conf licts. In particular, anal-
yses in international relations of “weak” states, “collapsed” states, and the 
privatization of conf licts (Rotberg 2003, Rotberg, Dadmehr and Jenne 2003) 
have resulted in a re-evaluation to account for threats emanating from pri-
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vate actors. However, OFPRA agents view this source of threat with great 
suspicion, and subject it to criteria that maintain state hegemony in ideas 
defining conf lict and protection. Indeed, each asylum seeker must show 
evidence that the state did not or could not afford him necessary protection.
He states that he did not seek protection from the Nigerian authorities, even 
though the said authorities would have been able to provide him with ef fec-
tive protection. 
This criterion – lack of State protection – is not universal. It is not necessary 
in the Canadian asylum system, for example, where 70 percent of asylum 
requests are accepted (USCRI 2008). Yet it is just one reason why asylum 
refusals are much higher in France. Other factors are the link between asylum 
and immigration, asylum being increasingly considered as another immi-
gration route in Europe and in North America, and differences in French and 
Canadian national cultures when facing the phenomenon of migration. For 
instance, Colombians who are able to go into exile and seek asylum abroad 
are generally well-off, with resources that make them desirable to the Cana-
dian government. By contrast, France, with a European conception of “zero 
immigration”, seems to establish criteria that exclude as many asylum appli-
cants from the judicial process as possible, without attaching any particular 
importance to the socio-cultural situation or the potential “contribution” of 
different refugee groups. 
A second criterion– the “general situation of insecurity” – is related to 
the first exclusion criterion. It is interesting to note that this criterion dis-
tinguishes the French definition of asylum from definitions in jurisdictions 
whose legal tradition is derived from English common law. 
She does not allege any personal threat to her; she merely refers to the gen-
eral situation of insecurity prevailing in Haiti.
Indeed, in the specific reading developed by the DAF, following OFPRA, asy-
lum applications due to situations of structural insecurity are a priori refused, 
except where a request presents an additional element of individual threat. 
Thus, among the asylum applications that I had the opportunity to see in the 
field (beyond the forty-eight cases studied here), descriptions of living con-
dition without personal narratives of dangerous events are systematically 
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classified as outside the purview of asylum procedure. This definition of vul-
nerability and protection is at odds with practices in Canadian, American, 
Australian and British jurisdictions, which include general insecurity as a 
fundamental criterion in determining the need for protection. Conversely in 
France, an individual conception of asylum prevails. Applicants whose daily 
living conditions justify the need for protection are excluded on the grounds 
that their applications do not correspond to an individual trajectory, but to a 
collective projection. The discourse of asylum rejection is generally based on 
the figure of the false refugee, an economic migrant who invents false needs 
for protection. Whereas situations of “generalized insecurity” are recog-
nized as living situations that require protection, belonging to a group that 
is subject to threats is disqualifying if no personal narrative distinguishes an 
applicant's singular situation from that of his or her fellow citizens (as in the 
case of Ahmed Masri). 
Indeed, the “general situation of insecurity” is one of four official criteria 
named by the DAF's director as important in substantiating assessments of 
“manifestly unfounded” claims.11 However, asylum applications from certain 
nationalities are largely accepted in practice: according to figures released 
by the Ministry of the Interior, 83 percent of Iraqi asylum-seekers and 63 per-
cent of Sri Lankan asylum-seekers were admitted in 2007, while 30 percent 
of all asylum applications filed at the border were accepted (Anafé 2008). 
A third exclusion criterion – “the absence of personal threats” – echoes 
“generalized insecurity” by highlighting the individual concept of protection 
defended by French asylum doctrine. Fear of persecution, the basis of the 
Geneva Convention's definition of refugee, is defined in French doctrine as 
the presence of clearly identifiable and attestable personal threats.
He is not able to explain to what extent he would be threatened in case of 
return to the Congo.
He does not mention any direct and personal threat to him from anybody.
Behind this perception of the refugee is the idea that the applicant bears 
individual responsibility for the persecution victimizing him or her. France 
offers protection to individual refugees involved in political activity, as con-
11  Minutes of the meeting between Anafé and the OFPRA on the concept of “manifestly un-
founded”, Ibid.
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firmed by the experience of Abdoulaye Ita. After his brother f led Chad to 
come to France, where he was given refugee status, Chadian authorities 
sought Abdoulaye Ita, suspecting him of knowing where his brother had 
taken refuge. Abdoulaye was refused asylum in August 2004 after meeting 
with OFPRA, however, because “he was not involved in any political activity”.
In this frame of analysis, a final exclusion criterion – the “motive of pure 
personal convenience” – places applicants outside the field of asylum. Con-
firming a definition of asylum aligned with representations of political ref-
ugees (Noiriel 1991), the notion of “personal convenience” refers to personal 
elements, such as health, illness or family situations, that break the linear 
confrontation between the applicant and the power that threatens and tar-
gets him or her. As events necessitating escape become more distant in time, 
the asylum narrative is increasingly undermined and touched by the intru-
sion of personal considerations outside the tragic framework (the naked 
scene of oppression and resistance). Narratives are ultimately disqualified by 
such intrusions. Known as “pure personal conveniences”, the necessary but 
unwelcome dimensions of life (such as family ties, psychic comfort, health 
status) disrupt and parasitize political tragedies that legitimize the use of 
asylum in the context of migration control. As an administrative judge told 
two Congolese children, a brother and sister who were juvenile asylum-seek-
ers:
You're talking about an indirect threat, because your father is concerned. The 
only thing that is established, without any proof, is the death of Mademoi-
selle's mother. And again, the soldiers did not come specially to kill her; she 
took a bullet as she went out. […] I understand that this is not an easy situa-
tion, but the asylum procedure must be strictly reserved for people who have 
no other solutions. You know what is happening in most African countries, 
one could tell the same kind of narrative that you did.12
This kind of judgement, which makes it possible to exclude all requests that 
fall “outside the field” of asylum, is only one dimension of asylum adjudi-
cation. It relates to the substance of the narrative and seeks to ascertain 
whether the claim is genuine. Another, more important issue is whether the 
claim is true. This issue is linked to the form of the narrative. However, these 
12  Field notes, Administrative Court, 5 April 2007.
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two factors are closely aligned as motives for refusal decisions, which pass 
f luidly from one argument to the other.
The truth of the narrative: the technical sense  
and the moral sense of truth
How do we approach the process of truth determination at work in judging 
the applicant's narrative and spoken performance? Bernard Williams' gene-
alogical study of truth determination (Williams 2002) is an interesting start-
ing point for investigating adjudication processes that lead to an assessment 
of claims as “manifestly unfounded”. Williams seeks to identify the intellec-
tual and moral approaches, both scientific and casual, that guide our judg-
ment of the veracity of a proposition – of its truth. For Williams, distinguish-
ing truth from falsehood relies upon two “virtues of truth”: sincerity opposes 
truth to lies, and accuracy opposes truth to error. These categories appear in 
the judgments of Border Asylum Division agents. DAF agents evaluate sin-
cerity based on the applicant's subjective and emotional involvement in his or 
her narrative (“conventional”, “impersonal”, “stereotyped”, “not very loqua-
cious”), marked by the use of certain recurring narrative patterns (mention-
ing places of custody or means of escape). They also evaluate the criterion 
of likelihood (“the conditions are not credible”, “unreliable”), simultaneously 
scrutinizing context and probability, and attributing intelligibility to the 
narrator's rational behaviour (“It is surprising that, having first crossed the 
French border to go to Dubai, she did not think of asking for asylum at that 
time”).
This set of norms regulating the asylum narrative are culturally deter-
mined, referring to shared conceptions of what is “likely” or unlikely, or what 
makes speech “emotional” (Belorgey 2003, d'Halluin 2004, Crépeau et al 
2001, Rousseau and Foxen 2006, Valluy 2009). Reaching a judgement here 
also implies an appreciation of accuracy, not this time in terms of assessing 
narrative norms, but rather in the application of norms of examination. Thus, 
the administration claims that its method determines the truth based on cri-
teria of clarity (“confusing”, “obscure”), accuracy (“the statements of the per-
son's concerns are vague”, “He is not in a position to say, even approximately, 
how many times he was placed in police custody”) and verification (“without 
any conclusive explanation”, “without detailed evidence”, “the documents 
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showed do not contain any guarantee of authenticity”, “without bringing any 
tangible element in support of this information”). These judgements rest on 
the epistemic norms that underlie any empirical or logical statement, includ-
ing this ethnographic work. The criterion of verification raises the question 
of producing evidence and certificates (Fassin and d'Halluin 2005, d'Halluin 
2006b, Fassin and Rechtman 2007). The need to substantiate and empirically 
validate applicants' narratives implies an administrative logic of proofs. In 
an interview, an OFPRA agent expressed his aversion to this analysis. But he 
admitted that he finds verification issues at different levels:
The request for written evidence is an extrapolation of the Anafé.13 Concern-
ing the case mentioned in the report of the association (Anafé 2004) [a for-
mer bodyguard of Laurent Kabila, whose application was rejected until he 
produced a picture showing him in the exercise of his duties as bodyguard, 
was mentioned as an example of OFPRA's onerous requirements for concrete 
evidence], this guy was auditioned by me and indeed I was sure he was telling 
lies. I was very surprised when he showed me the picture, I really thought 
he was lying […] there are so many people who claim that they were Kabila's 
bodyguards!
[…] Once I asked for information about a Rwandan asylum application: I did 
not know what to decide so I sent a note to a regional analyst of the Ministry 
of Foreign Af fairs who contacted the Embassy of France on site. The Embassy 
of France replied that there were no problems, so no threats on the point in 
question. But we know they do not know everything. Later, the analyst told 
me: “I think it was a mistake”. I did not know what to decide so I asked the 
advice of a third party. But I knew what the answer was going to be when I 
asked. When a case is dif ficult to judge, a third opinion from the Ministry of 
Foreign Af fairs is sought, knowing that this opinion will always be on the side 
of refusal. (Interview with Julien Robert, Contractual Protection Of ficer (OP) 
at the Border Asylum Division, 3 July 2007)
13  The case mentioned in the association report was that of a former bodyguard of Laurent 
Kabila, whose asylum application had been rejected until he showed a photo of him per-
forming his duties as a bodyguard. This example denounced the tendency of the asylum 
division to require documentary evidence to believe applicants' stories (Anafé 2004).
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Verification criteria, both scientific and legal, reveal how truth determina-
tion mobilizes issues of method, resulting from rational determination, and 
of judgment, calling for “intimate conviction”. 
The criterion of accuracy slides towards a third stratum – the moral 
domain. Determinations of clarity and precision are apparent in refusal 
decisions: “he remains evasive”, “she is totally incapable of giving the slight-
est detail”, “he is elusive”. Opinions drawn from rhetorical or semantic meth-
ods evoke moral connotations. Moral evaluations of applicants distinguish a 
set of postures that qualify the oral narrative: notions of deception and also 
of cooperation and good faith are particularly distinguished:
He cannot clearly state the reasons for his departure while the protection 
of ficer repeatedly asked him to focus his statements on recent events. [He] 
dwells on facts from the 1990s, without giving the reasons for his departure 
from Turkey in 2007.
He keeps asserting, laconically, that he was beaten, while remaining silent 
on interrogations.
These statements characterize different levels of verification in manifestly 
unfounded asylum narratives. I refer to Williams to understand two dimen-
sions of the production of truth that appear in asylum examinations. One 
refers to assertion (produced by the applicant), and the other to belief (the 
“intimate conviction” at the core of the OFPRA agent's judgment). Williams 
distinguishes these two poles by recalling the relational dimension of the 
production of truth engaged in an “epistemic division of labor” (Williams 
2002: 43) between the one who states and the one who receives and judges 
the statement's veracity. If sincerity is virtuous, conveying truth in the enun-
ciation of a proposition or the narration of a fact, ascertaining veracity also 
implies virtue in commitment to apprehending and judging the truth, which 
Williams calls the “investigative investment” (Williams 2002: 124). On the 
one hand, the figure of the “refugee-liar” (Rousseau and Foxen 2006) is based 
on assessments of sincerity, which I tried to understand via the semantic 
categories used to qualify lies. On the other hand, the time OFPRA agents 
devote to interviews, the formal requirements, judgment stereotypes and 
superficial information about cultures and countries of origin, show meagre 
“investment” (Belorgey 2003, Belorgey 2007, Valluy 2009). The discursive sys-
tem of the “manifestly unfounded” claim, with its codes, themes, and oblig-
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atory stages, rests on two fictions (Decourcelle 2002, Belorgey 2007): the 
agent's good faith, and the asylum seeker's capacity to summon biographical 
linearity and narrate his or her life clearly and concisely. The notion of “mis-
trust” used to describe the experience of the refugee (Daniel and Knudsen 
1995) helps explain this space of suspicion where narrative is expressed or 
hidden.
In this game of utterance and conviction that determines truthfulness, 
Williams shows with pertinence that the truth at play is not of indivisible or 
unconditional value, and that it is not at stake in the same way for the one 
who states and the one who receives. At stake in sincerity is “should I tell 
the truth?” and “how much of the truth should I tell?” Thus, there is more or 
less truth. At stake in conviction is not the existence of truth (“must I believe 
in the truth?”). For receivers who admit that truth exists, the question then 
becomes, “Will I bother to find out about it?”
There is this dif ference that in defining accuracy we must mention the truth, 
while with sincerity the reference to truth only comes to the next step. (Wil-
liams 2002: 126)
Analysing the values  that define and underpin the question of truth in asy-
lum examination shows how practices of administrative control and cate-
gorisation of asylum seekers are tied together in the moral and epistemolog-
ical dimensions that shape the narrative of asylum.
Memory and the state
Certainly, the administrative world of border control is a microcosm, with 
logics of emancipation related to the supervisory administration of national 
territory. But the administrative machine also mirrors myths and national 
values forged in public spaces. Proposing an analysis that complements 
and critically addresses both the Frankfurt School's work on the modern 
episteme of administrative rationality (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997) and 
Hannah Arendt's observations on the banality of evil (Arendt 1965), Michael 
Herzfeld demonstrates how administrative categorization applies a national 
logic that seeks to “distinguish between those included and excluded from 
the national order and to represent these distinctions as given by nature – 
The Asylum Procedure in Border Detention 77
rather than cultural or historical contingencies.” (Herzfeld 1992: 174). Ref lec-
tions on administrative rationality in the aftermath of the Second World War 
tended to see it as a self-referential mechanism capable of applying almost 
any national policy via unique systems of hierarchies and rationalities. Yet, 
Herzfeld guided his empirical investigations in a different direction. For 
him, the categorization practices underlying administrative rationality 
depend strongly on national circumstances, inasmuch as they are produced 
by national memory of who is included and who is excluded from national 
belonging: “The power to refuse Hospitality is the foundation on which indif-
ference rests: it is a denial of the common substance.” (Herzfeld 1992: 177). 
In this respect, it is significant that, after President Nicolas Sarkozy's elec-
tion in 2007, the agencies referred to in this chapter were reorganized and 
merged into a single ministerial body called the Department of Immigration, 
Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development. 
The name of this new ministry permits the introduction of the idea that 
the process of asylum application and asylum itself are part of a broader set 
of relations between populations seeking asylum and administrations inter-
preting asylum in terms of post-colonial memories of power relations. In the 
novel, Transit, written by Djiboutian author Abdourahman A. Waberi, the 
protagonist, Harbi, an asylum seeker waiting at Roissy airport, bogs down 
in a bitter soliloquy:
I cannot wait to find peace of mind and body again. To tame my mind where 
morbid, incongruous ideas keep running wild, and snuf f out that snickering 
little voice. Glue the pieces of my dislocated being back together. In short, get 
used to my new identity. A memory anchored deep in the nest of my brain 
is coming back to me. I must have been a child of four or five then, and I can 
recall the frightened look in my eyes very clearly. One day, as I was walking 
with my aunt along one of the avenues in our neighborhood, I passed by a 
military patrol. Like a chrysalis about to burst, the question popped out 
instantly:
“Who are those people?”
“The French, our colonizers.”
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“Why are they here?”
“Because they're stronger than we are.” (Waberi 2003: 17)
Here, free association of the narrator's thoughts links his memory of the 
colonial past with his present situation of confinement after his asylum 
request. Why does this memory resurface during the border transit? In 
the literary fiction Waberi imagines, Harbi's memory of colonial domina-
tion and its actualization in the contemporary global context contribute to 
configuring the practices of forced migration and asylum. This dimension 
stands out clearly in the administrative practice of granting more credit to 
certain asylum stories than to others based on country of origin. The French 
state has long applied a special kindness towards refugees from Rwanda 
that, it may be supposed, is related to France's ambiguous engagement in 
the Rwandan conf lict and the failures of French intervention during these 
events (Prunier 1997). Another example of how political considerations con-
nected to post-colonial memories and contemporary power relations shape 
the asylum system occurred in the winter of 2004-2005. Hundreds of Ivo-
rian asylum seekers were rejected and sent back to Côte d'Ivoire in an acute 
climate of violence that presaged civil war. When the French army tried to 
intervene in the Ivorian conf lict, its troops were attacked and denounced 
for conducting an operation of “post-colonial domination”; they eventually 
withdrew from the conf lict (Marshall 2005). On Christmas night 2004, an 
Ivorian asylum seeker rejected by OFPRA cut his throat to resist deportation. 
A few days later, a Congolese asylum seeker from a refugee camp in Côte 
d'Ivoire, who had left during xenophobic attacks that had massacred part of 
the camp's refugee population, was rejected by OFPRA and sent back under 
escort to Côte d'Ivoire. A legal refugee in Côte d'Ivoire, Ernest Businga had 
brought with him several letters addressed to the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva, requesting transfer to another country 
where he would be safe. These letters were authenticated by the UNHCR 
office in Paris, but the Ministry of the Interior held to its decision to reject 
and expel Ernest Businga, arguing that, although he was a statutory refugee 
who feared threats and had tried for months to seek the High Commission-
er's protection from the violence to which he was exposed, his refugee status 
fell under the Convention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and not 
the Geneva Convention, to which France is a party. By taking the trouble to 
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argue why it had abandoned Ernest Businga to his fate, the administration's 
position quite clearly echoed France's withdrawal from regional issues in 
West Africa. This highlights the political stakes that underpin the selection 
of those with rights to national protection and others caught in the ramifica-
tions of diplomatic affinities and tensions in the arena of asylum. Ernest was 
finally removed by force (“bien embarqué”). For a few months I continued to 
receive his emails: he was hidden, terrified, asking for help.
Conclusion
The administrative elision of individual narratives entails the conjunction 
of various factors. These heterogeneous elements all stem from perceptions 
by French authorities of the migration “problem” and the asylum adminis-
tration that results from this perception, its disciplinary management of 
f lows of asylum seekers and its fight against perceived abuses of the wel-
fare system. Migration and the control of migration confine asylum seekers 
in processes of subjectivation articulated around issues of mis/trust. Exile 
narration is the basis for asylum procedure administration. Yet, such nar-
ration confronts bureaucratic rationalities anchored in national logics and 
memory. It defies demands for linearity in support of truthfulness and ethi-
cal judgment, which suspends confiscated and alternative narrations14 – the 
confused work of a living memory:
Something we might tentatively call the truth of the person, a truth that, to a 
certain degree […] might well become more clear in moments of interruption, 
stoppage, open-endedness – in enigmatic articulations that cannot be trans-
lated into narrative form. (Butler 2005: 64)
As this chapter's observations show, I have not had access to this singular 
“truth”, but to violent discrepancies that, at times, make one suspect its exis-
tence. In her definition of living memory, Judith Butler states, however, that 
her goal is not to celebrate
14  These dimensions, referring to the lived experiences of border detention, are analysed in 
Makaremi 2011. 
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a certain notion of incoherence, but only to point out that our ”incoherence” 
establishes the way in which we are constituted in relationality: implicated, 
beholden, derived, sustained by a social world that is beyond us and before 
us. (Butler 2005: 65)
The ordinary violence of border detention resides partly in the collapse and 
illegibility of this social world. Defiance links migrants to the violence of 
interpellation (Althusser 1976, Butler 2005), where they are constituted as 
the subjects of a control. It links them through a violent imposition of silence, 
where the “incoherence” of singular narratives binds them in an implacable 
procedure that unfolds from a fissured relationality to the exercise of force.
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Moral Economy and Knowledge Production 
in a Security Bureaucracy 
The Case of the German Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution
Werner Schiffauer
Germany's 1999/2000 citizenship law marked a shift in the country's 
self-definition from a non-immigration country to an immigration country. 
The general opening up of the German nation-state was soon followed by new 
closures, however. Discussions began on who should, and who should not be 
accepted as members of the re-invented nation-state. The debate centred on 
Muslim immigrants. How can Muslim immigrants become part of Germany 
when they adhere to a religion (and culture) with a long historical position 
as the quintessential other to European culture and society? What place, in 
particular, should be assigned to Muslim organisations that provide for doc-
trine and ritual? As the new Islamic presence in Germany was considered 
a key challenge for maintaining public security and order, the Ministry of 
the Interior took the lead in policy development. Within the ministry, secu-
rity agencies, particularly the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Verfassungsschutz) played a decisive role in generating knowledge about the 
newcomers and the structure and formation of Islamic politics.
In this paper, I analyse the ways in which security knowledge is produced 
in the Ämter für Verfassungsschutz, the “Offices for the Protection of the 
Constitution”.1 I apply an emic approach, asking how bureaucrats in this 
institution perceive and categorise Islam, to show how this knowledge con-
stitutes the foundation for various security strategies. I begin by sketching 
the mission and the vision of the Verfassungsschutz and exploring how ideas 
1  The of fices for the Protection of the Constitution consist of one Federal Of fice (Bundesamt), 
part of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and 16 state of fices (Länderämter).
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about the work ethos and work ethics of office holders are derived from the 
tasks assigned to them. By analysing one specific product of the work of the 
Verfassungsschutz (a PowerPoint presentation), I show how its vision and mis-
sion are translated into a classificatory system characterised by impervious 
grids. The structural properties of this knowledge, as well as its limitations, 
are made visible by contrasting it to knowledge obtained by participant 
observation. Seen in this light, Verfassungsschutz classifications appear as 
categorical straightjackets that fail to capture the dynamics and complex-
ities of Islamic and Islamist communities. This failure, however, remains 
largely unnoticed in the bureaucratic apparatus, as security knowledge and 
security practices  – such as surveillance and discipline – are intertwined. 
Conf licts with other state agencies favouring more biopolitical or pedagog-
ical approaches (my example is the field of “de-radicalisation” politics) and 
moves in favour of more qualitative approaches occasionally emerge, but 
most are “resolved” in favour of classical security knowledge.
The background to this paper was my constant irritation with the Ger-
man state's view of Islamic communities as I carried out anthropological field 
research on the Cologne-based organisation self-described as Kalifatstaat 
(“Caliphate State”) between 1990 and 2000 and on the Muslim community 
Millî Görüş between 2000 and 2010 (Schiffauer 2000; 2010). I was confronted 
with the fact that state agencies systematically interpreted identical observa-
tions differently than I did. This experience was the beginning of this research 
project aimed at an emic understanding of knowledge production in the secu-
rity agencies. Since the security establishment proved to be largely inaccessi-
ble, direct participant observation was only possible for Islamic actors. 
Ethos and ethics in bureaucracies
Ethics are a good point of departure if one wants to understand bureaucra-
cies from an emic perspective. A focus on ethics means asking how moral 
ideas shape the work of civil servants. This allows access to the self-under-
standing of professional civil servants and provides an answer to the ques-
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tion: “What do they think they are doing?” (Eckert in this volume), and also: 
“What do they think they should be doing?”2
These questions are related to the vision and the mission of a bureaucracy, 
which specifies the services a bureaucracy owes society and clarifies the value 
society obtains from these particular services. Vision and mission are usually 
formulated by reference to the common good of the nation-state. The mandate 
of the office defines the ways in which it serves the common good, whether 
by collecting taxes,3 organising school infrastructure, engaging in urban 
planning or providing security. The status of a bureaucracy, as ref lected in its 
annual budget allocations, depends upon the answers to these questions. 
The ethics of a specific bureaucracy are derived from these mission state-
ments. They serve as a yardstick that distinguishes good from bad bureau-
cratic work. The former fulfils the mandate of the office and adds to its value; 
the latter does not. The ideal thus formulated is never realised completely, 
but an institution may not depart from it too much – otherwise it is called 
to order. The vision and the mission of an office are celebrated and regu-
larly remembered at ceremonial events such as political receptions or the 
appointment of new directors. 
Julia Eckert (in this volume) introduces a distinction between ethics and 
ethos. While the ethics of an office refers to its substantive goals, its ethos 
refers to its standards of implementation. The work has to be carried out in a 
way that corresponds to bureaucratic reason. The rationality proclaimed by 
all state bureaucracies is coherence and consistency; as well as regularity and 
calculability. Equal cases should be treated the same. This implies an idea of 
serving the public in an accountable, unbiased, verifiable and controlled, but 
also in efficient and reliable, way. Like ethics, the ethos of an office is speci-
fied by its mandate.
It should be mentioned here that state bureaucracies follow different ethics. 
Following Foucault's distinction of different types of governmentalities (Fou-
cault 2006a), one can make a key distinction between bureaucracies practicing 
governmentalities of discipline and surveillance, and bureaucracies practic-
2  The case of the Verfassungsschutzämter is a particular case in point. The value of information 
provided by them was seriously called in question af ter the end of the Cold War in 1989. 
There were debates about abolishing them altogether. The Islamist challenge af ter Sep-
tember 11 enabled the agency to prove its usefulness in the post-Cold War period.
3  See David Foster Wallace's enlightening discussion of the ethos and ethics of a tax bureau-
cracy (Wallace 2011).
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ing “bio-political” governmentalities. The former see their task as maintaining 
security and order; the latter find their raison d'être in enabling positive devel-
opments, and emphasise control and regulation. This difference is ref lected in 
their respective ethics. Ministries of the interior abide by strikingly different 
ethics from ministries of family and social affairs or ministries of education. 
The analysis of ethics allows us to overcome one serious problem of studies of 
the state: too often the unity of the state is overemphasised, and existing dif-
ferences between bureaucracies are underestimated. Analysis of the different 
ethics allows us to conceive of the state as an arena of contestation over how to 
serve the public good meaningfully and effectively. Additionally, there can be 
contradictions between ethics and ethos, as Eckert has pointed out. Formally 
correct actions that are dictated by the work ethos can impede accomplish-
ment of tasks demanded by the ethics of the office. Police officers complaining 
that legal prescriptions hinder them in carrying out their work in an efficient 
way are a good example. In these instances, conf licts regularly arise between 
those in the office demanding exceptions in order to cope with the challenges 
at hand (and thus do justice to the ethics of the office) and those who defend 
the ethos of orderly and consistent procedure that guarantees equal treatment 
of equal cases. While the former consider the latter to be inf lexible and stub-
born, the latter see the former as acting in an arbitrary fashion. Again, the ter-
minology of ethics and ethos allows us to conceptualise a given bureaucracy 
as a field of contestation where tension between ethics and ethos is negotiated.
Ethos and ethics in the Offices for the Protection 
of the Constitution 
The Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutzämter) are 
domestic intelligence agencies. Their task is to obtain knowledge of planned 
anti-constitutional activities at an early stage and provide this information 
to public authorities and (to a limited extent) the general public. The laws that 
regulate the duties of the Verfassungsschutzämter draw two ethical lessons 
from the traumas of German history. On the one hand, a lesson is drawn 
from the failure of the Weimar Republic. According to the dominant narra-
tive of history, the democratic centre was crushed by mutually reinforcing 
radicalism on both left and right, culminating in the National Socialist take-
over. Unlike the Weimar Republic, which gave too much space to the enemies 
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of democracy, the Federal Republic is supposed to be a wehrhaf te Demokratie, 
a “militant democracy” capable of actively defending its democratic sub-
stance.4 The Verfassungsschutzämter consider themselves to be the institu-
tional embodiment of this idea. But a lesson may be drawn from the second 
trauma, which is National Socialism itself. The Verfassungsschutzämter must 
never become a second secret state police (Gestapo). It should be powerful, 
but must not be in a position to abuse this power. This obvious dilemma is 
met, above all, by separating intelligence and police action. The Verfassungs-
schutzämter observe and produce knowledge, but refrain from taking action 
themselves. They have the power of definition, but not of coercion. As an 
“early warning system”, they inform political authorities, other government 
agencies and the general public about their findings and enable them to take 
appropriate steps.5 The connection between state knowledge production and 
state action is interrupted and an interface is installed, which should allow 
control of the office. In sum, the ethics of the Verfassungsschutzämter are 
derived from their self-understanding as intelligence agencies in the service 
of democracy and the rule of law, which is specified by the lessons drawn 
from the experience of Germany history.
Two further specifications resulting from this self-understanding 
deserve special mention. The first emphasises early or timely information. 
The idea is to produce knowledge about potential dangers: protecting the 
constitution requires not only observing groups whose danger is proven, 
but also those that could be dangerous in the future (ibid.). This ensures the 
effectiveness of the office. State and society must be informed about devel-
opments when they are still in a position to take effective measures. The sec-
ond is an obligation that the information gathered be made public. This is put 
into practice through the publication of annual reports, and via exhibitions 
and special events. The agency must justify why certain groups appear in 
their reports. Disclosure implies accountability.
This knowledge production is now subject to a special ethos. Several 
aspects deserve to be mentioned in this context. In order to control the 
power of the Verfassungsschutz, the acquisition of information is subject to 
strong limitations. The Verfassungsschützer are not allowed to carry out inter-
4  This narrative structures the presentation of the history of the Federal Republic in school-
books (see, Baumann et. al 2002: 33f f). 
5  Gesetz über den Verfassungsschutz in Berlin §5 (1).
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rogations (this is reserved for the police) or to conduct surveys. The office 
relies mostly on written analyses and informants. Other aspects of their 
ethos relate to the general observance of neutrality and impartiality charac-
teristic of all public authorities. The demand is that different extremisms be 
treated analogously, that is, they should not be blind in the “right” eye, the 
“left” eye or the “Islamic” eye. Finally, the offices have developed a distinctive 
set of rules aimed at guaranteeing objectivity. Direct contact between eval-
uators and persons who are being monitored is forbidden in order to prevent 
identification and “going native”. Field data can only be collected indirectly 
through informants. The co-operation of evaluators, providers and infor-
mants has been aptly described by Yassin Musharbash:
[…] the employees are divided into two tribes: “providers” spend a lot of time 
outside the of fices. They recruit and lead informants – these are mostly 
shady figures from extremist milieus, who sell information to the service[…] 
Their insider knowledge […] sometimes also leads to arrests, the banning of 
an organisation or the thwarting of a crime[…] Evaluators live at the desk. 
They pass questions to the providers: Why is X no longer chairman? They 
transform the information that the providers produce into analytical notes 
[…] It would be wrong to imagine the providers and the evaluators as a team. 
Evaluators are not supposed to know informants' identities, providers cannot 
read the evaluations of the evaluators. They should not influence each other. 
Providers deliver pieces of a jigsaw [puzzle], evaluators put them together to 
form a picture. Superiors pass on the picture to policemen, prosecutors, civil 
servants in the Ministry of the Interior. (Musharbash 2013)
What does that mean for the production of knowledge? 
A product delivered
Politicians, the public and the administration expect the Verfassungsschutz 
to provide an overview of groups and tendencies that threaten civil order 
in the Federal Republic. The Ämter are expected to provide information 
on the activities of foreign powers on the territory of the Federal Republic 
(such as espionage) and map the activity of left-wing, right-wing and Isla-
mist extremists. A PowerPoint presentation by the Verfassungsschutzamt of 
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North Rhine-Westphalia (VNR-W), entitled “Islam and Islamism. Attributes 
and Developments”, produced around 2005 for a public audience, is a good 
example of how the agency tries to do justice to this expectation.6 Figures 1a 
and 1b show how the VNR-W estimated the danger emanating from various 
Islamist groups, which it is required to do by its mandate. 
Figure 1a: Risks according to the readiness to use violence.
Figure 1b: Risks arranged according to long-term ef fects (adapted from 
“Islam and Islamism. Attributes and developments” [VNR-W 2007-8]).
6  It has meanwhile been taken of f the internet, probably because it was too revealing of 
state activities.
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Although outdated (Salafism, very prominent today, did not then figure), it 
illustrates the kind of knowledge relating to Islam created in the Verfassungs-
schutzämter. It is also good for thinking about connections between ethos 
and knowledge production. 
Knowledge about extremist Islamist groups is arranged in two pyramids 
according to the size and nature of the risk posed by each group. The pre-
sentation translates statements, which were contained in the annual reports, 
into a scheme. Fig 1a depicts short-term dangers resulting from acts of vio-
lence, while Fig 1b depicts long-term dangers for the societal order. Thus the 
configuration of the map displays the nature and size of the risk. 
At the base of the pyramids, one finds violence-abjuring Islamist groups 
such as Millî Görüş or the Muslim Brotherhood, which are included because 
they supposedly work to overthrow the German constitution by legal means. 
Right above them are groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and the “Kalifatstaat”, 
which are nonviolent in Germany but promote the use of violence to liberate 
their respective homelands. Next come groups participating in armed strug-
gles in their respective homelands, including Hamas and Hezbollah. At the 
apex, internationally operating terrorists such as Al-Qaeda are represented. 
The overall idea expressed in juxtaposing the two pyramids is that Millî 
Görüş and the Muslim Brotherhood pose the least risk with regard to violent 
attacks but the highest with regard to long-term effects on the societal order; 
whereas exactly the reverse is true for Al-Qaeda: It presents the greatest risk 
from terrorist attacks but the least risk relating to societal order.
A number of aspects of this representation deserve attention. First, it 
is limited to Islamist groups, which are distinguished from Islamic com-
munities. According to the Verfassungsschutz, Islam is “religion” in the true 
sense, whereas Islamism is ideology, namely the “abuse of the religion of 
Islam for the political aims and purposes of the Islamists”.7 Since Islam as 
a religion is protected by the constitution, it does not appear in this classi-
fication. Second, the categories used to classify groups (nonviolent, violent, 
etc.) are derived for a very specific perspective, namely, the security of the 
German nation state. Methodological nationalism structures the presen-
tation. Of course, this is the perspective state agencies have to take, but it 
must be remembered because there is a marked tendency to forget the posi-
tionality of the insights. Thirdly, groups active in Germany are sorted into 
7  Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2019.
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different risk categories – Millî Görüş8 and the Muslim Brotherhood are cat-
egorised as “renouncing violence” and “socially and politically active groups 
in Germany”, while Hizb-ut Tahrir and the Caliphate State9 find themselves 
labelled as “propagating violence”, and “active on the margins of local society 
and struggling to overthrow regimes at home”. Thus, the point of view taken 
differs systematically from one that, for example, a student of Islamic reli-
gion would assume, who, aiming at an emic view, might sort them according 
to schools of theological reasoning or according to genealogy. 
The representation is a fine example of the form of state knowledge as a 
whole. In his lectures on the state, Pierre Bourdieu described the creation of 
official, public categories, which are generally accepted as valid, as a central 
act of statehood (2014: 33.34). Homogenous, quantifiable, static and bounded 
units are created and arranged. With such maps, society is made legible 
(Scott 1998).
Other authorities (such as integration offices) need and demand this 
type of knowledge in order to carry out their duties. The 2007-8 PowerPoint 
presentation acknowledges this by assigning specific administrative strate-
gies to individual categories. While Al-Qaeda is to be fought using military 
means “such as the destruction of camps and weapons, targeted killing or 
arrest of fighters and supporters” (VNR-W 2007-8: slide 30), groups using 
violence in their home counties or otherwise propagating violence should 
be outlawed (VNR-W 2007-8: slides 31, 32), and groups operating seemingly 
within the law (which the Verfassungsschutz refers to, somewhat misleadingly, 
as “legalistic Islamist organisations”) should be repressed using methods 
such as tax audits and investigations (VNR-W 2007-8: slide 33). 
In Verfassungsschutz reports, the same categories that structure the 
representation of Islamism also structure the representation of right- and 
left-wing extremism. In all these domains, distinctions are made between 
groups that reject violence and work politically within society, and groups 
that directly confront society. Symmetry in representation is made possi-
ble by the concept of extremism. Following Backes and Jesse (1996), extrem-
ism is seen by the Verfassungsschutz as a “collective term for various political 
endeavours, which share the rejection of the democratic constitutional state 
and its fundamental values and rules of play” (Verfassungsschutzbericht 
8  For Millî Görüş, see Schif fauer 2010.
9  For the “Kalifatstaat”, see Schif fauer 2000.
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Berlin 2009: 144). This underlying worldview can be represented by several 
concentric circles. The centre of society is surrounded by a sphere of “soft” 
extremism (Jesse 2008), within nested spheres of tougher, more violent 
extremisms. Danger to society comes from the extremist edges. 
This theory is attractive to state apparatuses for several reasons. It allows 
equal treatment of different groups, thus reinforcing the ethos of neutral-
ity and the impartiality of state action. It identifies the State with the “cen-
tre of society” and thus stages its centrality. More practically, the theory of 
extremism assigns answers to threats developed on an earlier field of con-
f lict (let's say, the fight against leftist radicalisation during the seventies) to 
threats emerging on other fields. The usual sequence of analysis and strategy 
development is turned upside down: strategy does not follow analysis, but 
analysis follows strategy. In other words, if strategies of policing have proven 
successful, it is tempting to organise knowledge production in a manner 
that fills the same primary categorical distinctions. The role of analysis, then, 
becomes less of a guide for strategy development, and more of a means to 
legitimise and rationalise existing strategies.
Translating the territory onto a map
Like all maps, the map discussed here reduces complexity. However, it is 
important to know what happens to raw data processed according to Ver-
fassungsschutz ethics and ethos. Following Latour, I conceive of knowledge 
production as a multi-step process, in which concrete, object-oriented knowl-
edge is elaborated upon and transformed in several steps, until it becomes 
cartographic, tabular or statistical knowledge in the end. In this process of 
reworking, the concreteness and abundance of low-level knowledge are lost. 
What is gained, however, is comparability and an overview. Latour conceived 
of this step-by-step reduction and abstraction as a translation process. In 
our case the steps of translation are from (1) the informant's oral report to the 
provider's written protocol, to (2) the evaluator's text, drawn from various 
sources, to (3) the synoptic representation that gives an abstract overview. 
Following Latour, our analysis consists of determining what is saved and 
what is lost at every transition. By focusing on translation, Latour places the 
discontinuities in data processing at the centre of the investigation. None of 
Moral Economy and Knowledge Production in a Security Bureaucracy 95
these steps follows automatically. Each requires conscious decision-making 
and active intervention.
Awareness of these transformation chains is crucial in understand-
ing acquired knowledge. Latour insists that it is impossible to relate the 
final product of cognitive work – the maps, diagrams, and classifications – 
directly to the raw components (e.g. Latour 2014: 119 f f). Rather, one must 
revisit the chain of successive translations step by step. By conceiving of the 
process this way, he takes an intermediate position between a correspon-
dence-theoretical realism and a constructivism that renounces truth-claims. 
Applying this insight to our field, we observe that an official report is neither: 
it is not matter of fact, nor is it deliberate construction. An analysis of the 
translation processes carried out when producing the reports allows us to 
understand the specific nature of the knowledge created.
To adequately grasp these processes, one would have to carry out partic-
ipant observation among Verfassungsschutz officials similar to the research 
Bruno Latour carried out among the pedologists of Boa Vista (Latour 1999). 
As few other sectors in society are as secretive as the public sector (and intel-
ligence services in particular), this is impossible. I suggest an alternative 
route that contrasts the Verfassungsschutz' scrutiny of the Islamic landscape 
from above and from a distance with an anthropologist's view from nearby 
and from the side. This is the view of an educated and trained participant 
observer. By contrasting the result of participant observation10 with the map, 
we learn what is kept and what is lost during data processing. 
Five reductions of complexity can be observed. The first concerns the 
internal plurality of the Islamic communities. When viewed from nearby, 
they no longer appear homogeneous. Rather, one gets the impression of are-
nas of intense discussion, with different factions striving to position their 
community in society at large and determine the course to pursue. The sub-
text of the debates is mostly the dilemma of continuity and change,11 which is 
particularly intense in immigrant communities. Most comprehend that con-
tinuity is only possible through change – but one must avoid petrification, 
10  Apart from my own research on Islamic communities in Germany (Schif fauer 2000, 2010) 
I refer to Klinkhammer (2000), Frese (2002) Jonker (2002, 2005, 2006), Tezcan (2002) 
and Thielmann (2013, 2014). While these scholars dif fer in their theoretical outlook, they 
agree on the empirical findings discussed here.
11  This is a basic problem for religions in general. See Ernst Troeltsch (1977/1925) and Latour 
(2014: 85f f.).
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on the one hand, and self-abandonment on the other. However, the need 
to achieve this balance in specific areas is controversial. Questions arise in 
terms of sexual morality and family ethics, political engagement and theo-
logical positioning, to name but a few contentious areas. One can observe 
that a conservative attitude towards sexual ethics does not necessarily cor-
respond to a conservative attitude with regard to politics or theology.12
There are some attempts by the Verfassungsschutz to do justice to hetero-
geneity at the community level by introducing “cartographic” sub-divisions. 
For example, “traditionalists” were at one time distinguished from “reform-
ers” within Millî Görüş; another time there was the attempt to differentiate 
“fundamentalism” from “extremism/Islamism” (Puschnerat 2006: 219). Nev-
ertheless, such distinctions are too clumsy to do justice to the complexities 
of negotiation. This is because while categorisations may become more elab-
orate, they are not dynamic – no matter how intricate the category system 
becomes, it will always remain rigid. It freezes positions which are in a state 
of f lux. Moreover, compulsory final evaluations are to be made in order to 
arrive at unequivocal policy recommendations. They necessitate the with-
drawal of distinctions introduced earlier in order to make unambiguous 
knowledge available to decision-making authorities. Certainty is restored. 
An example of a summarising evaluation may illustrate this:
Even if some reformers demand a reorientation of Millî Görüş-IGMG, key 
protagonists still stick to the dogmatic ideals of the original Millî Görüş. It is 
therefore doubtful whether reforms can be implemented in the organisation 
or made sustainable. (Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2009: 34)
The quotation shows how distinctions that were introduced (in this case, 
the demand for reform), are ultimately withdrawn. They remain, but are 
irrelevant to the overall assessment. The homogeneity thus reproduced has 
far-reaching consequences. When an IGMG member applied for citizenship, 
the application was generally denied. It was argued that individual members 
of an organisation hostile to the constitution could be held responsible for 
12  The post-Islamist generation in Millî Görüş communities may serve as an example: their 
members are religious, frequently stricter than their parents, and at the same time polit-
ically more open to the secular rule of law and democracy than their parents (Schif fauer 
2010: 158-225).
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the group doctrine. An exception was made only if the applicant could con-
vincingly prove membership of the reformist wing. Thus, the burden of proof 
was laid on the applicant. 
In this context, the rhetoric of numbers deserves attention. A cen-
tral function of categorisation is to facilitate quantification. Digitisation 
is a central technique of governmentality (Porter 2015): only what can be 
expressed numerically “counts” in politics. Every child learns at school that 
apples and pears should not be counted together unless they are grouped as 
“fruit”. Numbers imply homogeneity, uniformity. They play a crucial role in 
risk assessment, in evaluation procedures, and in justifying interventions. 
If the number of members of a category, such as that of “legalistic Islamist 
organisations”, is set at 2900 (in Berlin), readers assume that 2900 individ-
uals have corresponding orientations. In this context, the 2014 report of the 
Verfassungsschutz carried out a telling turnaround. It states that:
Meanwhile, some IGMG supporters in Berlin are no longer pursuing extrem-
ist goals. Overall, a process of change is to be seen, which shows a growing 
distance from the extremist ideology of [Necmettin] Erbakan. Internal posi-
tions are increasingly occupied by reform-oriented of ficials. To take this into 
account, we no longer judge the IGMG as a whole to be extremist, but only 
those who hold the extremist, “Millî Görüş” ideology. Berlin's Verfassungss-
chutz therefore focuses on those organisations and aspirations whose aims 
are the implementation of the “Millî Görüş” ideology. This reduces the poten-
tial [“legalistic Islamists”, WS] in Berlin from 2900 individuals in the IGMG 
to the 500 IGMG members who support the Millî Görüş movement. (Ver-
fassungsschutzbericht Berlin 2014:66)
Obviously, this drastic change in assessment from one year to the next does 
not correspond to a sudden reshuff ling in organisational membership. 
Rather, it ref lects a gradual, long-term shift that was not represented in the 
reports for many years. Only when the old figures were no longer tenable was 
the assessment abruptly re-adjusted. 
Constructing indices of attribution is another knowledge problem of 
sociological interest.13 As a rule, a verbal statement favouring Erbakan or an 
13  On the anthropology of indices, see Rottenburg et al., 2015. 
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affirmative reference to Qaradawi14 (for example, in the context of the Euro-
pean Council for Fatwa and Research) can assign a subgroup or individuals 
to the “legalistic” group within Millî Görüş. We can observe a double reduc-
tion of complexity. On the one hand, people holding a wide range of positions 
are reduced to a single position (Erbakan on Adil Düzen [Just Order],15 Qarad-
awi on his fatwa related to suicide bombings). On the other hand, the variety 
of reasons that may inspire personal or group admiration are not taken into 
account. Someone may revere Erbakan for purely religious reasons, while 
disregarding his political work. Such veneration may well be compatible with 
a deeply democratic spirit.
Reduction of complexity also occurs when boundaries are crosscutting 
and overlap. A close look shows that boundaries between Islamic organisa-
tions are anything but clear. In fact, local differences are sometimes greater 
than disparities between umbrella organisations. By no means is a “liberal 
spirit” or “greater worldliness” more common in a DİTİB community16 than 
in a Millî Görüş community. At close range, seemingly clear boundaries dis-
solve and are replaced by continuities, overlaps and transitions.
The clear boundary the Verfassungsschutz draws between Islam (religion) 
and Islamism (political ideology) is by no means as distinct as the Amt sug-
gests. The question of how far religion is political – and must be political – 
cannot easily be answered. It constitutes an open search leading to provi-
sional answers. Religions put God, man, nature and society in a relationship 
that cannot be reduced to a private relationship between God and the believer. 
Yet, all religions define worldly tasks from their basic understanding of 
these relationships. Many believers are faced by the dilemma of how much 
14  Yusuf Abdallah al-Qaradawi is an Islamic legal scholar, television preacher and author. In 
the context of the “European Council for Fatwa and Research”, he has spoken out for the 
further development of Islamic jurisprudence in order to into take account the situation 
in Europe. From an internal Islamic perspective, he is seen as one of the legal scholars 
practicing a liberal interpretation of Islamic law (Caeiro 2003 and Schif fauer 2010, 233f f., 
on the relationship between Millî Görüş and the Council). Qaradawi became a target of 
the Verfassungsschutz, because he defended suicide bombings in Palestine, arguing that 
otherwise an equality of arms would not exist (Schif fauer 2010: 237).
15  Adil Düzen: “Just Order” is a document in which Necmettin Erbakan laid down his vision 
of an Islamic state in 1993. For more on Adil Düzen, see Schif fauer 2010: 69f f.
16  The DİTİB is an Islamic umbrella organisation af filiated with the State Of fice of Religious 
Af fairs (DIYANET) of the Turkish Republic. Of ficially it stands for a secular interpretation 
of Islam.
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compromise can be made in dealing with the world. Where must one draw 
the line? Like the aforementioned dilemma of continuity and change, this 
challenge opens up ways of manoeuvring between an ethics of responsibil-
ity (Verantwortungsethik) and an ethics of conscience (Gesinnungsethik),17 and 
leads to novel – usually provisional – answers that may redefine community 
boundaries. One example is a movement in the Millî Görüş community away 
from what I called populist Islamism towards a mainly post-Islamist reli-
gious community (Schiffauer 2010). Here, the relationship to the world was 
constantly renegotiated. Of course, some communities emphasise the bor-
ders that separate them from the outside, maintaining an internal cohesion 
and consciously creating a far-reaching consensus.18 However, these com-
munities are minoritarian. Most Muslim believers would condemn them as 
sectarian, since the emphasis on boundaries is divisive and abhorrent to the 
Islamic quest for unity. 
State authorities' desire for clear boundaries also ref lects a widespread 
fear of public scandals or legal objections. The need to justify political deci-
sions leads to a tendency to emphasise the boundaries between categories, 
and to exaggerate the differences between them. If a politician “categori-
cally” refuses an invitation by a particular organisation, he has to give good 
reasons as to why he makes this distinction. The “legalist”, violence-advo-
cating, or violence-promoting categories of Islamism must be clearly distin-
guished so that differential treatments can be justified and will stand up in 
court decisions. In other words, political reasons require “discriminatory 
distinctions” (Farschid 2015: 143). These political considerations, however, 
have to remain hidden, and it is instead claimed that these distinctions arise 
from the nature of things. 
Another reduction of complexity relates to the apprehension of tempo-
rality. We have already discussed this in the context of homogenisation. Cat-
egorical knowledge is sluggish. This is probably due to the fact that categor-
ical knowledge produces fixed “identities”. Categorical thinking starts with 
continuity and considers change as exceptional or requiring an explanation. 
This differs from hermeneutic-procedural thinking, which takes its depar-
17  The dilemma between an ethics of responsibility and an ethics of conscience was devel-
oped by Max Weber in his essay on “Politics as profession” (Politik als Beruf ) (1919/1994). 
18  See, e.g. my description of the “Kalifatstaat” (Schif fauer 2000).
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ture from change, and considers the emergence of continuity or the consoli-
dation of “identities” as phenomena requiring explanation. 
As mentioned above, complexity reduction also results from the symmet-
rical treatment of different kinds of extremisms. Criticism of the distortions 
that arise from the analogous treatment of left- and right-wing extremisms 
has recently been voiced, especially by left-wing social scientists.19 In this 
context, the distortions are even greater when the categorical apparatus is 
applied to Islamism. This is because left-wing and right-wing extremisms 
are secular movements, whereas Islamism is grounded in religion. The moti-
vations, debates, and developmental logic of Islamism cannot be understood 
when it is marked as a “political ideology”. Here, too, it suffices to illustrate 
this with a single example: if one takes Islamism as a political ideology, one 
considers the ramifications of the Muhammad cartoons essentially from the 
standpoint of political mobilisation. The Islamist appears to “instrumental-
ise” and “abuse” religious feelings. The fact of a genuinely felt religious harm 
is withdrawn from consideration and is no longer seen as a motive for polit-
ical action.
Finally, complexity reduction results from the imperative to make find-
ings public. This implies accountability. The Verfassungsschutz has to justify 
why it observes one group but not another with a similar outlook. In order 
to legitimise and rationalise decision-making, the office must stress the 
differences between them. Idiosyncrasies become emphasised as essential 
attributes. This has to be done in a manner that withstands court challenges. 
In other words: groupings are made more different than they appear on 
ground. Continuities that exist in reality are replaced by discontinuities. 
To summarise: When processing the data in order to map the field of 
Islamic communities, the Verfassungschutz saves the content but discards the 
structure. All the positions mentioned in the reports exist; the problem lies in 
sorting them into fixed categories. In the translation process, an extremely 
complex, heterogeneous and dynamic field comes to be represented in a 
static map. That which is f luid is fixed; the porous is made water-tight; the 
heterogenous made homogenous. In short, a categorical fiction is produced.
Differences between bureaucratic and everyday knowledge have been 
emphasised by other ethnographers of state apparatuses, notably James 
Scott (1998), David Graeber (2015) and Michael Herzfeld (1993). All three 
19  See the debate in Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Hef t 47/2008.
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formulate a sweeping criticism of bureaucratic knowledge and demand its 
replacement with practical knowledge, metis (Scott), or hermeneutics (Grae-
ber). What they do not see is that categorical knowledge cannot be replaced 
by other forms of knowledge because it is (also) an expression of adminis-
trative rationality. State action requires categorical knowledge to fulfil the 
state's mandate to carry out and enforce decisions that have been reached 
democratically. There is no administration without categorisation. Herme-
neutical knowledge does play a role in administrative practice: it comes into 
play in discretionary practice,20 or in potential challenges to administrative 
decisions. But doing justice to individual cases must remain the exception in 
administrative practice. It is time consuming, costly and inefficient.
Categorical knowledge is also required when security issues are involved. 
While hermeneutical knowledge allows qualitative insights (for example, 
into the nature of radicalisation), it cannot be used to estimate how many 
violent Islamists are around. Although it concedes that there are violent 
Islamists, it insists that the phenomenon cannot be clearly defined and that 
numbers are illusionary. This type of knowledge does not allow the admin-
istration of security, nor the planning or legitimisation of security measures. 
Categorical knowledge is thus double faced – it permits repression, on 
the one hand, but limits government action, on the other. The principle of 
proportionality, crucial for security policy in the democratic state, cannot 
be based on hermeneutical knowledge that emphasises transitions and pro-
cesses. Ultimately, with a security policy based on hermeneutical knowledge, 
anybody or nobody could come under suspicion. Categorical knowledge, by 
contrast, promises to limit, isolate and then “combat” problematic phenom-
ena in an almost surgical manner. For good or bad, security agencies focus 
on some, but leave the rest in (relative) peace. Finally, hermeneutic knowl-
edge makes it very difficult to establish legal responsibilities and account-
ability. Thus, categorical knowledge undergirds state governance and the 
maintenance of social order. When the ability to distinguish and to differen-
tiate disappears, totalitarianism results.
Much of governance is based on categorical fictions. One must act “as if” 
it were possible to draw clear boundaries and separate categories. The issue 
is not to do away with the maps, as Scott and Graeber demand, but rather, to 
20  This has been intensively discussed in the literature on street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky 
1980, Evans and Harris 2004, Hupe 2013, Buf fat 2015, Evans 2015).
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ref lect on the process of knowledge production out of which a map is pro-
duced. Awareness of this “as if”, of the contingent character of the knowl-
edge base, is crucial for good administrative practice. Only if civil servants 
apprehend that the map is not the territory will they avoid problematic and 
unintended consequences. This, however, is difficult, as I will show in the 
next section.
Five mechanisms for confusing the map and the territory
Five mechanisms work to conceal the fact that categorical knowledge only 
partly grasps the complexities and temporalities of facts on the ground. 
First, the constructedness of categorical knowledge often escapes its 
architects. Two aspects seem to be central to this operational blindness. One 
lies in the practice of boundary-drawing itself. Setting and drawing bound-
aries are acts of “de-fining” (literally, “setting limits”) a phenomenon. One 
establishes its “essence”, what it is, by setting it apart from what it is not. The 
act of definition is a decisive step towards the essentialisation of the phe-
nomenon. Not only are limits defined, the suggestion is that they relate to 
substance. This suggestion is reinforced because each definition also struc-
tures perception. It constitutes a paradigm (Kuhn 1962/1976) and exhibits 
all the mechanisms captured so well in Kuhn's analysis. One sees what one 
expects to see and takes this as a proof that things are actually as repre-
sented. But the practical organisation of intelligence work also contributes to 
operational blindness. The separation of informants, providers and evalua-
tors required by Verfassungsschutz ethics may guarantee “objectivity” to some 
degree, but it also systematically reduces the information that appears in the 
reports. As evaluators receive only second-hand information, they cannot 
access the contradictions and complexities that arise in face-to-face interac-
tions. They get no “feel” of the situation, which might help them to question 
or contextualise indexical clarity.
A second mechanism derives from the interface management required 
by institutional ethos. The Verfassungsschutz does not take on an operational 
role itself. It “only observes” and informs other authorities, who operate 
based on knowledge the Verfassungsschutz provides. On the one hand, this 
process limits their offices' field of activity (which is wanted); on the other 
hand, it solidifies and objectivises knowledge.
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Mapmakers – in this case Verfassungsschutz evaluators – are at least 
partly aware of the problems related to mapping. They know what difficul-
ties arise when sorting phenomena into categories transforms continuities 
into discontinuities; they also understand the difficulties arising when phe-
nomena do not fit. However, this perspective-granting insight disappears 
when knowledge is transferred to another place. 
This became very clear to me when I reconstructed a security hearing 
held in Munich in 2012 concerning a citizenship application from a mem-
ber of Millî Görüş. These hearings are required when somebody admits to 
membership in a group classified as extremist (from a list provided to them) 
during the application process. A section head (Sachgebietsleiterin) in the 
office responsible for foreigners (Ausländeramt), a civil servant who did not 
belong to the Verfassungsschutz, conducted the hearing. She was briefed by 
a letter from the Verfassungsschutz summarising information in the reports. 
What constituted the endpoint for the Verfassungsschutz was the starting 
point for the interlocutor in charge of the hearing. She had no knowledge of 
the complex processing of information underlying the summary given to her. 
The civil servant had to take the statements literally – as a reality upon which 
to act. On this basis, the security hearing was conducted and developed its 
own dynamics. The applicant was confronted with “objective” information 
that portrayed the Millî Görüş as political, whereas she herself had experi-
enced it as religious. Faced with this, she had two choices: either to state that 
she had been deceived by her co-believers and her first-hand knowledge was 
wrong, or to insist that all she had seen and experienced in the community 
was purely religious. She opted for the latter and her testimony was inter-
preted as the claims of a clever Islamist. How could she not have realised the 
organisation's political character? The hearing turned into a farce, with its 
very purpose (to do justice to the specific features of the case) thereby under-
mined.21 The case shows how an operational structure based on an ethical 
principle – the separation of knowledge gathering and official implementa-
21  The relevance of this point became particularly clear when she appealed to the courts. In 
the court hearing, which I was able to attend, it became transparently obvious that the 
presiding judge was in a situation similar to that of the section head described above. 
He formed his opinion based on documents prepared by the Verfassungsschutz. He was 
blatantly in the proverbial situation of the blind man hearing a description of the colour 
red. In this case, the Verfassungsschutz representative felt compelled to point out that the 
specific culture of mosque communities had to be taken into account in order to arrive at 
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tion – can work in reverse. What was meant as a restriction of Verfassungs-
schutz power (it only observes), in fact reinforces its power of definition. Its 
knowledge is regarded as absolute because the construction of knowledge 
has been obscured. 
A third mechanism derives from the logic of security politics. The fact 
that the security services analyse hazards means that information provided 
by the Verfassungsschutz is taken seriously and given great weight. In par-
ticular, it is tempting for politicians to accept the Verfassungsschutz reports 
uncritically and act accordingly. If nothing happens, this can be attributed to 
the implementation of expert recommendations. If something does happen, 
blame can be laid at the feet of the Verfassungsschutz. By making the knowl-
edge provided by the Verfassungsschutz the basis of action, it is solidified 
and re-affirmed.22 
The secretiveness that characterises the work of the Verfassungsschutz is 
a fourth, powerful mechanism justified by the fact that “that the office's role 
in constitutional protection requires it to protect its sources”. This may be 
so, but it also obscures the production of evidence. While other knowledge 
producers, such as the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) 
or university departments, generate data from which conclusions are drawn 
transparently and which are therefore open to review, this is not the case 
with the Verfassungsschutz. The risky translations that guide any process of 
knowledge production remain hidden. Ultimately, the Verfassungsschutz 
demands unconditional faith in its findings – and thus trust in the state. It is 
remarkable how well this technique works: reference to esoteric knowledge, 
accessible only to initiates, triggers a kind of theological ref lex. Remarkably, 
its obscurity increases, rather than diminishes, the willingness to believe it.
Finally, a fifth mechanism relates to the fact that administrative catego-
ries are highly self-fulfilling. Individuals and groups subjected to categori-
sation have very few options other than to play along and thus affirm the 
labels. Even if they feel they are wrongly represented, they have no effective 
a proper understanding. He thus pointed out cognitive gaps in the paperwork, of which 
he was aware, but which were not evident to an outsider.
22  It should be mentioned some prominent politicians, like the former senator of the interior 
of Berlin, Erhart Körting, criticised this tendency of political actors as a refusal of political 
responsibility. A negotiation process in which security arguments are weighed against 
integration arguments and the basis of knowledge from the Verfassungsschutz is checked 
would enhance political responsibility.
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alternative but to defend themselves in those terms (“We are not Islamists”), 
or to partner in dialogues (such as the Islamkonferenz) or on boards (like those 
set up for Islamic Theology). The fact that people who are classified also use 
the classifications, nolens volens, only insisting that they are put in the wrong 
box, confirms their validity. As everybody agrees on the script, it becomes 
the basis for interaction and its artificiality tends to be forgotten.
All these mechanisms contribute to the ever-increasing consolidation 
of Verfassungschutz knowledge. In the end, map and territory become indis-
tinguishable. The “as if” character of categorical knowledge remains deeply 
hidden.
Biopolitical challenges
As long as the state apparatus is administering, surveilling and disciplining, 
the mapping itself is largely self-affirming. Only when dealing with excep-
tions, as in discretionary practice, do differences between map and territory 
become visible. But these exceptions confirm the rule rather than question it. 
However, ethical conf licts exist with biopolitically oriented state agen-
cies that see their task less as administrative, and more as focused on find-
ing proactive solutions to societal problems through the organisation of 
dialogue and participation. Departments and initiatives involved in the area 
of integration policy do not differ from security agencies in their vision of 
the common good. But they arrive at other strategies to pursue their aims. 
While security agencies see their task as surveilling and disciplining, inte-
gration agencies see their task as the organisation of living together. In this 
case, they set up a framework for Islamic life in Germany. Following Foucault, 
the logic of integration policies is the logic of control and regulation aimed at 
bringing forth subjects who rule themselves.23 State agencies and initiatives 
active in the field of biopolitics often find the mapping developed by the Ver-
fassungsschutz too rigid and misleading. 
23  This formulation draws heavily on Foucault's work on governmentality and biopolitics. I 
don't see this in terms of a regime based on surveilling and disciplining being replaced by 
one characterized by control and regulation. The dif ferent techniques work side by side, 
at least in the security apparatus, however there are tensions between the dif ferent log-
ics of governance (Foucault 2006a/2006b).
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Examples of biopolitical initiatives concerning Islam in Germany include 
the Islam Conference (Tezcan 2012), the establishment of Islamic theological 
programs at universities in the Federal Republic, as well as various derad-
icalisation policies and all kinds of pedagogical intervention. The idea is 
to create consensus and identification through dialogue, involvement and 
persuasion (Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2015). Here, the emphasis on soft 
control and encouragement implies quite a different ethics and ethos from 
that of the security agencies. Integration agencies represent a benevolent 
authoritarianism. Their task is to domesticate. Their ethics and ethos resem-
ble those of good teachers. They are committed to openness, respect and 
understanding while never forgetting the asymmetrical character of their 
relationships. They share with the security agencies the conviction that it is 
necessary to set limits and to be completely clear about what is acceptable 
and what not. But whereas categorical knowledge is the basis of action for 
security agencies and qualitative knowledge becomes important when deal-
ing with exceptions, biopolitical approaches reverse this order. They gener-
ally rely on qualitative knowledge of the particular; categorical knowledge 
only comes in play when drawing red lines.
When dealing with Islam, the two ethics clash from time to time. Depart-
ments and individuals in charge of integration, for example, are in favour of 
community initiatives signalling support for an open society. Building up 
self-regulatory mechanisms is what they're looking for. For example, the 
project “Isl'amour – hand in hand against forced marriage” by Muslim Youth 
(2009)24 was supported by the local District Office of Friedrichshain-Kreuz-
berg of Berlin, whose civil servants knew the activists personally and 
assumed that the most effective interventions came from the communi-
ties themselves. Despite strong support, the Federal Ministry of Family and 
Social Affairs rejected their request for funding, arguing that some cooper-
ation partners were listed as extremists in the Verfassungsschutzbericht (the 
Muslim brotherhood and Millî Görüş). What the District Office construed as 
an argument in favour of the project (initiatives coming from within conser-
vative communities themselves) was a no-go for the security agencies (sup-
24  Others include the “Dialogue – Young People for Human Rights” project (2009) and the 
“Youth against Violence” project (2010) in Braunschweig, which tried to foster coopera-
tion with the police against street violence.
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port would blur boundaries and legitimise legalist Islamist organisations). 
The security agencies had the final say. 
Civil servants at the local District Office felt that they were relegated 
to second-class status and expressed serious dissatisfaction with the pro-
cedure. They felt particularly bitter because they received no more detailed 
knowledge justifying the denial of funding than did their Muslim clients. All 
they learned was that the two organisations concerned were under surveil-
lance by the Verfassungsschutz, information they already possessed. No con-
crete evidence was given about individuals involved in the project. They felt 
that the verdict, based on schematic categorical knowledge, stigmatised pre-
cisely the group that they had tried to win over for the development of civil 
society. They argued that promoting these projects would have improved 
the standing of progressive activists in their communities. Refusal would 
weaken progressive circles, justifying the views of community members 
who regard such initiatives as illusionary, “because society does not want 
Islam anyway”. Finally, the civil servants expressed regret that they could not 
articulate their dissatisfaction about the decision in public. All comments 
were “off the record”.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined knowledge production in the Verfassungs-
schutzämter to show how it is structured by the ethics and ethos of the office 
as the institutionalisation of wehrhaf te Demokratie. Taking Islamist commu-
nities as my example, I demonstrated that the knowledge produced certainly 
ref lects the landscape of production but ref lects it in a special way. It is a 
scientific-ethical hybrid – and an adequate understanding of it has to take 
into account its hybridity. It cannot be criticised in a purely scientific way, in 
terms of the validity and reliability of its insights. If one questions the valid-
ity of a clear categorical distinction between Islamism and Islam, one is told 
that this question is beside the point because there are ethical reasons that 
necessitate making it and upholding it. Or if one points to distortions aris-
ing from the division of work between “providers” and “evaluators”, one us 
informed that the applicable work-ethos discourages seriously questioning 
this, given the specific historical precedent of the Gestapo. 
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Of course, categorical knowledge has serious shortcomings. It provides 
static maps of a highly f luid field. This becomes a problem for other state 
agencies that share the same idea of the common good but derive other strat-
egies – i.e. biopolitical ones – to achieve it. This results in a clash of ethics and 
ethos among different state agencies. It is the clash between juridico-polit-
ical ethics and ethos aiming at controlling bodies, and biopolitical-peda-
gogical ethics and ethos aiming at winning hearts. It would be possible in 
principle to solve this contradiction by emphasising the constructedness and 
artificiality of Verfassungsschutz knowledge. This is not easy, and we have 
pointed out the obstacles. The result is, however, that the map is taken as the 
territory. And this causes state agencies to stumble and trip when it comes to 
dealing with Muslim communities.
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In recent years, programmes for so-called assisted voluntary return migra-
tion (AVR) have become an important pillar of European migration policy 
(Broeders 2010).2 These programmes target asylum seekers whose chances 
of admission are considered to be low and, in some cases, rejected asylum 
seekers. They provide advice and financial incentives with the aim of per-
suading these people to agree to return to their countries of origin. A grow-
ing number of studies of migration policy have evaluated and measured the 
effectiveness of these programmes (e.g. Gosh 2000; International Organi-
zation for Migration 2004; Black and Gent 2006; Geiger 2009; Black et al. 
2011). However, few studies have attempted to understand the underlying 
structures and logics of this specific form of migration management, which 
oscillate between deportation and the provision of assistance on humani-
tarian grounds (cf. Hammond 1999; Blitz et al. 2005; Webber 2011; Lietaert 
et al. 2016). 
This chapter discusses the logics of these programmes through an anal-
ysis of the self-representations of counsellors who work in Switzerland's 
return migration bureaucracy. It approaches these self-representations not 
1  This chapter is based on my PhD research project on the governance of clandestine Tu-
nisian migration in the context of Switzerland's assisted voluntary return migration pro-
gramme. The research was supported by the Swiss Scientific National Foundation SNSF. 
2  In this chapter, the term AVR refers to a specific form of migration management in the form 
of these government programmes. It does not imply consent or agreement with the pur-
ported voluntary nature of these programmes. 
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primarily as individual expressions of personal attitudes, but rather as a 
ref lection of the conf licting bureaucratic ethics that provide moral legiti-
misation for concrete bureaucratic practices. Whereas several studies have 
highlighted the messy, conf licting reality of migration bureaucracy and its 
domination by various interests and actors (e.g. Eule 2014; Cabot 2013), I 
also see the effects of a structural incommensurability between bureaucra-
cy's universal promises and the governance of commonwealth boundaries. 
An ideal-typical bureaucracy serves for the benefit of everyone. The critical 
question is therefore: Who is part of the commonwealth and included in 
“everyone”? Usually this question is beyond the scope of bureaucracies and 
allocated to the realm of politics in a Rancièrian sense (see Rancière 1999). In 
the case of migration bureaucracies, however, structural incommensurabil-
ity occurs because the object of administration is precisely the formation and 
delimitation of the commonwealth, and this undermines bureaucracy's uni-
versalistic claim. The structural incommensurability of migration bureau-
cracy generates its necessarily exclusionary logics.
AVR operates against a backdrop of – and often hand in hand with – 
forced deportation. Since its success depends on the threat of coercion, there 
is a permanent need to legitimate AVR and to position it in the field of migra-
tion management in relation to forced deportation. In order to explore these 
tensions, I focus primarily on the self-representations of return migration 
bureaucrats. These officials are well aware that “deportability” (de Genova 
2002) is indispensable for AVR as a whole as well as for their individual 
professional success. At the same time, they assume an ambivalent stance 
towards coercive measures: either they consider each forced deportation to 
be a failed AVR, and therefore as a professional failure, or they obfuscate the 
relationship between AVR and forced deportation. In the latter case, officials 
argue that they are only consultants, independently and objectively inform-
ing their clients – i.e. the migrants – about their rights, duties, constraints 
and opportunities.
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the notion of bureaucratic ethics, 
asking in what ways the ethics of migration bureaucracies differ from the 
ethics of other bureaucracies. The second part explores the context of AVR, 
and how this specific field within migration bureaucracy as a whole oper-
ates at the intersection between coercion and voluntariness. The third part 
focuses on the self-representations of return migration bureaucrats in Swit-
zerland and shows via ethnographic analysis how their self-representations 
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relate to different bureaucratic ethics. Finally, I return to the paradox of vol-
untariness based on coercion and link it to the conf licting bureaucratic eth-
ics of return migration bureaucrats, which causes the structural incommen-
surability between bureaucracy's universal promise and the administration 
of commonwealth boundaries. 
This chapter draws on ethnographic material I collected between 2012 
and 2016 during my PhD research project on the governance of clandestine 
Tunisian migration in the context of Switzerland's assisted voluntary return 
migration programme. My research reconstructs the transnational trajec-
tories of Tunisian migrants – so-called harragas – confronted with govern-
mental attempts to organise transnational mobility via AVR programmes.3 
In this chapter, I focus on interviews with representatives of five return 
migration offices in different cantons in Switzerland. Additional observa-
tions and analysis of documents help to clarify the logics of the return migra-
tion bureaucracy. 
Bureaucratic ethics and the specific case 
of migration bureaucracies
Setting aside the debate on Weber's bureaucratic ethos (see Weber 1922: 
655ff; Eckert this volume) – interpreted either as imbued with ethics (see du 
Gay 2008), or potentially becoming devoid of ethics (e.g. Arendt 1995, Bau-
man 1989; Habermas 1988; Bayertz 1995: 35f) – I address the question of eth-
ics by examining the aims and values that migration bureaucracies strive to 
uphold. This approach follows the notion of bureaucracy in Bear and Mathur 
(2015), who identify two prominent characteristics: the administration of 
public goods and the pursuit of a utopian social order. 
3  The term harraga is widely used in Tunisia and other North African countries, where it 
refers to the high-risk migration strategy of crossing the Mediterranean clandestinely in 
small fishing boats. Harraga has a number of dif ferent meanings: On the one hand, it de-
notes the act of clandestine migration by boat. At the same time, it refers to people who 
perform the “harraga”. The term literally means “burning” or “those who burn”, implying a 
clandestine border crossing (“burning the border”), the people who cross the border, or the 
act of destroying one's personal papers during the clandestine crossing, a common prac-
tice to conceal one's identity from state authorities.
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Bureaucracies are also expressions of an implicit social contract between 
citizens and officials. According to Bear and Mathur, they share four main 
elements. First, bureaucracies geared towards the public good work by pro-
moting goods and services in the commonwealth according to predefined 
sets of rules. Second, a delineated commonwealth has the legitimate right to 
participate in the public good governed by the bureaucracies. In most cases, 
this right is expressed in the notion of the citizen (see Ferguson 2015).4 Third, 
the definition of citizen mediates the relationship between individuals and 
officials, who enact the relationship between individuals and the state. And 
finally, bureaucratic practice is oriented towards an imagined utopian social 
order. This last element contains normative aspects and tells us how society 
should be. For the interpretation of migration bureaucracies, this last aspect 
is of particular importance. 
Migration bureaucracies share distinct features that set them apart from 
other bureaucracies. They are characterised by competing logics and agency 
turf wars (see Eule 2014; Eule et al. 2017), and by illegibility (Hoag 2010). Even 
though these aspects can be found in virtually any bureaucracy, they appear 
to be particularly pronounced in migration bureaucracies. Yet, a further 
aspect points toward a structural difference. Migration bureaucracies are 
geared towards the governance of inclusion and exclusion (Tuckett 2018). 
Thus, its object of governance is the commonwealth itself, and not any public 
good. It differentiates those who are part of the commonwealth from those 
who are excluded from it. This creates a unique disposition. Those who are 
excluded from the commonwealth by the migration bureaucracy are both 
under its governance, and at the same time removed from its realm and 
placed beyond its reach due to their excluded status. To illustrate this point, 
compare the migration bureaucracy to a social welfare bureaucracy: Every-
one who is part of the commonwealth is a potential beneficiary of the welfare 
bureaucracy. Whether one is actually entitled to benefit from the goods and 
services it governs depends on a series of criteria one has to meet (e.g. lack 
of income, lack of private wealth, further indications of social vulnerabil-
ity). However, unlike migration bureaucracies, this differentiation does not 
question one's inclusion in the commonwealth and entitlement, in principle, 
to these social welfare goods if predefined criteria are met. 
4  This resonates with Arendt's (1986) idea of citizenship as the right to have rights, when we 
include in the notion of the public good not only goods and services, but also rights. 
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One might object that migration bureaucracy's public good is precisely 
the entitlement to participate legitimately as a full member of the common-
wealth – to share in the public good. However, this argument would intro-
duce a sort of second order of public good. Furthermore, it would conf late 
the distinction between rights/entitlements and public goods.
In the ethnographic material, the ethics of AVR appear as principles and 
aims such as “protecting the system against abuses”, “enforcing the law”, 
and “governing migration in a humanitarian way”. In order to explore this 
specific character of return migration bureaucracies in more detail, the 
following sections examine the case of Switzerland's AVR programmes not 
only as a specific type of bureaucracy, but as a specific area within migration 
bureaucracies. 
Governing return migration: Switzerland’s AVR programme 
for Tunisian asylum seekers
In June 2012, Switzerland launched an AVR programme for Tunisian asy-
lum seekers: the Länderprogramm Tunesien (country programme Tunisia).5 
This programme provided financial and professional support to individual 
and collective return projects for Tunisian asylum seekers. These small-scale 
economic projects were mainly located in the agricultural sector (sheep and 
cattle breeding, vegetable growing), the small-scale fishing industry, or in 
skilled crafts and trades. This AVR programme attempted to respond to the 
increasing number of Tunisian asylum seekers appearing after the Ben Ali 
regime in Tunisia fell on 14 January 2011. The ensuing turmoil and crumbling 
security apparatus opened a window of opportunity for mostly young male 
Tunisians to leave the country comparatively easily. As so-called harragas, 
they left their homeland clandestinely and reached northern Mediterranean 
shores in old fishing vessels. From there, they moved northwards. At the 
same time, earlier Tunisian migrants who were employed in Italy's shadow 
5  Switzerland has two types of assisted return. The “country programmes” (Länderprogramm) 
provide assistance for a limited period, of ten consist of relatively generous financial sup-
port that may be accompanied by the establishment of support capacities. The other is 
individual return assistance. With some reservations, any asylum seeker can apply for the 
latter. In general, individual return assistance provides smaller amounts of financial sup-
port with little additional support.
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economy joined the migration northwards to escape the consequences of the 
2008 global financial crisis, which hit Italy's economy hard. Thus, two groups 
of Tunisian migrants applied for asylum in Switzerland and surrounding 
countries, and caused a sharp rise in asylum applications between 2011 and 
2013. 
June 2012 is often considered the beginning of what has become known 
as the contemporary migration crisis.6 The Länderprogramm Tunesien 
responded to this supposed crisis, but earlier AVR programmes had already 
existed.7 In institutional terms, they can be traced back to the second half of 
the 1990s in Switzerland. Before that time, return aid was granted randomly 
to individual return migrants, with no distinct legal basis.8 It consisted 
mainly of unofficial assistance to destitute return migrants in the form of 
plane tickets or small amounts of money to alleviate individual hardship 
after their return (Kaser and Schenker 2008). 
The attempt to integrate an AVR approach into Switzerland's migration 
policy is closely linked to the end of the Balkan wars. At that time, Switzer-
land terminated temporary collective protection for people displaced by war. 
Suddenly, the thousands of refugees remaining in Switzerland were denied 
subsidiary protection. Lacking valid residence titles, their stay in Switzer-
land no longer had a legal basis. The consequence was mass expulsion. In 
order to ease the situation for individual returnees, but also to facilitate 
and accelerate returns, an AVR programme to Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
launched as a pilot project in 1996, with assistance from the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) (Kaser and Schenker 2008: 208). 
Since then, Switzerland has implemented more than ten Länderpro-
gramme. This includes programmes for Sri Lanka (2000-2004), Angola 
(2002-2007) and Armenia (2004-2008). Country programmes focus on asy-
lum seekers of a particular nationality for a limited period of time so that 
a joint effort on the part of the migration bureaucracy may decrease their 
numbers in the asylum system. One can identify three main reasons why 
6  The popular crisis discourse, however, is not only questionable, producing a permanent 
“border spectacle” (de Genova 2013, see also Andersson 2016), it also has a short-term 
memory. Today, the 2015 “refugee crisis” has already superseded the 2012 “crisis”, which, 
today, is nothing more than a faint memory in public discourse. 
7  For an overview of AVR in Europe see also Lietaert et al. (2016). 
8  The origins of assisted return migration can be traced back to the year 1959 (Kaser and 
Schenker 2008).
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migration bureaucrats consider AVR as the easiest possible way to expel asy-
lum seekers, illegalised migrants and rejected asylum seekers. AVR does not 
risk violating the fundamental human rights principle of non-refoulement, 
as every returnee signs a document stating that he or she “returns volun-
tarily to the country of origin”. This document is bureaucratic evidence of 
the returnee's free decision to return home. In addition, countries of ori-
gin, which are often reluctant to accept their deported citizens, or may even 
forcibly reject them, are more willing to comply with assisted return. Finally, 
AVR is less costly than forced deportation. 
In recent years, expelling rejected asylum seekers and migrants with-
out residence permits has become a political priority in many European 
countries. As Broeders (2010) observes, this policy has led to contradictory 
results: Capacity for administrative detention has increased, while at the 
same time the effective number of expulsions has stagnated or even fallen 
(see also Castañeda 2010). This means that the “deportability” (de Genova 
2010) of thousands of migrants across Europe does not lower the numbers of 
undocumented migrants and rejected asylum seekers. Instead, increasing 
numbers are living in a state of legal uncertainty and the everyday threat of 
deportation. Assisted return operates precisely in the milieu of this everyday 
insecurity, offering an end to this precarious and uncertain status. Against 
the backdrop of forced deportation, assisted voluntary return might become 
an option worth considering for Tunisian asylum seekers, although it con-
tradicts the initial intentions that motivated their clandestine migration. 
The double vocation of return counsellors
Since AVR works against the backdrop of forced deportation, a series of 
appraisals has argued that AVR, in fact, is nothing more than poorly masked 
coercion and forced deportation. Instead of replicating this important cri-
tique once again, I focus on Switzerland's AVR programmes as a case study, 
examining return migration bureaucrats' self-representations to explore the 
tension between voluntariness and coercion that results from competing 
bureaucratic ethics.
As part of my research on Switzerland's Tunisian AVR programme, I 
conducted a series of interviews with return counsellors. At the beginning 
of these conversations, my informants often talked a lot about how they 
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conceive of their own work. It was striking to observe how their self-repre-
sentation systematically invoked the ideal-type of the Weberian bureaucrat. 
They described asylum bureaucracy as a machine-like system that processes 
applications with precision, consistency and impartiality. Their role con-
sisted in keeping the system running as smoothly as possible. This template 
can be found in the self-representation of any of my informants. But as the 
conversations unfolded, it quickly became obvious that return migration 
bureaucracy – in its practice, but also in its very conception – does not cor-
respond to this Weberian ideal at all, as is shown in the following example, 
reconstructed from my field notes. 
I was sitting in one of Switzerland's return migration offices, interview-
ing two bureaucrats about their work.9 The office was located on the ground 
f loor in a side wing of the canton's security and police department, sharing 
its reception area with the migration service (Migrationsamt), who admin-
ister bureaucratic affairs relating to foreigners in Switzerland.10 Decorated 
with a few posters of unidentifiable foreign destinations, the office faintly 
resembled a travel agency. In one corner near the entrance, a rack contained 
AVR information brochures in a number of languages. One of my two infor-
mants leafed through a pile of documents he had prepared for our conversa-
tion and pulled out an image. It was a f lowchart, representing Switzerland's 
asylum procedure schematically. He handed me the chart, pointing with his 
pencil to the bottom, and began to explain: “Our task is [to ensure] that asy-
lum seekers with negative [asylum] decisions leave Switzerland.” The head of 
department – also present in the room – added: 
We do not like forced deportations. I am convinced that we all want to avoid 
forced deportations. Our aim is that every rejected asylum seeker returns 
voluntarily to his home country. […] As you know, I am just here to enforce 
negative decisions. I do not make [asylum] decisions. And I am not part of the 
police forces. So, I try to convince the migrants for their own sake to return to 
their country of origin.11
9  Fieldnotes August 2014, clarifications in brackets by D.L. 
10  The Migrationsamt is the cantonal migration authority. It is responsible for the registra-
tion of the non-national population and executes decisions of the federal State Secretar-
iat for Migration. 
11  Interview August 2014, clarifications in brackets by D.L.
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During our conversation, the two informants repeated on several occasions 
that they tried hard to avoid forced deportations. These efforts paid off, the 
department head proudly explained. His canton's return migration office 
had had the highest proportion of AVRs to asylum seekers in recent years. 
The self-representations of these two informants contain three constitu-
tive elements typical of this field: They highlight their duty to enforce neg-
ative asylum decisions; they voice their disapproval of forced deportations, 
while nonetheless defending them as indispensable; and they stress that they 
suggest the best possible solutions for the asylum seekers they advise. Yet, the 
weighting of these three elements varies among return migration bureau-
crats. Apart from individual preferences, this variance largely depends 
on the location of each officer's AVR office within the national migration 
bureaucracy. This becomes apparent when different cases are compared. 
In this particular case, the two informants were both committed to 
enforcing the rules and considered themselves submissive servants to these 
rules. They both argued that the AVR office contributes to enforcing deci-
sions made previously within the limits of the authority of the office, yet each 
officer added nuance in stating his position. The head of department clearly 
prioritised the need to enforce decisions, yet, as the quote shows, argued that 
certain enforcement methods are preferable to others. The return counsel-
lor, for his part, deviated from the clear-cut, rule-oriented narrative of his 
superior and mentioned the importance of working with returnees towards 
mutual consent. 
Strict rule-orientation and as well as the emphasis on mutual consent 
between bureaucrats and asylum seekers are strong expressions of bureau-
cratic ethos. They serve as a kind of guideline for bureaucratic procedures. 
And they show that, although enforcement of negative asylum decisions (i.e. 
returning rejected asylum seekers to their country of origin) is the unques-
tioned and ultimate aim of the return migration bureaucracy, decisions can 
be enforced in different ways, and some ways are better than others. In this 
context, return migration bureaucrats apparently consider so-called volun-
tary return morally preferable to forced deportation. This contributes to the 
moral legitimisation of deportations. 
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Rule-orientation and the public good
Let me take this argument a step further. Rule-orientation always includes 
more than just concern about procedure or, to borrow John Rawls' term, pro-
cedural justice (Rawls 1999: 73-78; see also Nelson 1980). Bureaucrats believe 
that reliance on the principle of rule-orientation in everyday bureaucratic 
practice adds to the public good in substantial ways. This blurs the boundar-
ies between bureaucratic ethos and ethics. Defence of procedural rules and 
principles via strict adherence can be considered an intrinsic aim of bureau-
cracy, and, it follows, also as an element of bureaucratic ethics. It is no coin-
cidence that the return migration bureaucrat quoted in the previous exam-
ple refers to a f lowchart to explain his work. That tool perfectly visualises 
the key idea of bureaucracy: an unambiguous set of actions and decisions 
that is rigorously aligned and follows an exact path. Each action and each 
decision is preceded by a precisely defined previous action or decision, and 
followed by a precisely defined subsequent action or decision. The two core 
principles of bureaucracy represented in the f lowchart are hierarchisation 
and the division of labour (see Handelman 2004). In short, the f lowchart is 
the perfect image of the Weberian ideal-type of bureaucracy. 
When asked why this rule-following principle is so important, return 
counsellors often link it to the issue of fairness. Or, as another informant 
puts it: 
It would be unfair to those who accept a negative asylum decision, if at the 
same time others resist and are rewarded for their misconduct, in the sense 
that they can remain [in the country]. Therefore, it is important to enforce 
negative decisions.12 
Identifying the principle of rule-orientation with fairness indicates that 
more is at stake than concerns about pure procedure. Not enforcing a neg-
ative asylum decision is considered unfair towards rejected asylum seekers 
who accepted their decision and left the country. By this reasoning, render-
ing justice to every asylum seeker means that every bureaucratic decision 
must be enforced, because the scope of fairness includes anyone subjected 
to certain rules. “Fairness” – in the emic meaning captured in the quote – 
12  Interview August 2014, clarification in brackets by D.L.
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corresponds in each case to the idea of coherence throughout the system. 
This means that each individual case is treated exactly the same as all other 
cases with the same characteristics, and that sameness makes the system as 
a whole coherent. Here, the scope transcends the individual case to focus on 
migration bureaucracy as a whole. 
These emic ideas of fairness and coherence contradict a familiar critique 
of bureaucracy which argues that such a strong sense of commitment to 
rules  – as identified in the statement above – implies simultaneous de-re-
sponsibilisation. Commitment to rules does not lead to de-responsibili-
sation from the bureaucrat's perspective. On the contrary, return migra-
tion bureaucrats take the rules seriously precisely because they feel deeply 
responsible for the commonwealth, and thus insist on the coherence of the 
decisions. 
However, defending the principle of rule-orientation does not imply that 
return migration bureaucrats agree with the rules they are enforcing. They 
are well aware that these rules might in some cases lead to questionable 
results. Some civil servants even criticise the actual migration laws more or 
less explicitly.13 They defend rule-orientation by arguing that it guarantees 
equal treatment to every asylum seeker. In other words, they draw a sharp 
distinction between the defence of a procedural principle and justifying the 
actual rules as such. Yet the ethnographic data shows that, in general, return 
migration bureaucrats only criticise the rules they enforce as private indi-
viduals, not in their official roles. This highlights the mode of operation of 
the bureaucratic principle, which disconnects the private from the official, 
as Weber (1999) notes. It prioritises rule-following – and therefore proce-
dural or formal justice – over substantive justice. Openly criticising a deci-
sion made previously would be judged unprofessional, unless this decision is 
the outcome of a violation of bureaucratic rules. 
The idea that the rule-following principle is worth defending contains a 
further aspect. Return migration bureaucrats argue that the rule-following 
principle and the enforcement of negative asylum decisions is “for the benefit 
of everyone”.14 This aspect is different from fairness, as Moore reminds us: 
“Strict rules yield certainty but are sometimes unfair. Equity gives attention 
13  In most cases, this critique is voiced in informal settings. During the interviews, most of 
the informants avoided personal critical statements.
14  Interview with a return migration bureaucrat, July 2014.
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to fairness and morality, but at the expense of legal certainty” (1972: 53). This 
aspect of certainty is crucial, as it goes beyond the individual case at stake. 
Following and enforcing bureaucratic rules correctly and consistently is not 
only an issue between bureaucrats and those immediately concerned with 
a certain bureaucratic rule. It contains the idea that defending the rule-fol-
lowing principle has a much broader impact on society as a whole. Bureau-
crats understand their everyday practice as a contribution to the public good, 
as this Weberian-like ideal-type bureaucracy stands for the fundamental 
principle of justice. As du Gay (2000) argues, neutrality, fairness and equal 
treatment of cases without regard to person form the indispensable condi-
tion of possibility of democracy. This is the bulwark against arbitrariness, 
injustice and unequal treatment. This self-representation assumes that the 
rule-following principle contains an intrinsic value worth defending, as it 
provides the necessary condition of democracy. 
As a guiding principle of bureaucrats' everyday practice, strict rule-ori-
entation exhibits a surprising parallel to Weber's distinction between Gesin-
nungsethik (ethics of conviction) and Verantwortungsethik (ethics of responsi-
bility) (Weber 1922: 237f). Rule-orientation resembles an ethics of conviction 
in the sense that it focuses on rules and ignores the outcomes. Therefore, 
rather than echoing a Bauman-inspired critique of bureaucracy as anethi-
cal, the ethnographic material reveals a migration bureaucracy full of ethical 
considerations, which tend to take the form of an ethics of conviction. 
Rule-orientation is not the only principle to which migration bureaucrats' 
self-representation adheres. The following ethnographic material suggests 
that the principles of efficiency and humanitarian reason contradict – each 
in a distinct way – the neat picture of bureaucracy wherein rule-orientation 
provides an indispensable threshold against arbitrariness and injustice. 
Efficiency versus rule-orientation
Efficiency as a second principle of bureaucratic ethos stands in tension with 
the principle of rule-following path-dependency. I suggest interpreting 
return migration bureaucracy as an institutionalised deviation from strict 
rule-orientation. In contrast to the dominant mode of self-representation 
of virtually all return counsellors, the return migration bureaucracy does 
not enforce negative asylum decisions, but anticipates such decisions for the 
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simple reason that there are no expulsion orders to enforce – so far at least. 
The AVR programme for Tunisia explicitly targets Tunisian asylum seekers 
whose applications are still pending. Why did my interlocutors systemati-
cally overlook this obvious paradox? 
In conversation, I often asked my informants why they emphasised the 
rule-following principle, even though AVR operations are obviously not in 
accord with it. In general, their first reaction was incomprehension. Inter-
locutors rejected my objection as “naïve”. They agreed that potential return 
migrants had not yet received a negative decision on their asylum applica-
tion when so-called voluntary return was proposed to them, yet my objec-
tion seemed “out of touch with reality”. One of the two return migration 
bureaucrats introduced in the first part of this section agreed with his col-
leagues' assessment of my failure of comprehension. Concerning Tunisian 
asylum seekers, he argued, it is “obvious” that their asylum applications are 
“unfounded” and that they will receive a negative decision sooner or later 
anyway. Another informant explained that, for this reason, his office's pol-
icy is to approach every asylum seeker systematically at the “earliest possi-
ble moment” in order to disseminate information about AVR among them. 
Along with many other colleagues, he believed that Tunisian nationals' asy-
lum applications were an “abuse of the system”. 
These reactions show that return counsellors constantly anticipate pro-
cedural outcomes and make guesses about the likelihood of positive deci-
sions. Their anticipations and guesses are mainly informed by State Sec-
retariat for Migration (SEM) statistics on asylum seekers' acceptance rates 
broken down by country of origin: Tunisian asylum seekers rank at the bot-
tom. Their anticipations and guesses are further fuelled by a wide variety of 
notions and prejudices, some based on individual experience, that circulate 
among the return counsellors. Considered in this light, processing Tunisian 
asylum seekers' applications step by step from beginning to end is a waste 
of time. This delegitimisation of Tunisian applications prepares the ground-
work for calls for more efficient procedures. The focus shifts away from a 
thorough examination of every asylum application, scrupulously following 
the prescribed bureaucratic path step by step, and towards reducing costs 
and improving the efficiency of the migration bureaucracy. 
This shift accompanied the proliferation of “audit culture” (Shore and 
Wright 1999; 2015) in public service, which turned the main focus of state 
bureaucracies away from fair procedures and equal treatment and towards 
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efficiency and cost reduction (see Hibou 2012: 46-51). AVR is a result of this 
shift. Yet migration bureaucracy can speed up procedure and skip certain 
administrative steps only with the cooperation of the potential returnees. 
Only an asylum seeker can renounce their legal rights to a thorough exam-
ination of their case and potential appeal of a negative decision by voluntarily 
revoking their asylum application. Hence, it is of the utmost importance for 
the success of AVR that return counsellors and potential returnees reach 
mutual consent, as will be explored in more detail in the next section. 
In contradiction to Weber (1999: 157-234), the return migration bureau-
cracy shows that rule-orientation is not necessarily the basis for an ever more 
efficient bureaucracy. These two principles may even stand in opposition to 
each other. AVR is the attempt to reconcile the two conf licting principles of 
rule-orientation and efficiency and resolve this contradiction. It curtails asy-
lum procedures without breaching rules. Therefore, terms such as “dignity” 
and “informed consent” – the latter explicitly expressed in a signed declara-
tion-of-consent document, a pre-condition for AVR – serve to legitimise this 
non-compliance with strict bureaucratic rule-orientation. 
Enforcing decisions “the human way” versus rule orientation
The two informants in the introductory interview referred to a further 
principle that stands in tension with strict rule-orientation. As the return 
counsellors mentioned, return migration enforcement should be executed 
in “a human way”. Both emphasised in conversation that not a single per-
son in the migration office would prefer forced deportation over so-called 
voluntary return – and not only for reasons of cost-efficiency. In AVR, one 
can observe that the humanitarian argument dominates other self-legit-
imisation strategies. This finds several different forms of expression. In 
addition to the above-mentioned argument that negative decisions should 
be enforced in “a human way”, the phrase “return in dignity” is frequently 
deployed, an expression that is particularly common in the language of the 
IOM.15 But why are return migration bureaucrats inclined to defend AVR by 
mobilising humanitarian arguments rather than referring to cost-efficiency 
15  See the IOM description of assisted voluntary return and reintegration: https://www.iom.
int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration [accessed 12 January 2017].
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or other criteria? A simplistic answer would point out that the humanitar-
ian argument is nothing more than a poor cover-up for a cost-benefit cal-
culation. Forced deportation is expensive and may include pre-deportation 
detention, accompanied f lights or even chartered special f lights. Further-
more, depending on the country of origin, the success of forced deporta-
tion is highly uncertain (see Rosenberger and Küffer 2016).16 Yet this does 
not answer the question of why the humanitarian argument is considered 
more legitimate than the cost-efficiency argument in this particular field of 
bureaucracy. 
The majority of return migration bureaucrats whom I interviewed sin-
cerely care that migrants have the opportunity to return “in dignity” to their 
country of origin, as one of them put it, echoing the IOM's official language. 
For her, “in dignity” means two different things. On the one hand, she asso-
ciates this term with voluntariness. The return decision should be of the 
returnee's free will. And she considered it even more important that return-
ees be able to frame their return as a success and not a failure. A closer look 
at the self-legitimisation strategy of this particular return counsellor fur-
ther illustrates this point. She is the head of a cantonal AVR office. Unlike in 
the first case, this AVR office is not part of the Aliens Police (Fremdenpolizei), 
which is located far away in a different part of town. Instead it belongs to the 
canton's welfare department. This results in a different notion of the office, a 
different professional ethos and a different idea of the relationship between 
civil servants and the public. The rule-enforcing aspect is less apparent, and 
return counsellors consider themselves more as service providers. When I 
asked this return counsellor to describe her own role, she replied: 
Look, my task is precisely not to enforce asylum decisions. My mission as 
a professional social worker is to assist my clients in the realisation of their 
decisions. If they decide to return: Fine, I will help them. If they have other 
plans: Fair enough. I will do what I can. But in that case, my options are lim-
ited, as you can imagine.17 
16  For example, asylum seekers and migration bureaucrats are both well aware that Algeria 
does not accept forced deportations of its citizens. It only takes back those who return 
voluntarily.
17  Interview with a return migration of ficer, August 2014. 
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This informant described her role in substantially different terms from 
those of the two return migration bureaucrats we encountered earlier. In her 
self-representation, the focus is less on the enforcement of rules and deci-
sions, and more on the relationship between the return counsellor and the 
asylum seekers subjected to the migration bureaucracy. She emphasised her 
professional ethos as a social worker who is committed to her clients as well 
as to the office. She regarded the double vocation towards the state and the 
individual migrants as part of the duty of the office, and not as a breach or 
weakening of bureaucratic principles. Therefore, she considered herself less 
as an administrator, and more as a mediator between the constraints of the 
migration bureaucracy and migrants' aspirations. Commitment towards the 
asylum seekers and a desire to take their aspirations seriously are entwined 
in her professional ethos. She emphasises this orientation through her fre-
quent use of the word “client”. This standpoint is different from that of the 
two return counsellors in the initial example who continuously use the term 
“asylum seeker”. At the same time, “client” not only implies a more equal rela-
tionship, it also tends to conceal the structural power asymmetry at work. 
The term suggests that enforcement of previously made decisions stands on 
the same level as migrants' plans for their future. Emphasising consultation 
and help as the AVR's two dominant ideas, the return counsellor described 
her own role as though the return migration bureaucracy had temporarily 
suspended the dominant rule-following principle. Only by disregarding the 
overall logics in which return migration bureaucracy is embedded is it pos-
sible to take this stance.
In defining humanitarian reason, Didier Fassin (2012) describes how the 
language of compassion and suffering has replaced terms of interest, rights 
or justice. One can no longer address claims of the state in the antagonistic 
language of rights and legal entitlements, but only in the submissive mode of 
compassion. In the context of migration, this means that asylum has become 
less and less a legal entitlement, and more an act of benevolent charity in the 
face of unbearable suffering. AVR advances this tendency to remove rights 
from the forefront, as it contributes to replacing a rights-based language 
with the language of care. The return counsellor's statement points exactly 
in this direction. In mobilising a language of empowerment (“[I] assist my 
clients in the realisation of their decisions”) she omits any reference to rights. 
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Conclusion: policing the boundaries of the commonwealth
Thus far, this text has examined three aspects that dominate AVR bureaucrats' 
self-representation: rule-orientation, striving for efficiency and humanitar-
ian reason. The discussion of the ethnographic material has shown that none 
of these aspects can be reduced to procedures – i.e. to bureaucratic ethos 
or to bureaucratic ethics alone. The rule-following principle guarantees 
certainty and predictability. Efficiency can tame excessive rule-orientation 
and aim for fast, lean procedures. And the principle of humanitarian rea-
son attempts to reconcile the other two bureaucratic principles that are pre-
dominantly geared towards the public good with the needs, aspirations and 
wishes of individual asylum seekers subjected to the migration bureaucracy. 
AVR's mediation between common interests and individual claims leads 
us back to the boundaries of the commonwealth, and the structural incom-
mensurability between bureaucracy's universal promises and governance 
of those boundaries. I have argued that bureaucracies are geared towards 
administration of the common good: The primary bureaucratic concern is 
modes of fair and just allocation of goods and services within the common-
wealth, hence one benefits, at least hypothetically, from this administration 
of the common good in virtue of one's individual status as a member of the 
commonwealth. This is true even where a given bureaucratic measure is to 
one's individual detriment. Migration bureaucracies – and AVR in particu-
lar – primarily deal with a different issue: They distinguish those who are 
part of the commonwealth from those who are excluded from it. The targets 
of this bureaucratic administration are not included into the utopian social 
order; they are removed from it. The benefits AVR provides are a substitute 
for the bureaucratic promise of the commonwealth, from which asylum 
seekers are excluded. 
This results in a particular relationship between the return migration 
bureaucracy and the people subject to its attention. Tunisian asylum seekers' 
migration strategies and their asylum applications can be read as a call for 
inclusion in the commonwealth's utopian social order: a social order from 
which they are excluded and which the return migration bureaucracy pro-
tects.18 At the same time, they are affected most directly by these bureaucratic 
18  This argument has been put forward by the thesis of the autonomy of migration (Papado-
poulos et al. 2008; de Genova 2010). It appears in a dif ferent form and a context other than 
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interventions. Migration bureaucracy is structurally unable to incorporate 
these harragas into the utopian social order because it would imply redraw-
ing the commonwealth's boundaries, a power that belongs to the political 
realm, not to the bureaucratic realm. Tunisian harragas call for inclusion 
through their sheer presence in a confrontation of “the logic of equality with 
the logic of the police order” (Rancière 1999: 101). The only two options in this 
Rancièrian political moment are repression and compassion. This structural 
inability of the migration bureaucracy to redraw commonwealth boundaries 
illustrates the aporia of universalism inscribed in bureaucratic ethics. The 
struggle for inclusion in the realm of the universal is always fought for and 
realised by those who are excluded from it (see Buck-Morss 2009). As discus-
sion of the self-representation narratives showed, return migration bureau-
crats must navigate these mutually exclusive claims. The wish to assist Tuni-
sian asylum seekers in realising their own plans for the future collides with 
the exclusionary logic of the migration bureaucracy, which removes them 
from the commonwealth it is charged with protecting. 
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Functional Inconsistencies 
State Inspection of Agricultural Labour in Switzerland
Simon Affolter
It is an ironic truism of our time that a bureaucratic apparatus often pro-
duces effects that conf lict with bureaucratic goals. Such “unintended 
outcomes” result from complex governmental procedures that can create 
momentum and lead to developments that deviate from the original intent. 
While acknowledging the endless red tape that bureaucracies seem to gener-
ate, I aim to show analytically that it is misleading to define contra-indicated 
results of official practice as “unanticipated consequences” (Merton 1936; 
Merton 1968) or “unintended outcomes” (Foucault 1991) in reference to offi-
cial government goals. As De Genova appropriately stresses, this interpreta-
tion expresses “‘good faith’ toward the state, and its underlying belief in the 
law's transparency [and] does not allow for the possibility that the law may 
have been instrumental in generating parameters” (2002: 432). Or, as Frank 
De Zwart points out: “social scientists, eager to speak truth to power, should 
consider the possibility that those in power may know the truth, yet let bad 
things happen anyway because they fear worse” (2015: 295).
Analysis of “unintended” or “unanticipated” effects from the “good faith” 
perspective neglects the involvement of numerous actors with varying inter-
ests in the negotiating process and in the implementation of new practices. 
Foucault respects these complex motivations when he observes that actors 
respond to outcomes by calculating, capitalizing and integrating them into 
their future conduct (Li 2007: 287). Thus, we should not see bureaucratic 
practices as pursuing one well-defined, publicly articulated goal. Rather, as 
Shore and Wright emphasize, the process of policy building is one of negoti-
ation by various actors and interests (Shore and Wright 2011). Thus, the final 
configuration of a concrete bureaucratic practice always ref lects the power 
relations of the actors involved in the negotiation process. 
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To illustrate this, I refer to the concept of hegemony projects, developed 
by the “Staatsprojekt Europa” research group (2012; 2014) and based on 
Nicos Poulantzas' neo-Gramscian approach (Poulantzas 2002). Under this 
view, social debates over hegemony can be structurally analysed by iden-
tifying contrasting hegemony projects, which are understood as strategic, 
socio-structurally framed actor-constellations that fight for interpretational 
sovereignty (Forschungsgruppe “Staatsprojekt Europa” 2012: 13). Thus, to 
understand the outcome of bureaucratic practices, we have to identify the 
various interests and goals that lie behind bureaucratic procedures. My 
approach comes close to the perspective of Laura Bear and Nayanika Mathur, 
who argue for remaking the public good in the anthropology of bureau-
cracy (2015). Referring to Osella/Osella (2001) and Ferguson (2013) in liberal 
thought, as the opposite of freedom. But the political anthropology of south-
ern Africa has long recognized relations of social dependence as the very 
foundation of polities and persons alike. Ref lecting on a long regional his-
tory of dependence ‘as a mode of action' allows a new perspective on certain 
contemporary practices that appear to what we may call ‘the emancipatory 
liberal mind' simply as lamentable manifestations of a reactionary and ret-
rograde yearning for paternalism and inequality. Instead, this article argues 
that such practices are an entirely contemporary response to the historically 
novel emergence of a social world where people, long understood (under both 
pre-capitalist and early capitalist social systems, they see bureaucracy as “an 
expression of a social contract between citizens and officials that aim[s] to 
generate a utopian order” (Bear and Mathur 2015: 18). 
This leads to the question of how to research and analyse governmental 
practices. According to Sharma and Gupta, “Mundane bureaucratic proce-
dures provide important clues to understanding the micropolitics of state 
work, how state authority and government operate in people's daily lives, 
and how the state comes to be imagined, encountered, and reimagined by 
the population” (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 11f.). It follows that governmen-
tal practice can only be examined by observing and analysing the everyday 
practice of state actors interacting with civil society. This approach has led to 
numerous anthropological studies of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 2010). 
State agents act within a set of legal rules and norms. But they also act within 
a specific institutional ethos (see the Introduction to this publication). We 
can go even further and acknowledge the individuality of different actors 
working in these institutions. As agents in state institutions, individuals 
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perform their jobs “in reference to a certain professional ethos” (Fassin et 
al. 2015: 6), but their work is also informed by individual ideology. Opposing 
values, ethics and ideas of the commonweal held by different actors (insti-
tutions and individuals) can come into conf lict in daily work. One therefore 
cannot automatically assume that final results are unintended. Various per-
spectives and goals need to be taken into account if one is to accurately deter-
mine why an outcome might be considered as unintended. 
The neo-Gramscian hegemony projects (Forschungsgruppe “Staatspro-
jekt Europa” 2014) provide helpful orientation via their top-down reading of 
state power. From the perspective of political science, they perform a dis-
course analysis of the political debates within various projects as factions 
fight for interpretational sovereignty in society. Here, I reverse their meth-
odological approach by using a bottom-up anthropological perspective to 
analyse the effects of bureaucratic practices with regard to the various actors 
involved and goals pursued. My questions are simple: Who finds the effects 
unintended? Who finds the effects attractive? How does meaning change for 
different actors? What measures are implemented in reaction to the results 
and why (or why not)? In my following empirical study of vegetable produc-
tion in Switzerland's central plateau, I focus on the agents responsible for 
labour market inspections and use an anthropological approach to interpret 
the results of their efforts. 
The association for labour market inspections
In 2008, the new Federal Act on Illegal Employment (Bundesgesetz gegen die 
Schwarzarbeit BGSA) came into force in Switzerland. According to the Act, 
“illegal employment should be combated. To do this, administrative improve-
ments and measures concerning inspections and sanctions [have been] 
designed” (BGSA, Abs. 1, Art. 1). Upon its implementation, every Canton in 
Switzerland was directed to create an institution responsible for inspec-
tions in the labour market. This law and the regulatory institutions it estab-
lished were also related to the free movement of people within Europe. To 
prevent transnational enterprises from systematically undermining Swiss 
labour standards, so-called “accompanying measures” allowed authorities 
to impose sanctions on employers who were not domiciled in Switzerland. 
Thus, the legal requirement of equal treatment was fulfilled: all working rela-
Simon Affolter138
tionships in an economic sector in Switzerland were to be treated equally, 
independent of the employer's legal residence.
In the Swiss canton where I performed my ethnographic fieldwork,1 an 
association was soon established with the task of inspecting labour condi-
tions in various economic sectors. Associated with the canton's Office for the 
Economy, it now functions as a para-state institution under the leadership of 
government representatives and employer and employee organisations. The 
association's executive board consists of representatives of the canton and of 
joint committees2 from various business sectors. The association has a staff 
of nine, including six inspectors.3 In addition to the Act on Illegal Employ-
ment, the regulatory work of the association also involves other pieces of 
legislation, including the Federal Act on Measures Accompanying the Free 
Movement of Persons (Flankierende Massnahmen), the Collective Employment 
Contracts (Gesamtarbeitsverträge GAV) and the National Collective Employ-
ment Agreements (Landesmantelverträge) regarding employment relation-
ships. The numerous migrant workers employed in low-wage sectors that 
the association is responsible for regulating mean that laws pertaining to 
residence and asylum also matter. Finally, as a regulatory body within the 
labour market, the association has the task of identifying actions necessary 
to improve labour conditions. 
In the following, I will focus on the inspection practice of this association 
and the effects this has on vegetable farmers in the Swiss agricultural sector, 
my field of research. In my fieldwork, I observed people employed on farms, 
describing recruitment procedures, labour conditions and daily life. The vast 
majority of employees on these farms are migrants. Some of them have set-
tlement permits, others have temporary residence permits and still others 
have no permission to stay or work in Switzerland at all. The regulation of 
migrant labour is mostly the responsibility of two government departments, 
1  In my research, I documented numerous irregular labour contracts, whereby the labour-
ers are mostly illegalised people in Switzerland. In my thesis, I also describe existing net-
works acting as informal employment agencies. Therefore, I anonymise the region of my 
research and all the involved actors to protect the autonomy of these people (cf. Düvell, 
Triandafyllidou, and Vollmer 2009). 
2  “Joint Committee” is a translation of the Swiss term “Paritätische Kommission,“ which ad-
dresses Swiss labour rights. The Paritätische Kommission is composed of equal numbers of 
employers and employee representatives.
3  “Inspector“ is the of ficial term for persons who conduct control procedures.
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with different areas of responsibility: The Office for Migration is responsi-
ble for granting residence permits and several kinds of work permits; the 
Department for Economic Affairs grants several other kinds of permits and 
monitors conditions in the labour market. Hence, the Association for Labour 
Market Inspections represents the nexus between the two governmental 
departments even as it represents state authority in the agricultural sector.
Since there are no collective bargaining or other obligatory agreements 
for wage labour in the agricultural sector, there is no joint committee of 
employer and employee organizations responsible for ordering inspec-
tions. It is therefore up to Canton authorities to determine an annual quota, 
assigning the association to investigate specific abnormalities detected 
in documents filed during the process of obtaining a work permit. Before 
a work permit can be issued, the Office for the Economy must review the 
employment contract to check whether it complies with labour-law provi-
sions. Binding legal norms may exist in the form of a national collective bar-
gaining agreement (Gesamtarbeitsvertrag GAV) or a standard employment 
contract (Normalarbeitsvertrag NAV) with binding minimum wages. For the 
agricultural sector, however, no national contract exists, only Canton NAVs 
without binding minimum wages. Farmers are “Swiss Employers whose 
activity does not fall under the scope of an average GAV or NAV with binding 
minimum wages and will not be sanctioned automatically if they undercut 
the usual wage. If the TPK [tripartite commission] discover the usual wages 
are being undercut, a mutual agreement procedure is conducted with the 
relevant employer” (SECO 2015: 27, author's translation). In mutual agree-
ment procedures, the aim is to set an appropriate wage increase in accor-
dance with the existing standard employment contract. The Swiss Code of 
Obligations provides the legal basis for this procedure (Art 360b, para. 3.):
The commissions monitor the labour market. If they observe abusive prac-
tices within the meaning of Article 360a paragraph 1, they normally seek to 
reach agreement directly with the employers concerned. Where this can-
not be achieved within two months, they petition the competent authority 
to issue a standard employment contract fixing a minimum wage for the 
af fected sectors or occupations (SECO 2015: 27, author's translation).
Thus, the results of inspection activities can inf luence labour law. If insti-
tutions carrying out inspections detect standard wages regularly being 
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undercut in a particular sector, a NAV with binding minimum wages can be 
issued. At the national level, this has only happened for domestic workers. 
The federal government's 2008 study made clear that domestic workers from 
low-wage countries were generally employed for wages lower than for com-
parable work in other sectors.4 As a result, an NAV with binding minimum 
wages was drafted in 2010 and has been in force since early 2011. 
In the agricultural sector, no such contract exists, nor was there ever a 
powerful push for one. There are several reasons for this. First of all, migrant 
farm workers are not represented by a powerful interest group. In Swit-
zerland, standard wages are negotiated on a sector-by-sector basis accord-
ing to the tripartite neo-corporatism model (where negotiations are held 
among representatives of labour unions, employers and the government). In 
annual negotiation processes, they define recommended wages and working 
hours in the agricultural sector. This non-binding NAV is mainly negotiated 
between the Farmers' Association and the small ABLA union that represents 
farm employees. I had an opportunity to talk with the union president, Paul 
Sommer. He explained to me that it is very hard to negotiate with other labour 
unions, because they “have no idea about the conditions in agriculture” and 
therefore would price labour out of the market. He agrees that wages should 
be raised in the sector, “but not in a way that is disproportionate to the condi-
tions in agriculture”. Here, he does not identify with the numerous migrant 
labourers in this sector, but rather places himself strongly on the side of the 
farmers and the problems farmers face. The reason for this became clear 
when he explained that his union mainly represents skilled agricultural 
labourers: the president himself oversees farm production at one of Switzer-
land's bigger prisons.
Because systematic labour inspections have never been enforced in the 
agricultural sector, the sector is underrepresented in discussions of statis-
tical data. With only 243 companies and 723 workers subject to inspection 
nationally, agriculture has among the lowest inspection numbers of any 
sector (SECO 2017: 18). Thus, it is not a priority for governmental authorities, 
nor for regulatory associations. This lack of statistical data makes it almost 
impossible to identify agricultural labour conditions that do not correspond 
4  “Le travail domestique en Suisse – Calcul d'un seuil de salaire en usage en vue de l'édition 
d'un contrat-type de travail au sein du secteur des Services domestiques en Suisse”, Prof. 
Yves Flückiger, Observatoire Universitaire de l'Emploi (OUE), Université de Genève. 
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with the NAV. The activities of the Association for Labour Market Inspec-
tions resemble pure data collection. Because of the low number of inspec-
tions, limited capacity to undertake checks, and the lack of binding legal 
norms in this sector, the scope of regulatory activity is quite limited. Never-
theless, the little data that is collected is statistically evaluated and collated 
in the annual report on labour inspections, where it adds credence to the 
interpretation that labour law is well respected in practice in the agricultural 
sector. It follows that the agricultural sector is never the focus of labour mar-
ket inspections, and no effort has been made to adopt binding contracts for 
agricultural labour. There is another effect: the comparatively low number of 
deviations from the law in the data contributes to the perception that work-
ing conditions are satisfying for agricultural employees. Therefore, the low 
wages and excessive working hours compared with almost every other sector 
are not questioned. 
Labour inspections generate data that disguises precarious labour con-
ditions and protects the agricultural sector from critical public debate. This 
has already inf luenced the outcome of a political intervention. In 2014, the 
Canton of Geneva applied for a regular working contract with binding min-
imum wages. Geneva's representatives argued that different working con-
ditions in the cantons lead to uneven market conditions. In its answer, the 
Federal Council referred to the collected labour control data:
The Tripartite Commission of the Confederation is aware of the fact that 
downward pressure on salaries occur and that workers from low-wage EU 
countries bear the brunt of this. But the volume of reported cases is not at 
a level that would justify the establishment of national minimum wages. […] 
such a contract for fixing minimum wages can only be realised at the request 
of the Tripartite Commission of the Confederation. […] Labour costs af fect 
the prices of products, and the poor wage conditions and/or downward 
pressure on salaries lead to unfair competition in the agricultural market, 
which increases price pressure. This unacceptable situation is jeopardising 
farms that deliver locally produced food and create jobs. This entails the risk 
that a part of the local agricultural production disappears and is replaced by 
imports, all in all an absurd situation.5
5  https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaef t?Af fairId= 20 
140308 [accessed 25 October 2016, author's translation].
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As we see, the collected data constitutes an instrument to legitimate the sta-
tus quo for farm employees. Potential improvements in labour conditions for 
farm workers in Switzerland are discussed in economic terms, comparing 
the competitiveness of national agricultural products with imported prod-
ucts from low-wage countries. Agricultural competitiveness rather than liv-
ing wages had become the focus of the discussion.
The Association for Labour Market Inspections operated under these 
conditions in the Canton where I did my fieldwork. There, I talked with 
the chief inspector about the activities of the association and accompanied 
another inspector on his trips in the field. 
This association was originally established under pressure from labour 
unions seeking to inspect labour conditions in the construction industry via 
an independent institution specifically designed for that purpose. Besides 
these activities, the institution ensured compliance with the GAVs and doc-
umented labour conditions for wider public and political usage, as the union 
representative in the canton explained me (interview from 20 February 2014). 
Chief inspector Simon Heine [name changed], who coordinated inspection 
activities in the association, has been on the board since its early days. At 
that time, Heine was already a member of the relevant labour union, having 
previously worked in the construction industry. In his work as an inspector, 
he saw an opportunity to put his labour union ideals into action and combat 
serious shortcomings in the construction industry.
Before the association took over inspection activities, the Canton's farm-
ers' association had carried out the relevant inspections in the agricultural 
sector. For the farmers' association, this mandate meant a conf lict of inter-
ests, a representative told me (interview from 18 January 2014). The farm-
ers' association represents for the interests of farmers in their dealings with 
cantonal and national authorities. Thus, it is effectively an employers' organ-
isation for the agricultural sector and unsuitable for inspecting labour con-
ditions. The canton's farmers' association was pleased when the mandate for 
inspecting the labour market was handed over to an independent institution.
As Chief Inspector Heine explains, the association's workload is generally 
very heavy. It currently carries out some 80 inspections each year in the agri-
cultural sector under the Canton's mandate. The chief inspector explains that 
agricultural operations play a special role in the labour market, and people 
working as association inspectors need to have an appropriate profile. Peo-
ple with no idea of working conditions in the agricultural sector lack suffi-
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cient understanding to undertake farm inspections and deal with the farm-
ers. For example, on most farms working hours are not recorded. In such 
circumstances, one must “simply trust in the farmers” (Interview from 11 
January 2014). Generally, inspectors have an adequate understanding of the 
circumstances, although the agricultural sector is a “tough industry”. When 
I remarked that this is also the case in other sectors where the association is 
responsible for controls, Heine immediately compared it to the construction 
industries where he worked for years and “knows, what he is talking about”. 
Construction work is also very tough, “this is absolutely the case”. But in the 
agricultural sector it is difficult “to keep the farm alive”. In the context of 
labour inspections, farmers are not perceived as employers, as are owners 
in other sectors of the economy. Due to difficult market conditions for agri-
cultural products, farmers have acquired a special status. Within the associ-
ation, the perception and motivation for inspections in agriculture are dif-
ferent from those in the construction industry, for example. In construction, 
Heine wants to “affect something with the controls”, he wants to fight “illegal, 
inhuman and often mafia-like” practices.
Taking over the mandate for the agricultural sector meant an increase of 
the annual quota of inspections without a rise in the number of association 
inspectors. It is therefore necessary to prioritise among the sectors when 
determining where inspections should be carried out. Because there are no 
public reports of illegal employment and few abnormalities have been mon-
itored by inspections, the agricultural sector is not treated as a priority. This 
has a strong impact on the practice of inspections in this sector, as inspec-
tors try to reach the commissioned annual quota as efficiently as possible. 
Chief Inspector Heine explained to me that inspectors pay attention to the 
number of workers in the fields when carrying out in spontaneous checks. 
They tend to perform inspections on fields with many workers, not on fields 
with only a few people working. This practice can be seen in annual statistics: 
in 2016, 156 checks of people were carried out on 25 farms, corresponding to 
an average of 6.2 checks per farm. For smaller farms, a working group of six 
people is a lot. Thus, efficient practice means that the Association primarily 
performs inspections on larger farms. 
When I accompanied an association inspector on his inspection trip in 
the agricultural sector, I noticed right away his obvious strategies to circum-
vent conf licts between personal and professional ethics. The activities he 
carried out while performing inspections scarcely resembled the officially 
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communicated goals. I will discuss these inconsistencies in terms of my the-
oretical approach at the end of the chapter.
Inspection practice in the field
“I imagine how the farmer must answer 
questions from his colleagues in the eve-
ning at the regulars' table”
Association inspector Frank Gubser (name changed) often carries out 
inspections in the agricultural sector. He learned carpentry after school, 
then switched to nursing a few years later, and finally completed an appren-
ticeship as a lumberman. After ten years working on reconstruction projects 
in Latin America, he returned to Switzerland and is now employed by the 
association as an inspector. The work is well suited to his philosophy of life, 
Frank explains. His life expectancy is over 80 years, and his time should be 
filled up usefully with social engagement. In his opinion, too much stress is 
placed on the role of the individual these days. He may not revolutionise the 
labour market with his work, but he can uncover cases of abuse, and thus 
contribute to the improvement of working conditions.
On the day I accompanied him, Gubser brought along two portfolios with 
work permits for farms he wanted to inspect. In one case a young French 
woman is working on a horse farm for a gross wage of 2,200 Swiss Francs per 
month (about the same in US dollars at 2019 exchange rates).6 Frank calls this 
a “bourgeois” case. The employer is abusing the dreams of a young woman 
who loves to work with horses and would do anything for that opportunity. 
The second case is a farm that grows berries. The farmer applied for five 
work permits, a “highly unlikely” number for berry harvesting. Berries are 
extremely labour-intensive and the harvest “cannot be managed with only 
five employees”. In addition to these two cases, Gubser also planned to per-
form a number of spontaneous inspections that day. 
First we visit the berry farm. Inspector Gubser looks at the berry fields 
next to the farmer's house as we driving by. We cannot see anyone working 
6  The NAV stipulates a gross monthly wage of 3,200 Swiss Francs. This is still 1,000 Swiss 
Francs lower than the wage for an unskilled worker in the building industry.
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on these fields. Then, we drive directly to the farm and park in the backyard, 
where the farmer's wife immediately welcomes us. Our identification as asso-
ciation inspectors makes her a little nervous, she explains, because the timing 
of the inspection is extremely unfavourable since there is a lot of work to do. 
Frank asks the woman about the berry fields: how is it possible to harvest the 
berries with only five employees? The woman replies that their customers pick 
the berries themselves. For Gubser, this explanation is satisfactory and the 
two talk about how self-picking can benefit a farmer's operation. Then Frank 
asks where the employees are working at the moment. The woman refers us to 
an older Polish employee who was just driving off in a small van. After brief ly 
consulting with the farmer's wife, he leads us to the “lower field”. Other peo-
ple were also working “up the hill”, but that field was not easily accessible by 
car. After a short drive we arrive with Jacek (name changed) at an asparagus 
field. Five employees are planting new seedlings. The “group leader” calls the 
employees together and explains what the inspection is for. He is the only one 
of the foreign workers to understand some German. All the employees carry 
copies of their passports, which is why the procedure is completed rapidly. All 
the names are recognised by the system and each worker has a short-term 
residence permit. Finally, Gubser asks the group leader about working con-
ditions on the farm. He asks suggestive questions, such as “Did the farmer 
organise an apartment for you on the farm? How many hours do you work per 
week, 52?” and so on. All suggestions are affirmed by the group leader without 
exception. After this control procedure, we talk a little about planting aspara-
gus and the harvest. Then we leave these people and drive on. 
This example shows what Simon Heine indicated in my first conversation: 
It is important to trust the farmers when performing control procedures in 
agricultural sectors. In this example we were deliberately piloted to a specific 
field to question the workers there. Whether the people working on the other 
field “up the hill” all had residence and work permits was not known. Nor 
were the original concerns that led to this farm being inspected followed up, 
even though Frank Gubser is absolutely aware of them. But “complete veri-
fication of a company is just simply impossible in the course of my work”, as 
he told me after this visit. Otherwise, only one operation could be conducted 
in a working day. Thus, the quality of inspections is subordinate to the quan-
tity of inspections conducted per day. This is not surprising. The heavy asso-
ciation workload and performance agreements with the Canton define the 
number of inspections per year. 
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Next, Gubser wants to visit the “bourgeois case”. Again we study the case 
documents. The employment contract for the French woman indeed notes 
a gross wage of CHF 2,200. Frank explains to me that this is a classic case: 
employers often mix up the kind of employment contract that should be 
given to the normal work force with those that apply to au pairs. The inspec-
tor defines “hybrid contracts” of the kinds often given to au pairs as prob-
lematic. They set improper standards in the labour market and therefore 
offer false incentives. When we examine the French woman's employment 
contract more closely, we notice that it had expired two weeks earlier. We 
therefore cancel the farm visit, even though Gubser is disappointed that this 
case “slipped through his fingers”. It is important to “make a mark” in such 
situations, he says, because such cases have barely and consequences for 
the employer, according to the law. The problem is that most employment 
relationships of this kind are not considered abusive by the employees. It is 
remarkable that Frank does not evaluate regular employment contracts in 
the agricultural sector in the same manner, since working hours, wages and 
working conditions in general are significantly worse than in every other sec-
tor. Frank explains that he absolutely lacks the time to perform inspection 
activities satisfactorily in the agricultural sector. This was why the current 
case had been lying on his desk for a long time. Throughout the previous few 
weeks, he had been totally absorbed in a large construction site.
In the afternoon, Gubser shows me the procedure for a spontaneous 
inspection in the fields, what he calls a “field inspection”. We are driving 
on a country road when we see two workers weeding in a field. Frank stops 
the car and explains to them that we are inspectors from the Association 
for Labour Market Inspections. Both workers come from Poland and do not 
speak any German. Since one of them is working his third season on that 
farm, he finally understands what he has to do. He explains what is happen-
ing to his colleague and together we drive to the farmer's house – the two 
Polish workers on the tractor in front and Frank and I following in the car. 
When we arrive at the farm, we are friendly. Although he is a little fright-
ened and scared, the farmer welcomes us. Frank explains that it is only a 
standard check of work permits for his employees and that nothing has hap-
pened. The farmer then calls his wife out of the house. As the farm's business 
manager, she brings the required documents in a ring binder. The inspection 
of the two workers' documents is quickly performed: both have work per-
mits for six months. The farmer tells us that he finds it very important that 
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such checks are performed. Otherwise in the village, many farmers would 
have been employing people illegally. He would never do that, but he might 
be an exception. Many of his colleagues would not care about the law, they 
would just search for cheap labour. This leads to a discussion between the 
inspector and the farmer about the negative effects of illegal employment for 
both employees and employers. Both men have the same opinion about ille-
gal employment, share anecdotes and discuss consequences. After a warm 
goodbye we drive off. 
Back in the car, I ask Frank Gubser about his experiences with “field 
inspections” in the past. Having seen no abnormalities in this control, I ask 
about situations where irregularities were noted. Frank enters a narrative 
mode. His stories are exciting and a motivating aspect of his job. The most 
tragic situation he encountered during his controls was on a small farm with 
a restaurant on the premises. There, a woman from Mongolia had been work-
ing for five years. The woman milked the cows in the morning, then prepared 
meals for the restaurant and did domestic work as well. She was regularly 
raped by the farmer and sometimes even by his son, when he visited. Frank is 
very involved in this story. This situation shows what can happen if a female 
worker is not protected by labour laws, Frank tells me. This leads me to ask 
about the consequences of this shocking story, and about the involvement of 
inspectors in procedures following inspections. Gubser sees this as a prob-
lem. According to formal process, inspectors are completely excluded from 
procedures following inspections and receive no information about them. 
But Frank Gubser has an extensive network of contacts among the institu-
tions that prosecute cases arising from inspections, and can always inform 
himself about cases where he was the in-field inspector. In the case of the 
Mongolian woman, the procedural results were very double-edged, as Frank 
calls it. Because she was in Switzerland illegally, the woman was deported 
despite her tragic story. Here, the limits of his work come very clearly to light. 
Although it is critical that abuses be uncovered, his working relationship 
ends with discovery. Penalties for malefactors are not always satisfactory: 
for the Mongolian woman, this was definitely true.
How Gubser assessed this and other cases leads to the question of what can 
be called a “good inspection activity”. Frank has a clear answer and explains 
it to me in reference to another case. Two years earlier, he wanted to carry out 
checks on two workers in a field. But when he stopped his car and opened the 
door, the two men dropped everything and ran off. He was happy to let them 
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run. The reason was clear to him: they had no work permits and very likely no 
residence permits. He documented the situation by photographing the full 
and empty vegetable crates, tools and other traces of activity. This is import-
ant, he explains, because he needed exhibits for the report. Otherwise, one 
could simply deny that the two men had been working in the field. Although 
it was late, he called the police requesting immediate assistance because the 
two men had f led. He wanted to make a “real spectacle” out of it with “police 
cars, sirens and uniforms”. Frank loved imagining “how the farmer must 
[have] answer[ed] questions by his colleagues in the evening at the regulars' 
table”7 about the incident. Something like that has an effect, Frank thinks. 
The two underprivileged men were not punished because of their illegal sta-
tus. Frank's personal goal was not to detect illegal workers. The aliens law is 
not as important to Frank as working conditions and employers who abuse 
employees. These are what he wants to detect in his work. When telling this 
story, Frank smiles: “This is the ideal situation for me”.
From "unintended consequences" to questions of power 
As we can see, governmental labour inspection practice in my field of 
research is characterised by various inconsistencies. But inconsistency does 
not make a bureaucratic practice dysfunctional. From an administrative 
standpoint, the inspection procedure works well. The proposed number of 
checks can be achieved satisfactorily, the data collected is relevant and can 
be analysed. But this practice does nothing to improve labour conditions in 
the agricultural sector nor to represented them accurately for political and 
public debate. Instead, it supports the interpretation of labour law as “highly 
respected”, and validates the perception that agricultural work carried out 
under regular work contracts is “fair”. This can be explained using Handel-
mans' important analysis of bureaucracy as fundamentally built on cate-
gories (Handelman 2004). Compared with other categories, the category of 
legal working conditions appears to be the best, and “fairest” option. Except 
7  The “regulars' table” (Stammtisch) denote a specific table in a restaurant which is reserved 
for regular guests. Of ten, the table is frequented by dif ferent groups of people during the 
day. In the evening, it is the place to meet friends af ter work. In general, it is a man's place.
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for wages, contract compliance is not the main focus of the inspections, and 
inspection practice is limited to examining residence and work permits.
Labour inspections in the field pursue various interests and goals. Fed-
eral authorities have the overarching goal of combatting informal work, 
because undeclared work contributes to the loss of public funds. At the same 
time, inspections are supposed to be a means of improving labour condi-
tions. This is apparent in Frank's practice in the field and in his understand-
ing of his work. Professional morals and personal morals are almost entirely 
congruent (Fassin 2015). But the goals and interests of various groups also 
shape inspection practice and interpretations of the resulting data. 
The belief that agriculture is a “hard business” is ubiquitous: this interpre-
tation is applied not just to the work of employees, but alto to the practice of 
agriculture itself. Farmers are not seen as employers and managers, because 
they are still highly involved in the labour process. Furthermore, the ongo-
ing transformation of the agricultural sector towards larger, more indus-
trialised farms jeopardises smaller family farms. For these reasons, there 
is widespread acceptance that sanctions should not be existential. A certain 
tolerance should be encouraged even if it is inconsistent with labour law. This 
hegemonic perspective is deeply rooted and contributes to political debates. 
Agriculture has a unique position in the political landscape of Switzer-
land. To ensure food security for the national population, production is 
highly subsidised by the state (Tanner 1992; Moser 2011). As part of the global 
food regime, however, agricultural production endures permanent compe-
tition with imports from low-wage countries (McMichael 2013). Therefore, 
precarious labour conditions are officially acknowledged as a precondition 
for competitive and sustainable national farms. This interpretation also 
inf luences labour's engagement with farm work. None of the powerful 
labour unions is active in the agricultural sector, although the small, spe-
cialised ABLA union negotiates regular working contracts with the farmers' 
association. As I have shown, this union shares the perception that agricul-
ture cannot be compared with other economic sectors. What we thus see is a 
neo-corporatist model of labour union engagement, ref lecting a hegemonic 
view of the place of agricultural work within society and the economy (Jessop 
2015). In this process, no substantive representation exists for unskilled, sea-
sonal employees, most of whom are migrants. 
In a further interpretation of inspection practices formulated by a differ-
ent state actor, an agent from the Office of Migration told me in an interview 
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that labour market inspections can also be used to detect illegal residents. 
Labour inspection practice thus becomes a means of residency control, as it 
identifies people living and working without permits on state territory. But, 
as already shown, association inspectors circumvent this function when it 
conf licts with the individual morality and ideology of professional action. 
Describing these effects as unintended is thus misleading, rather it 
becomes a question of integrating the perspectives and manifold interests 
of various actors. Some inspectors develop strategies to diminish the effects 
of their work that clash with their personal ethics. Nationally, agricultural 
inspection procedure seems to have “unintended” (in terms of unwanted) 
effects regarding the improvement of labour conditions. The Federal Coun-
cil statement on the political initiative to define binding minimum wages 
(cited above) shows that collected data from agricultural labour inspections 
effected just the opposite: it was used to justify non-intervention in the 
labour-law provisions of the agricultural sector.
But this unintended and unwelcome outcome for agricultural workers 
becomes an attractive outcome if we shift perspective. As I have written 
elsewhere, the data collected by the inspection practice is not representa-
tive of the highly hierarchical and ethnicised labour market in the sector 
(Affolter 2013; Bopp and Affolter 2013). Generally, precarious working con-
ditions ensure cheap production. Because of intensive national and interna-
tional price pressure on fresh fruit and vegetable markets, cheap production 
is a precondition for economic success. The farmers integrate workers with 
irregular working contracts into their personnel by engaging (illegalised) 
people in labour intensive phases during the harvest season. But in doing 
this, they pursue the strategy of not letting these people work with those 
employed on regular contracts in the fields. Irregularly engaged workers 
mostly work separated on secluded fields to prevent checks by inspectors or 
the police. This strategy, together with the protectionist agenda of numerous 
political actors, including the farmers' association, is what James C. Scott 
calls the art of not being governed (2009). This is why it is vital to stress who 
it is that reaps the economic benefits of low-wage work when analysing pro-
duction relations in a given sector. Rather than dismissing the effects pre-
sented here as “unintended,” I highlight and analyse the inconsistency of this 
bureaucratic practice. Different ideals of the public good and formal goals of 
bureaucratic practices may converge in such a way that the hierarchy of goals 
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and laws becomes obvious: the goal of decent labour conditions contravenes 
the wider economic goal of protecting the Swiss agricultural sector. 
This leads us back to my original question about intention and bureau-
cratic practice. When the effects of bureaucratic practice do not correspond 
with officially declared goals, we should not immediately assume this is 
unintended. First we need to ask: Who finds the effects unintended? Who 
finds the effects attractive? How does meaning change for different actors? 
What measures are implemented in reaction to the results and why (or why 
not)? Here, the bureaucratic procedure followed by agricultural labour 
inspectors produces statistical data that is used to protect the status quo of 
agricultural production in Switzerland, and to discourage public and politi-
cal interventions to improve labour law in the sector. Better working condi-
tions with higher wages and fewer working hours would challenge the value 
chain of agricultural production. This shows that bureaucratic procedures 
have functional outcomes often determined more by ad hoc assumptions 
and agreements than by written law. Anthropological analysis from the bot-
tom up gives us insights about hegemonies inherent in negotiation processes 
that determine state practices. State tolerance of precarious work (by mainly 
non-citizens) in the agricultural sector does not ref lect bureaucratic inept-
itude, but rather represents prioritisation of economic aspects of national 
agricultural production. This prioritisation of economic interests, in com-
bination with migrant workers' lack of political representation, guarantees 
cheap production costs and contributes to the continuing precariousness of 
these workers' working and living conditions.
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The Economy of Detainability 
Theorizing Migrant Detention
Nicholas De Genova1
The dramatic expansion in recent years of an effectively global deportation 
regime (De Genova and Peutz 2010) – and the accompanying widening pur-
view of deportability for migrants, which has been the effect of diversified 
and intensified forms of “interior” immigration law enforcement – has gen-
erated the conditions of possibility for an analogous expansion of migrant 
detention. In this article, I offer the beginnings of a conception of migrant 
detention in terms of an economy of detainability and the wider disciplinary 
ramifications of this condition of susceptibility to detention as an amalgam 
of the deprivation of liberty, spatial confinement, temporal interruption and 
indeterminacy. Notably, it is not the principal task of this essay to elaborate 
any specific ethnographic or historical example, as such. Rather, the primary 
concerns here are theoretical and critical. It is remarkable that the general 
dynamics that I will sketch here are in no sense confined to the ethnographic 
particulars or socio-historical peculiarities of any specific (nation-)state or 
its legal regime, or the specific ethics or ethos of any particular immigration 
bureaucracy (see, e.g. Welch and Schuster 2005). This fact could arguably be 
taken to suggest that – at least with regard to the detention and deportation 
of illegalized migrants – we have been witnessing a significant harmoni-
zation of how diverse and discrepant immigration bureaucracies and their 
enforcement regimes conceptualize their official roles in superintending the 
1  An earlier and less elaborated version of this article was published online by the Global De-
tention Project as “Detention, Deportation, and Waiting: Toward a Theory of Migrant De-




formal inclusions and exclusions that are taken to demarcate the parameters 
of the best interests of the common weal. With regard to the figure of the ille-
galized migrant (notably including that of the rejected “asylum-seeker”), in 
other words, it seems plausible that there has been an increasing consonance 
across the planet of the ethos of supremely rational, rule-oriented public ser-
vice among immigration bureaucracies as well as their procedural ethics, as 
evinced by the proliferation and generalization of migrant detention and 
deportation. This alone commands ref lection and merits critical scrutiny. 
Rather than presenting a detailed empirical case study or a mass of orig-
inal research findings, therefore, I want to propose some ideas that might 
offer a fresh critical perspective for the purpose of understanding the more 
global phenomenon of migrant detention. Indeed, critical ref lection on 
migrant detention may have something significant to contribute to a more 
rigorous approach to both theory and practice in challenging the injustices 
that confront an ever widening cross-section of migrants, refugees, and oth-
ers categorized as non-citizens within the immigration bureaucracies and 
juridical and law enforcement regimes of (nation-)states around the world. 
Gathering insights from a variety of geographically diverse research in 
numerous disciplines, then, this article is dedicated to formulating concepts 
that may inform how we understand what is at stake in the multifarious con-
frontations between immigration bureaucracies and enforcement agencies 
and those whom they deem to be disposable (detainable or deportable) and 
effectively outside of the common weal to which they presume to dedicate 
their energies. Put somewhat differently, this essay hopes to elucidate some 
of what is at stake when detention becomes a site of migrant struggles.
Deportability / Detainability
One of the defining features of the sociopolitical condition of migrants, 
whatever their precise juridical status within the larger immigration sys-
tem of any given (nation-)state, is the susceptibility to deportation that is 
a virtually universal feature of their non-citizen status. Within any given 
regime of immigration-related conditionalities and contingencies (Goldring 
and Landolt 2013; cf. Chauvin and  Garcés-Mascareñas 2012; Coutin 2003), 
migrants always remain more or less deportable. This is what we may under-
stand to be an “economy” of deportability: even if all non-citizens are poten-
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tially subject to deportation, not everyone is deported, and not everyone is 
subject to deportation to the same degree; there is, in other words, an unequal 
distribution of the various forms of this particular power over non-citizens' 
lives and liberties, as well as the rationalities and techniques or technologies 
deployed in the administration or government of migrants' lives through 
recourse to the means to deport them, or to serve them deportation orders 
(without actually deporting them), or otherwise to refrain from deport-
ing them or mandating their deportation. And yet, even in spite of such an 
uneven distribution of deportation, this condition of deportability – this 
possibility of being deported, of being forcibly expelled from the space where 
migrants are actively engaged in making their lives and livelihoods  – has 
profoundly disciplinary repercussions (De Genova 2002; 2005:213-50; 2010b; 
2014). 
The widening purview of deportation over the last decade or two, on an 
effectively global scale, has been predictably accompanied by a comparable 
expansion of migrant detention. 
In this article, I am indeed focused specifically on migrant detention. 
Nonetheless, from the outset, we must recognize that there is a fundamen-
tal difference between deportability and what I call detainability (De Genova 
2007). Bridget Anderson, Matthew Gibney, and Emanuela Paoletti discuss 
the deportation of “foreigners” as “a membership-defining act” dedicated to 
asserting the value and significance of citizenship, and reinforcing the dis-
tinction between citizens and non-citizens in terms of the citizenry's “(uncon-
ditional) right to residence in the state” (2013:2). Thus, what is ultimately the 
defining condition of migrants' non-citizenship – their deportability, their 
susceptibility to deportation – turns out likewise to be a decisive and defin-
ing predicate, in the negative, of citizenship itself. Non-deportability is vir-
tually universally upheld to be a principle of modern citizenship. However, 
this working understanding of citizenship implies a liberal leap of faith that 
seems to disregard the fullest (illiberal) extent of acts of sovereignty within 
the toolkit of liberal statecraft that have variously served to constitute and 
regulate citizenship. We need only be reminded of various historical exam-
ples of statutes for the denaturalization (and exclusion) of “undesirable” (or 
“enemy”) citizens, which range from the mundane disqualification of women 
from their birthright citizenship for marrying “alien” men (Bredbenner 1998) 
through to the mass de-nationalization an deportation of German citizens – 
Jews, communists, homosexuals, Gypsies, and so on – to Nazi prison labour 
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camps, and finally, to their extermination (Agamben 1995/1998: 126-35, 166-
80). Nonetheless, whereas deportability is indeed conventionally confined to 
non-citizens, detainability – the susceptibility to detention – is a condition 
that widely (and perhaps increasingly) also pertains to citizens. In the con-
text of an escalation over recent years in exceptional police measures under 
the rubric of “security” as well as securitarian law-making, the increasing 
use in many countries of detention (rather than incarceration), particularly 
as a purportedly “preventative” measure, confirms that detainability oper-
ates as a significantly more general mode of governance than deportability. 
Thus, much of what I will argue with specific regard to migrant detention 
and detainability has considerably wider ramifications, and often pertains, 
albeit unevenly, to various categories of citizens as well as non-citizens. The 
unequal distribution of detention and detainability is a graduated and dif-
ferential one that not only sorts and ranks according to the inequalities of 
citizenship status, therefore, but also class inequalities and racialized hier-
archies associated with the ascriptive identities of minoritized communities 
(most notably, Muslim “minorities,” citizen and non-citizen alike, in the con-
text of the so-called War on Terror) (cf. De Genova 2007; Eckert 2014). Here-
after, however, I will be restricting the scope of my discussion more exclu-
sively to the detention and detainability of non-citizens.
Detention has indeed become an ever increasingly significant feature 
of how states govern migration, and consequently, also how they discipline 
migrants. Hence, this essay is interested in developing the idea of an econ-
omy of detainability. Again, this concept of “economy” does not refer in any 
narrow or simple sense to “economics,” conventionally understood, although 
it plainly has implications for how migrants come to be exploited as labor or 
otherwise are subject to specific types of political or juridical inequalities in 
the field of activities that we customarily call “the economy.” Instead, adapt-
ing the Foucauldean conception of an “economy of power,” we are interested 
here in how a wider social field encompassing both “economics” and “politics” 
involves an unequal distribution of rationalities, techniques and technolo-
gies that make migrants subject to detention, and thereby administers and 
governs them through that uneven distribution of their detainability, their 
greater or lesser susceptibility to detention. All may be more or less suscep-
tible to detention, given particular contingencies and circumstances; some 
may be detained while many others are not; many may be detained as a pre-
lude to deportation, while still others may be detained and then released, 
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while remaining subject to the prospect of subsequent detentions; others 
may be detained repeatedly. This is what we may understand by an economy 
of detainability.
Administrative / Punitive
Detention, like deportation, is a term that has no distinguished pedigree in 
the history of political ideas and legal concepts. In striking contrast with cit-
izenship, for instance, which derives from a hallowed history of philosoph-
ical debate and political practice concerned with the proper relationship of 
individuals to the public life of a larger community – and again, very much 
like deportation – detention has no such exalted genealogy. As a figure of law 
making and law enforcement, of course, actual practices and procedures of 
detention will always be found to have a history. But there is something dis-
tinctly nondescript about the term, perfunctory even, which underscores its 
status as a kind of understated, largely unexamined fixture of statecraft. To 
be detained, after all, is suggestive of merely being slowed down (“held up”), 
and is conventionally used in a manner that would suggest that the condi-
tion of being detained arises inadvertently, without having been deliberately 
perpetrated by any active agent. Etymologically, the word's origins would 
indicate a holding back, or a holding away. Hence, detention is figured as 
a condition of being “held” in custody, but commonly in a manner that has 
no strict juridical status, and thus without recourse to the formalities of any 
due process of law: no actual charges leveled, evidence presented, or legal 
“rights” stipulated. 
Notably, like deportation, detention is pervasively institutionalized as 
a merely administrative measure. Without the formal safeguards custom-
arily built into criminal law, the people subjected to these measures find 
themselves within the purview of a juridical regime (immigration law) that 
provides no such protections for its “targets.” And yet, detention in its most 
basic outline involves a coercive deprivation of a person's most elementary 
liberties. Consequently, something that can only be experienced by the 
person subjected to it as a profoundly punitive iniquity is presented as an 
utterly routine and mundane recourse of states “holding” (and eventually, 
disposing of) their ostensibly unwanted, undesirable, unwelcome foreigners 
(Dow 2004; Hall 2012; Hasselberg 2016; Welch 2002). By appearing thus to be 
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something that comes about automatically as a mere effect of a seemingly 
objective condition related to one or another immigration-related “offense,” 
detention (like deportation) comes to appear like an inevitable “fact of life”: 
that is to say, detention tends to be naturalized, and rendered more or less 
unquestionable as a simple and inevitable reality that derives from some sort 
of self-evident “violation” of the law. 
Within the asphyxiating constrictions of such banal language to describe 
what can only be experienced in fact as a rather punitive if not violent depri-
vation of very fundamental freedoms, however, we begin to appreciate that 
with detention – again, very much like deportation – we are in the midst of 
what Hannah Arendt famously designated as “the banality of evil” (1963). As 
is well known, Arendt invoked this notion with regard to the unsettling (and 
terrifying) “normal”-ness of the high-profile Nazi technocrat Adolf Eich-
mann, during his trial for war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people, and 
crimes against humanity (1963/2006:276). While Eichmann was widely con-
sidered to be directly implicated in the perpetration of a truly extraordinary 
evil, in other words, Arendt nevertheless discerned something profoundly 
important about how mundane that evil was when embodied in the non-de-
script personality of Eichmann. The particular banality of Eichmann's evil 
derived from what Arendt deemed to be not only “the essence of totalitar-
ian government” but also “perhaps the nature of every bureaucracy”: the 
dehumanizing reduction of individuals into “functionaries and mere cogs in 
the administrative machinery” (289). It is in this respect that the idea of the 
“banality of evil” is instructive when we confront and seek to challenge such 
otherwise routine “administrative” punishments as detention and deporta-
tion. The bureaucratic rationality that coldly executes such severely punitive 
measures as “standard operating procedure,” and the consequently heart-
less disregard for their veritable cruelty for those whose lives are thereby 
derailed, convert a systemic evil into the simple and banal functionality of a 
presumptively efficient governmental apparatus.
Arguably even more than the onerous punitive power of deportation 
itself, detention may be understood to enact the sovereign power of a state 
upon the lives of migrants in a manner that frequently transmutes their 
deportable status into a de facto legal non-personhood. That is to say, with 
detention, the effectively rightless condition of deportable migrants culmi-
nates in summary (and sometimes indefinite) incarceration on the basis of 
little more than their sheer existential predicament as “undesirable” non-cit-
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izens, usually with little or no recourse to any form of legal remedy or appeal, 
and frequently no semblance to any due process of law whatsoever. Migrants 
subjected to detention, very commonly, are literally “guilty” of nothing other 
than their “unauthorized” (illegalized) status, penalized simply for being 
who and what they are, and not at all for any act of wrong-doing. With deten-
tion, nonetheless, they are subjected to a condition of direct confinement by 
state authorities, often castigated to a station effectively outside the law, and 
thereby rendered veritably rightless – sometimes indefinitely. This propo-
sition should not be understood to be universal or absolute, of course. To 
speak of such a condition – not only outside of the purview and protections 
of criminal law but even beyond the reach of other administrative bodies of 
law, such as immigration law – we are indeed speaking of migrant detention 
in pronouncedly illiberal political contexts, not uncommonly characterized 
by high levels of impunity, and plagued by severe deprivation and outright 
cruelty, including physical abuse and torture. Yet even in putatively liberal 
political contexts, such as the United States, there is no dearth of evidence 
to confirm the rather appallingly high degree of administrative “lawlessness” 
and sheer brutality that prevails in both conventional policing and incarcera-
tion, as well as migrant detention (cf. Burridge et al. 2012; Dow 2004; Garland 
2001; Gilmore 2007; Gottschalk 2006; James 2000; 2007; Price 2015; Simon 
2007; Wacquant 2009). Furthermore, during recent years, in many countries, 
there has also been an alarming conf lation of criminal and immigration 
law – “crimmigration” (Stumpf 2006) – which has aggressively contributed 
to the outright criminalization of various forms of migrant “illegality” and 
the subsumption of immigration-related “offenses” within the purview of 
actual criminal law, prompting new avenues of critical inquiry into the con-
cept of governing migration through crime (Dowling and Inda 2013).
In any case, the indeterminacy that prevails in migrant detention, even 
within relatively liberal juridical regimes, inf licts a subtle and unfathomable 
cruelty upon those detained. For many migrants subjected to detention, con-
sequently, deportation at least represents the comparative relief of knowing 
that the punitive process will end once the expulsion has been accomplished, 
at which point they may then be relatively free to resume some semblance 
of normal life, albeit back “home” in the country from which they previously 
departed. Of course, for some migrants or refugees, deportation only deliv-
ers them back into the hands of authorities in their ostensible “home” coun-
tries, where they may be “detained” or imprisoned anew, and sometimes also 
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subjected to torture (see, e.g. Bhartia 2010; Kanstroom 2012). Likewise, even 
for those deportees who are indeed “free” to resume their lives following their 
coercive return “home,” life is often unviable (see, e.g. Coutin 2010; Kans-
troom 2012; Peutz 2010). Nonetheless, detention – being “held in custody,” in 
contrast to being “sent back” somewhere and presumably released – often 
involves imprisonment aggravated by excruciating uncertainty and indeter-
minacy about any future prospect of release. Little surprise, then, that many 
detainees would prefer to be deported immediately rather than remain stuck 
in detention. In other instances, after having served a prison sentence for a 
conviction for an ordinary criminal offense, migrants (including long-term 
“legal” residents) abruptly discover that – for no other reason than the mere 
fact of their statutory non-citizenship – they must suffer the double punish-
ment of expulsion: upon completion of their prison terms, they are summar-
ily delivered into detention (sometimes indefinite) and informed, frequently 
to their utter shock, that they will be deported as “criminal aliens” (cf. Grif-
fiths 2015; Hasselberg 2016; Kanstroom 2012). In either case, being “detained” 
introduces a panoply of both legal ambiguities and existential uncertainties 
for non-citizens that commonly far exceed and casually dispense with the 
juridical parameters otherwise afforded to ordinary “criminal” citizens who 
have been incarcerated for conventional convictions.
Indistinction / Indeterminacy
Thus, their detention frequently leaves non-citizens at the mercy of the 
caprices of the immediate enforcers of their confinement. Here, we may 
be instructively reminded of Giorgio Agamben's crucial insight that “the 
police” – and we may add here, also prison guards or other similarly imme-
diate enforcers of order within detention facilities – “are not merely an 
administrative function of law enforcement; rather, the police are perhaps 
the place where the proximity and the almost constitutive exchange between 
violence and right that characterizes the figure of the sovereign is shown 
more nakedly and clearly than anywhere else” (1996/2000:103). That is to say, 
in Agamben's account, the sovereign power of the modern (liberal, consti-
tutional, democratic) state significantly derives from the capacity to decide 
upon when there exists a “state of exception” (Agamben 2003), or a “state of 
emergency,” that requires the state to disregard or suspend the law in order 
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to putatively preserve the integrity of the larger political and juridical order 
that relies on the Rule of Law. Thus, there inevitably exists what Agamben 
calls a “zone of indistinction,” which is to say, an area of ambiguity, where 
it is possible to suspend the separation of “right” (the law, as an abstrac-
tion, that appears to delimit the state's exercise of power over its subjects) 
from brute force (the sheer fact of perpetrating violence to enforce relations 
of rule or domination). If this is so, then the police (and the detention or 
prison guards) similarly operate on a continuous everyday basis at the blurry 
intersection where the abstract universality of “the law” routinely becomes 
real only through the immediate, concrete, interpersonal coercive or vio-
lent encounter where “the law” in general is applied, or enacted, in specific 
instances through its enforcement. Thus, the lowest-level enforcers of the law 
must constantly exercise their own discretion and routinely decide on a case-
by-case basis on the “state of exception” between the abstraction of the law 
and the fact of violence that enforces it, in the putative interests of “order” or 
“security.” In this sense, it is not necessary for the state to proclaim a “state of 
emergency” or “martial law” to see that sovereignty is permanently derived 
from the sorts of acts of “law enforcement” that involve the discretionary 
exercise of power (including violent coercion) by the most low-level enforc-
ers of “order.” For these ordinary police and prison or detention authorities, 
the law, in its abstraction and generality, remains largely silent about how 
it must be applied and enforced through greater or lesser acts of violence. 
Such mundane acts of enforcement are largely authorized by the law, and 
yet operate outside of strict purview of the law, and depend on the discretion 
and predilections of those who embody the state's sovereign power in the 
“zone of indistinction” that is everyday life.
 Migrant detention often is imposed as a prelude to eventual deportation, 
although it is also common that actual deportation is not possible for various 
reasons and consequently, detained migrants are repeatedly released after 
periods of more or less prolonged interruption of their ordinary lives. Hence, 
whereas deportation must be situated alongside a variety of other practices 
of expulsion and in this way represents a kind of coercive mobility, or forced 
movement (Walters 2002), detention instead signals a practice of confine-
ment, and therefore coercive immobilization. Notably, detention appears 
within the purview of “human rights” as a rather generic figure of impris-
onment. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.” In this regard, 
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detention and imprisonment are effectively synonymous. Hence, detention 
must be situated within the nexus of diverse forms of captivity and confine-
ment (Foucault 1972-73/2015; 1975/1979; cf. Walters 2004:248). Nonetheless, 
while located within this continuum of coercive confinement, detention 
must be also distinguished from other forms of incarceration. What chief ly 
characterizes detention as such is the extent to which it has been reserved 
as a category for naming precisely those varieties of confinement that are 
intended to be emphatically distinguished from the more customarily 
juridical coordinates of penal imprisonment for criminal offenses. In short, 
detainees are so designated precisely because they are understood to not be 
“prisoners”; detention is so named exactly to the extent that it is conceived to 
be something that is not incarceration. Here, indeed, we may recall Arendt's 
memorable insight into the cruel and revealing irony that common criminals 
in fact had more legal rights and recognition than those “interned” in the 
Nazi concentration camps, or indeed, than those relegated to the status of 
stateless refugees (1951/1968:286). To be a “criminal” is to be subjected to the 
recriminations of the law, and thus to be inscribed within the law and its 
punishments; in contrast, to be a detainee is to be subjected to an “admin-
istrative” apparatus, and as a consequence, to potentially (not always, but 
not uncommonly) be figured as effectively outside of the purview of the law 
altogether.
 Ensnared within the pompous gestures of “national” sovereignty and a 
state's prerogative to enforce its own (bordered) legal order, therefore, the 
detention of non-citizens – a punishment that is activated often for no other 
reason than a person's mere status as an “irregular” non-citizen – under-
scores the more elementary fact that some people's lives are plainly judged 
to be unworthy of justice. More specifically, non-citizens – for no other rea-
son that their pure identity as such – may always be (at least, potentially) 
relegated to a de facto status of juridical non-personhood: hence, the often 
arbitrary and authoritarian character of detention regimes. 
Time / Discipline
The detention power commonly operates outside and beyond the parameters 
of any system of criminal law, and has ordinarily been figured as merely a 
matter of expediency in a state's presumed eventual disposal (deportation) 
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of illegalized or criminalized migrants. To adequately comprehend the pro-
ductivity of this power to detain migrants, we therefore need recourse to 
a concept of detainability: the susceptibility to detention, the possibility of 
being detained (De Genova 2007). Just as deportability is much more about 
the deep consequentiality of the possibility of being deported even if most 
remain un-deported (De Genova 2002; 2005:213-50; 2010b), then, detainabil-
ity (the susceptibility to being detained) – and also actual detentions that do 
not culminate in deportation – serve to discipline migrants' lives through the 
unfathomable interruptions that exacerbate their precarity. Thus, we must 
interrogate the economy of different conditionalities and diverse contin-
gencies (Goldring and Landolt 2013) – within historically specific regimes of 
immigration, asylum, and citizenship – that undergird the various degrees 
by which distinct categories of migrants are subjected to this susceptibility 
to the detention power. Such an economy of detainablility always necessarily 
implies that some non-citizens are more susceptible than others to the puni-
tive recriminations of any given detention regime, and experience their rela-
tive vulnerability to detention (their detainability) unequally, within a nexus 
of different degrees of precarity for those whom it subjects to its power (De 
Genova 2007; see, e.g. Griffiths 2015; Hasselberg 2016).
A non-citizen's susceptibility to detention – her detainability – therefore 
involves a deeply existential predicament that is defined by the grim pros-
pect of being apprehended and coercively removed from the spaces and tem-
poralities of everyday life. In this respect, detention provides an instructive 
example of what Agamben (1995/1998:175) designates “dislocating localiza-
tion”: people are forcibly dislocated form their lives but nonetheless coer-
cively held in a particular place. Plainly, this term could likewise describe 
ordinary imprisonment. For present purposes, it is instructive to underscore 
that spatial confinement and captivity is also an interruption of the detain-
ees' time. Indeed, detention always entails the enforcement of a dire and usu-
ally abrupt separation of an individual non-citizen from all the material and 
practical coordinates of her day-to-day circumstances, the actual life and 
livelihood that she has been engaged in sustaining and cultivating, as well 
as all the immediate and affective human relationships of which these are 
made. Even if the end result is only that migrants are released when actual 
deportation has proven to be unfeasible, the rhythms of their lives and their 
larger life projects are profoundly fractured (sometimes repeatedly) by coer-
cive periods of detention. In this respect, detainability is as much entangled 
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(and sometimes even more so) with a migrant's actual un-deportability as 
with her actionable deportability (the prospect of actual deportation). While 
all of the foregoing is also true of ordinary incarceration, the excruciating 
difference commonly at stake in detention is the deeply ambiguous and 
profoundly punitive dimension of temporal indeterminacy. In The Punitive 
Society, Michel Foucault remarkably examines the profound correspondence 
of “the prison-form of penalty” and the “the wage-form of labor” (1972-
73/2015:261) as “historically twin forms” (71), predicated upon “the introduc-
tion of the quantity of time as measure, and not only as economic measure … 
but also as moral measure” (83), and hence, “the introduction of time into the 
capitalist system of power and into the system of penalty,” whereby “the time 
of life” is “exchanged against power” (72; emphasis in original). In short, the 
prison-form of penalty presupposes a strict quantification of (life-)time – as 
measure – that is, in effect, exchanged according to a rational calculus. In 
striking contrast, detention – and the uncertain prospect of eventual depor-
tation, as well as the uncertain prospect of non-deportation and release, 
shadowed by the prospect of subsequent detention – delivers the detainable 
non-citizen into a quintessentially Kaf kaesque nightmare (cf. Bhartia 2010; 
Cohen 2016; van Houtum 2010). 
Nevertheless, detainability persists as a fundamentally (if diffused) dis-
ciplinary mechanism of social control and domination. Like the ominous 
prospect of deportation, then, the always unpredictable possibility of deten-
tion becomes a defining horizon for many migrants' experience of everyday 
life. This prospective risk of detention, furthermore, enforces a protracted 
condition of vulnerability to the recriminations of the law, and consequently, 
a complex and variegated spectrum of ways in which everyday life becomes 
riddled with precarity, multiple conditionalities, inequality, and uncertainty. 
In this respect, detainability is also a temporal predicament that can render 
one's way of life and one's life projects to be always relatively tentative and 
tenuous (Coutin 2000:27-47). Detainability, like deportability, is therefore 
entangled with a protracted socio-political condition of uncertainty and the 
lived precarity that ensues from the unpredictable hazard of apprehension 
and detention. 
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Hence, the detention power capitalizes on the amorphous temporalities 
of indefinite (possibly perpetual) waiting.2 As Pierre Bourdieu notes:
“Absolute power is the power to make oneself unpredictable and deny other 
people any reasonable anticipation, to place them in total uncertainty…. The 
all-powerful is he who does not wait but who makes others wait…. Waiting 
implies submission…. It follows that the art of ‘taking one's time’ … of making 
people wait … is an integral part of the exercise of power…” (1997/2000:228).
Vexed with precautions and often overshadowed by a diffuse but persistent 
terror – the fear of detection, arrest, detention, and deportation – those who 
are subjected to the prospect of detention are subjected to a banal (pseu-
do-)“administrative” power that in fact conceals a brute authoritarianism. 
This seemingly mundane and merely bureaucratic condition invariably 
reveals its absolutist character by enforcing a condition of indefinite wait-
ing and being made to live with protracted uncertainty – even if it is never 
activated in the form of an actual detention. Yet, these more or less torturous 
conditions of life for those who are compelled by circumstances to make their 
lives beneath the horizon of the possibility of detention have been made ever 
increasingly normal -- “terribly and terrifyingly normal” (to recall Arendt's 
phrase) -- within our modern global detention and deportation regime. 
2  There is a growing literature – primarily ethnographic in character, and with a noteworthy 
prominence of studies concerned with migration – on the phenomenology and socio-po-
litical consequentiality of “waiting”; see Anderson et al. (2013); Andersson (2014a,b); Auye-
ro (2012); Bear (2014); Bredeloup (2012); Coutin (2003; 2005); Crapanzano (1985); Cwerner 
(2001); Grif fiths (2014); Hage (2009); Hall (2012); Hasselberg (2016) Jef frey (2010); Khosravi 
(2009; 2014); Mountz (2011); Mountz et al. (2002); Repak (1995); Schwartz (1974; 1975); Sut-
ton et al. (2011); van Houtum (2010). Likewise, there are important precursors to this incipi-
ent field of inquiry within more theoretically informed Marxian and feminist studies of the 
temporalities of social reproduction; see Adam (2002; 2008); Baraitser (2014); Bryon (2007) 
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